Agricultural development in Iran: evaluation of state planning and policies in relation to agriculture by Rezazadeh, Farhad
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1979
Agricultural development in Iran: evaluation of
state planning and policies in relation to agriculture
Farhad Rezazadeh
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, and the Agricultural Economics
Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rezazadeh, Farhad, "Agricultural development in Iran: evaluation of state planning and policies in relation to agriculture" (1979).
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 7241.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/7241
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the 
most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material 
submitted. 
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction. 
1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating 
adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity. 
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an 
indication that the film inspector noticed either blumd copy because of 
movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete 
copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photo­
graphed the photographer has followed a definite method in "sectioning" 
the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand comer 
of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with 
small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again-beginning 
below the first row and continuing on until complete. 
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by 
xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and 
tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our 
Dissertations Customer Services Department. 
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we 
have filmed the best available copy. 
UniversiW 
Microfilms 
International 
300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 
18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND 
8000166 
REZAZAOEH, FARHAD 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN: EVALUATION 
DF STATE PLANNING AND POLICIES IN RELATION TO 
AGRICULTURE. 
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY,  PH.D. ,  1979 
,COP%. 1979 REZA2ADEH, FARHAD 
Universe 
Microfilms 
irtemational 300 n.zeeb road, ann arbor, mi «sioe 
0 1979 
FARHAD REZAZADEH 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
Universify 
MicrtfSims 
Internationa! 
300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 
Agricultural development in Iran: evaluation of state 
planning and policies in relation to agriculture 
by 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of 
The Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major: Agricultural Economics 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1979 
Copyright Farhad Rezazadeh, 1979. All rights reserved. 
Farhad Rezazadeh 
Approved: 
in Charge of Major Work 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS iv 
LIST OF EQUIVALENTS v 
LIST OF PERSIAN TERMS vi 
MAP OF IRAN: TYPES OF AGRICULTURAL REGIONS vii 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 
Economic Theories of Agricultural Development . 4 
Stage theories 6 
Economic theories of dualism 9 
High return input model . 11 
CHAPTER 2 AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION 22 
Geography and Climate . 22 
Resources 23 
Population 25 
Water and Land Resources 26 
Major Crops . 32 
CHAPTER 3 GOVERNMENT PLANS AND POLICIES 39 
The Economy: An Overview 39 
Government Planning and Programs 47 
The First Plan 50 
The Second Plan 50 
The Third Plan 52 
The Fourth Plan 54 
iii 
Page 
The Fifth Plan 55 
Summary 62 
CHAPTER 4 WHITE REVOLUTION AND THE FARMING STRUCTURE 64 
Land Reform 64 
The Structure of Iranian Agriculture After the 
Land Reform 72 
Supplementary Measures: Farm Organizations 79 
Rural cooperatives 79 
Farm corporations 80 
Agro-busincsses 88 
Production cooperatives 89 
Commercial and traditional farms 91 
Supplementary Measures: Agricultural Credit 91 
Supplementary Measures: Infrastructure 97 
Summary 97 
CHAPTER 5 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 104 
Production of Major Crops 105 
Average Yield for Major Crops • 113 
Agricultural Imports 123 
Per Capita Food and Agricultural Output 129 
The Growth Rate of the Agricultural Sector 129 
Conclusion 134 
CHAPTER 6 PRICE STABILIZATION AND PRICE FLOOR POLICIES 137 
CHAPTER 7 RURAL WELFARE AND SOCIAL SERVICES 163 
iv 
Page 
Distribution of Income 154 
Employment 170 
Health and Education 176 
General Remarks 184 
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 193 
Comprehensive Planning Which is ReIfactive of the People's 
Needs 198 
Preliminary Research and Collection of Data 201 
Production Expansion Strategy ...... ... 202 
Changes in farming structure 202 
Changes in production inputs and technology 203 
Agricultural Pricing, Marketing and Subsidization 206 
Infrastructure . 211 
Irrigation system and water supply 211 
Marketing channels and facilities 213 
Credit and financial institutions 214 
Education 215 
Health and sanitation 220 
Soil conservation and land development 221 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 225 
Books and Articles , = _ = , , , , , r 225 
Persian Newspapers and Periodicals 236 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 238 
V 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACBI Agricultural Cooperative Bank of Iran 
ADBI Agricultural Development Bank of Iran 
CENTO Central Treaty Organization 
PAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(Also known as BIRD or World Bank) 
ILO International Labor Organization 
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PBO Plan and Budget Organization of Iran 
SCI Statistical Center of Iran 
UN United Nations 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization 
USAID United States Agency for Agricultural Development 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
vi 
LIST OF EQUIVALENTS 
Currency 
80 Rials = U.S. $1.00 prior to 1973 
75 Rials = U.S. $1.00 after January 1973 
Calendar 
There is approximately 621 years difference between the Iranian 
and Gregorian calendars. The first day of each year in the Iranian 
calendar is equivalent to March 21 in the Gregorian calendar. Thus, 
the first day of 1350 is equivalent to March 21, 1971. Throughout 
this work all Iranian dates are converted to Gregorian years. 
Metric Measures . 
1 meter = 1.1 yards 
1 kilometer = 5/8 mile 
1 hectare = 2.5 acres 
1 kilogram = 2.5 lb. 
1 metric ton = 2200 lb. 
1 cubic meter (cbm) = 1.31 cubic yards 
vii 
LIST OF PERSIAN TERMS 
Boneh 
Bozorg-Malik 
Deh 
Ghanat 
Khurdeh-Malik 
Khushneshin 
Majlis 
Malik 
Ostan 
Saheb-nasgh 
Shahrestan 
Traditional collective production unit (production 
cooperative) 
Large landlord usually owning more than one village 
or its equivalent 
Iranian village 
Traditional underground conduit and system of 
irrigation 
Medium sized landowner owning less than one village 
or its equivalent 
Landless peasants and squatters 
Iranian parliament 
Landlord 
Regional administrative unit (the province) 
Peasant who has root rights to the land 
Administrative units within the province (the country) 
PLEASE NOTE: 
In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible 
way from the available copy. Problems encountered with this 
document have been identified here with a check mark . 
1. Glossy photographs 
2. Colored illustrations 
3. Photographs with dark background 
"4. Illustrations are poor copy 
Print shows through as there is text on both sides of page 
6. Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages / throughout 
7. Tightly bound copy with print lost in spine 
8. Computer printout pages with indistinct print 
9. Page(s) lacking when material received, and not available 
from school or author 
10. Page(s) seem to be missing in numbering only as text 
follows 
n. Poor carbon copy 
12. Not original copy, several pages with blurred type 
13. Appendix pages are poor copy 
14. Original copy with light type 
15. Curling and wrinkled pages 
16. Other 
UniversîW 
MiadRlms 
International 
300 N, ZEES AD.. ANN ARBOR. Ml 48106 13131 761-4700 
viii 
MAP OF IRAN; TYPES OF AGRICULTURAL REGIONS 
ARDElilL 
^HQRASAN REZAIYEW; BILAN 
ZANJAN 
I CENTRAL 
TEHRA \  KMORASAN , KORDESTAn 
SEMNAN 
HAMADAN 
WSAVEH KERMANSHAH 
Vw X ^^^^OntSTAN 
^lUM 
sou™ AROESTAN 
KHOHASAN 
• .\"\VESfAIIANV 
BAKHTIA 
n 
KHUZESIAf\ 
SHIRAZ^,- ;-
w 
HERMAN 
SISTAN 
\\jlROfT\^) JAHROM 
BANDAR AREAS 
BAIUCHESTAN 
0 50 100 200 300 400 500km 
Legend 
QS!SR bsar.isflss 
Agricultural region boundiries 
NbwIy exploited ireas 
lntpn<»v« r^nipn* 
CSSS 
1 : • 1 Reflions cf scatteied cultivated areii in the Zigrot and 
Centre! Hhorisin 
I North western cereal growing lone 
(\\^\^ ReqIofiJ ofmiroinal cultivited arm around lha desert and 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The post world War II era has witnessed various modem economic 
theories regarding the development of developing countries. One 
common feature of most of these theories is their emphasis on 
industrialization and the consequent neglect of the agriculture. 
Prominant among these are the growth stage theories crowned by the 
Rostowian doctrine of the "leading sector" and its variants. The 
Rostowian concept of development stages is important to the students 
of economic development both because of its influence on the U.S. 
policy toward developing countries and because of its adoption and 
application by the many of the respective governments of these 
countries. Another common feature of economic theories of develop­
ment is their emphasis on the role of the government in the process 
of economic development. Governments of these countries are often 
viewed as modernizers and a viable force in the transformation of 
the society. 
The oil producing countries and especially Iran provide an 
interesting case and test ground for the accuracy of above notions, 
for it is in Iran that we can witness their practical application. 
The large Iranian oil revenues have led many economists to suggest 
that petro-dollars by removing the financial constraints to develop­
ment have opened the door to a new era, the Golden Era, of develop­
ment and progress for Iran. Such notions, despite the warnings by 
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few economists about the emerging "oil for arms" and "oil for food" 
policy, have particularly found prominance after the 1973 OPEC 
agreement and the consequent price increases which substantially 
increased the oil revenues. 
Hence Iran has been singled out as one of the few countries 
which is experiencing rapid economic development by the merit of 
its immense oil revenues and the Shah's White Revolution. The oil 
euphoria has been so overwhelming that some economists have even 
gone as far as putting Iran in par with advanced European countries 
giving credence to the Shah's claims that by the end of the twentieth 
century Iran will be ranked among the top six advanced countries of 
the world both in terms of political and economic strength. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the performance 
and prospects of the agr.cultural sector in Iran. Two particular 
propositions underly the main thesis of this study: (1) the pursuit 
of the economic growth theories with their particular emphasis on 
industrialization has led to the economic anarchy and instability 
of the Iranian economy and the poor performance of the agricultural 
sector; (2) governmenis in developing countries do not necessarily 
play a positive role in the development and the tranformation of the 
society and can often become a deterrent to modernization. 
The study is conducted by examining and analyzing the nature 
of tlie Iranian agriculture and government planning and policies in 
relation to this sector. Chapter 1 provides a brief review and a 
critical analysis of economic theories of development as well as 
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identifying those which were pursued in Iran. Chapter 2 provides 
a background to the Iranian agricultural resources and production. 
Geography and climate, human, land, and water resources, and the major 
crops of the Iranian agriculture are among the topics discussed 
in this chapter. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the Iranian 
economy, its growth and performance, and role of the oil industry 
both in terms of its impact on the GNP as well as government develop­
ment strategies. Also discussed in Chapter 3 are various government 
plans, its allocation of resources among the major sectors, and its 
objectives and priorities within the agricultural sector. 
Chapter 4 examines various government reform measures regarding 
the structure of farming and their objectives and accomplishments. 
Particular attention is given to the Iranian Land Reform (1952-71), 
its impact on landownership, rural population, and the size of farms. 
Other government programs regarding farm organizations, distribution 
of credit, and infrastructure are alsc discussed in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 examines the performance of the agricultural sector. 
Among topics discussed are government production targets and growth 
rates and their actual realization; supply and distribution of 
agricultural inputs and its impact on production; and the increasing 
gap between the domestic supply and demand and the government's 
import policies. 
Chapter 6 attempts to analyze government pricing policies, 
minimum price guaranties and its impact on production, and government 
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purchasing programs and performance of agricultural output. Chapter 
7 examines other general government objectives in the agricultural 
sector and their actual realization. These include distribution of 
income, agricultural services and education, and health and nutrition. 
Chapter 8 provides the concluding remarks as well as exploring 
the future prospects of the rural sector. 
Economic Theories of Agricultural Development 
To a great extent the history of the development of mankind 
has been the history of economic development and much of the societal 
changes and transformations find their roots in such development. 
The early main technical innovations such as crude stone tools, 
then melting of metals, and domestication of grains and farm animals 
led to the increased production above the subsistance level and pro­
vided the basis for settlements in ever larger communities and 
sufficient surplus for some to assume artistic, intellectual, 
secular and non-secular roles. The later developments brought 
about mainly by the Industrial Revolution and the formation of 
nation states led to drastic changes and transformations never 
experienced before. 
Not all nations, however, experienced the same technological 
developments and transformations, while some countries were totally 
untouched by it and remained in a mainly feudal and primitive 
agricultural state, others felt its magnitude and intensity in a 
quite uneven manner. 
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This contradictory and asymmetrical progress of civilization 
through economic development led to the apparent income disparity 
not only among classes within a state, but also among the nation 
states themselves. The rapidly growing population and the pre­
valent starvation and hunger in some countries raised many questions 
as to the ability of the economy of these countries and their primi­
tive agricultural sector to provide sufficient food for the subsis­
tance of the population. This question of survival could not only 
be restricted to the said countries but posed a threat for the 
advanced countries as well. 
The post World War II era marked a significant change in the 
attitude and concern of the developed countries toward the "less 
developed." Various economic theories of development were formulated 
and plans and programs were launched for the economic advancement 
of these countries. In fact the term economic development has 
only become popular since the second World War and was first applied 
to the countries which had recently acquired their ^  jure or ^  facto 
independence from western powers. 
As the new concept of economic development spread among academic 
circles, scholarly attention concentrated on the process of such 
development in the v.'estern countries and the lessons which could be 
drawn from it for the present probler.is. 
The striking contrast discovered was the dominance of the 
non-agricultural sectors in the developed countries and agriculture 
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in the less developed. Based on this observation, the logical 
inference was that developroent requires the rapid industrialization 
or the development of the non-agricultural industries. Hence the 
central emphasis of the early development plans and theories was 
the expansion and growth of the industries, largely ignoring 
agriculture. 
We shall briefly review some of these theories and provide a 
critique of them. The purpose, however, is not to discover the 
"right" theory of development, but to reach a better understanding 
of different approaches to development and to outline those which 
were applied in Iran. 
Stage theories 
Among these theories probably the most influential was 
Rostow's growth stage theory.^ The detailed description and critique 
of this theory seems essential at this point for several reasons: 
(a) Rostow's theories are perhaps the best representation of the 
prevalent development theories during this period; (b) Rostow's 
theories were very influential in the formulation of U.S. foreign 
aid policies as well as the development plans and policies of the 
developing countries; and (c) Rostow's theories appear to be the 
2 
growth strategy followed by the Iranian government. 
The underlying premise in Rostow's theory is that "it is 
possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, 
as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society. 
7 
the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, 
3 
and the age of high mass consumption * 
Rostov provides the following description of the take^cff 
stage: "Take-off is defined as requiring all three of the following 
related conditions: (1) a rise in the rate of productive investment, 
from, say, five percent or less to over 10 percent of national 
income (or net national product); (2) the development of one or more 
substantial manufacturing sectors, with a high rate of growth; 
(3) the existence or quick emergence of a political, social and 
institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expansion 
in the modern sector and the potential external economy effects of 
4 
the take-off and gives growth an on-going character." 
The maturation stage is the following stage whereby the growth 
process is considered as self-sustainable.^ However, Rostow does 
not provide a scientific analysis as to why a society moves from 
one stage to another or more specifically; what are the necessary 
and sufficient preconditions for transition from a traditional 
phase to a take-off stage? He provides a description of take-off, 
but does not discuss the forces which bring about the required 
conditions for it. Nor does he provide a scientific explanation 
or documentation as to why he thinks these conditions as well as 
changes are universal for all countries. His best description of 
the causes is that "the idea spreads not merely that economic 
progress is possible, but that economic progress is a necessary 
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condition for some other purpose, judged to be good: be it national 
dignity, private profit, the general welfare..New types of enter­
prising men come forward—in the private economy, in government, 
or both—willing to mobilize savings and to take risks in pursuit 
of profit or modernization."^ Hence the key emphasis is on the 
"spread of idea" that economic progress is possible as well as 
necessary, leading men and governments to take risk for profit or 
modernization. 
Furthermore, Rostow equates growth with development with 
extensive reliance on statistical growth figures as the indicators 
for development without any regard for how the fruits of this 
growth are percolated down to the masses of people, or effect the 
development and modernization of rural life and the sustenance 
of massive migratory population to the urban centers. He envisages 
similar pattern of growth for all countries. The policy implication 
of this is that in order to develop, all developing countries must 
go through the same growth process as those experienced by the 
developed countries. This can be achieved through foreign aid and 
investment as well as the export of technology and know-how by 
the industrial countries. 
There are several variations of the Rostowian stage theory. 
The modifications and revisions, however, do not alter the essence 
of theory, but rather seek to find ways and means through which the 
development can proceed as prescribed. What shall be done, for 
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instance, if the productive investment falls short of the suggested 
10 percent of national income, or if the institutional framework 
is not suitable for the expansion of the modern sector? Some try 
to incorporate the concept of redistribution of income emphasizing 
7 
growth with redistribution. Others still provide a growth stage 
theory which emphasize agriculture.^ The latter, however, pioneered 
by Perkins and Witt, Mellor and Johnston, Hill and Mosher, brought 
forth the significant role that agricultural development can play 
in the overall development. 
Economic theories of dualism 
In a movement away from "fundamental industrialization" or 
rapid industrialization, the dual economy approach outlined mainly 
in the works of Fei and Ranis and later Jorgenson were developed. 
According to Fei and Ranis, the economies of the developing 
countries are "characterized by the coexistence of two sectors: 
a relatively large and overwhelmingly stagnant subsistance agri­
cultural sector in which institutional forces determine the wage 
rate, and a relatively small but growing commercialized industrial 
9 
sector in which competitive conditions obtain in the input markets." 
In this model the agricultural sector is characterized by four 
elements; (1) disguised unemployment and underemployment; (2) zero 
marginal productivity of labor; (3) an institutionally determined 
wage rate for agricultural labor; and (.4) fixed amount of land. 
Under these conditions and at the early stages of development, the 
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authors assume that a substantial amount of labor can be transferred 
from the subsistance sector to the commercialized industrial sector 
without affecting the agricultural output. In this sense the 
transfer of labor from the subsistance to the nonsubsistance sector 
constitutes an agricultural surplus. Furthermore, additional 
surpluses can be extracted from the subsistance sector as the 
productivity in agriculture increases. 
Jorgenson's model by dropping the assumption of zero marginal 
productivity of labor and institutionally determined wage rate in the 
agricultural sector assumes that the withdrawal of labor from the 
subsistance sector will decrease the agricultural production and 
therefore, create the problem of maintaining the growing urban 
population. Thus the transfer of labor and capital accumulation 
cannot take place without major technological changes in the 
agricultural sector.Of course Jorgenson's model does not account 
for the increases in the population and hence the labor force. 
Although the two models lead to different conclusions, it 
appears that the fundamental question which should be resolved 
is not whether transfer of labor will affect agricultural output, 
but rather how this surplus can be extracted even if assumed 
redundant. Furthermore, both models treat increase in productivity 
in agriculture as having no effect on demand for "resource inputs 
other than labor intensive capital improvements such as land 
reclamation and development. The production of technical change in 
agriculture is itself, however, a relatively capital intensive 
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activity, particularly, when one considers the human investment 
involved.Finally, regardless of whether the requirement is 
change in technology, dampening of population growth, or any other 
changes, it is apparent that its degree of success depends very 
much on the effectiveness of government programs and policies. 
This is a point which we shall return to shortly and discuss in 
more detail. 
High return input model 
High return input model here is referred to the approach 
developed by Theodore W. Schultz. Professor Schultz assumes the 
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peasants in traditional societies as rational and efficient. 
What is lacking is a"body of useful knowledge which has made it 
possible for the advanced countries to produce for their own use 
factors that are technically superior to those employed elsewhere. 
This would imply that in order to transform a traditional agricul­
tural sector into a productive source of economic growth investment 
should be made in areas of research and education to produce new 
technical knowledge. 
Holding Schultz assumptions as valid, the model still "does 
not explain how economic conditions induce the development and 
adaption of an efficient set of technologies for a particular 
14 
society." Furthermore, since generally research and education 
are largely financed by the government, its supply will depend on the 
effectiveness of government development programs and policies. 
12 
This latter point has been taken for granted by many economists. 
While different approaches to development have been suggested, it 
appears that there has been a general consensus regarding the role 
of government. As early as 1943, the economists have stressed that 
15 
the government should play a major role in the growth process. In 
1947 Professor Mendelbaum pointed out: 
"The theory of State initiated and financed expansion of 
demand is by now so undisputed, and there are so many historical 
precedent to confirm it, that more need not be said, at the 
present stage, about this starting point. We assume that this 
method will be chosen whenever the need for industrialization 
is so strongly felt that slow changes and exclusive reliance 
upon private initiative no longer suffice....Even apart from 
the U.S.S.R. there are many instances in the recant history 
of industrialization where the assumption by the State of 
entrepreneurial functions has accelerated the modernization 
of equipment and reduced the disadvantages which formerly 
characterized the position of backward countries. 
A 1970 publication of the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization makes somewhat similar comments : 
"Planning has become an essential and integral part of 
industrial development programs, for market forces by them­
selves, cannot overcome the deepseated structural rigidities 
in the economies of developing countries....Today the need 
for some degree of economic planning is universally recognized. 
It is, of course, an integral part of the economy of the 
Soviet Union and the other centrally planned countries."1? 
This has been emphasized by Rostow, Buchanan, Williams and 
Viner as well as receiving the blessing of the post-Stalin Soviet 
leadership under the title of "Non-Capiltalist Road," and the present 
18 
Chinese leadership. But these references to the state role have 
been made with no consideration of the nature of the government 
itself. The example of Soviet Union is given without considering 
13 
the nature of the state and the prevalent conditions in these 
countries, or whether these governments can duplicate the Soviet 
experience. Thus it appears that the emphasis on the state role 
rests on the presupposition that the state is also capable of 
fulfilling the task. 
All of the above approaches imply one or more of the following: 
1. Development can be achieved through the export of technology. 
2. Development can be achieved through the pursuit of similar 
growth process experienced in the industrial countries. 
3. View governments and the ruling class of developing countries 
as "modernizers" and capable of devising programs and 
policies for the development of the country. 
However, decades of practical experience demonstrates that 
neither technology nor economies of industrial societies can be 
simply transferred to developing countries in such a magnitude 
and ways that will result in drastic and substantial transformation 
and modernization of the country'. Even if we assume this possible, 
we must make a further assumption that the governments of these 
countries, considered as major transferers, can fulfill the task. 
But many limitations to development stem from the exogenous 
variables to development process, namely, the political, cultural, 
and institutional barriers which must be considered. Hence the 
development of agriculture does not only require the knowledge 
of conditions which can cause the increase in output and productivity. 
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but also institutions as well as political and cultural atmosphere 
which are conductive for such a progress. 
This has been recognized by some economists for some time. 
For instance. Professor Earl Heady has pointed out: 
"The knowledge is already at hand, theoretically and practically, 
in explaining the development of agriculture. The variables 
which are important to the process are rather obvious, and 
those which should be manipulated, aside from other restraining 
forces, are intuitively evident....What is less obvious is how 
to overcome the political, cultural, intellectual, and 
similar restraints, largely exogenous to the agricultural 
development process, which prevent 'getting on with the job" 
The mysteries of agricultural development are small 
indeed. More mysterious and complex are the 'outside' policy, 
planning, political, and cultural process which provide 
restraints to appropriate changes in the 'growth variables' 
or policies which relate to agriculture. 
Professors John Brewster and Gunner Myrdal have paid considerable 
attention to the problems of institutional constaints. The result 
of their studies lead to the conclusion that institutional con­
straints represent the major barriers to technical change and agri-
20 
cultural modernization. The realization of institutional constraints 
as development barriers was said to be one of the basic premises 
of the U.S. agricultural development and technical assistance 
programs in the 1950's and early 1960's. Institutional reforms in 
the land tenure, marketing, and credit systems received top priority 
and the Alliance for Progress in Latin America as well as similar 
programs in other parts of the world, including Iran, were launched 
for the same purpose. 
But the land reform programs and similar measures in essence 
must rest on the initial hypothesis that the governments of these 
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countries, largely represented by feudal and semifeudal classes, 
are capable of changing the very institutions that maintain them. 
For instance, in a study of land reform programs under the 
Alliance for Progress, Professor Ernest Feder concludes; 
"The best visible result of the Alliance seems to be the 
enactment of a large number of land reform laws, which have 
become effective instruments not for carrying out large 
scale reforms but for stalling thera;"'^^ 
Similar conclusions were reached by Professor Kusum Nair 
regarding land reform programs in India: 
" — though since 1947, India has enacted perhaps more land 
reform legislation than any other country in the world, 
it has not succeeded in changing in any essentials the power 
pattern, the deep economic disparatias, nor the traditional 
hierarchical nature of intergroup relationships which govern 
the economic life of village society."22 
Similar results were observed in Philippine: 
"In 1903 only 0.8 percent of the population owned 35 percent 
of the total farm area. Fifty years later, a lesser percentage 
of people owned more lands. In 1953, only 0.36 percent owned 
41.5 percent of total farm land.,..As of 1968, there were 
about 10,764 landlords listed by provincial assessors as 
owning from 50 hectares to more than 1,-000 hectares of 
agricultural land....The total area of their landholdings 
could easily come to 3,000,000 hectares or a little below 
50 percent of the total agricultural area of the country 
today."23 
Such efforts in Iran, as it shall be demonstrated later, have 
been noithing more than attempts to consolidate the power position 
of the iruling elite. 
The realization of the significance of exogenous variables 
and the failure of traditional growth theories has led to the 
formulation of dependency theories initiated and propagated by the 
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economists and social scientists of the developing countries 
themselves. A pioneer in this area was Theotonio dos Santos who 
outlined the following requirements for a new development theory: 
"1. The theory of development must analyze the process of 
development in its various historical and concrete 
manifestations. 
2. It must extract, through such a historical analysis, the 
general law of development of the societies it chooses 
to investigate. 
3. In formulating these laws, development theory must take 
into account the internal contradictions of the process, 
abandoning any formalistic attempt to reduce it to a 
unilinear transition from one type of society to another." 
The central thesis of dependency theories is that the government 
and the economic systems of developing countries are dependent upon 
the western powers and capital. But in order to reach a conclusion, 
the dependency theorists must reach a corollary conclusion that 
developing countries are capitalist and engaged in capitalist 
production. Indeed, the dependency theories consider the problem 
of underdevelopment as a consequence of the development of a 
particular form of dependent capitalism: 
"Underdevelopment, far from constituting a state of back­
wardness prior to capitalism, is rather a consequence and a 
particular form of capitalist development known as dependent 
capitalism. The process under consideration...is a case of 
the formation of a certain type of internal structure condi­
tioned by international relationship of dependence."25 
But the study of development of capitalism in various countries 
clearl"' demonstrates that the prerequisite for the development of 
capita] 3m is capital accumulation and circulation as well as 
drastic -ansformation of the agricultural sector, and that without 
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capitalist production in the agricultural sector and application 
of new technology and machinery such transformation is not possible. 
Thus the dependency theories confuse feudal or semifeudal economies 
along with some capitalistic features with a capitalist economy 
and go as far as even suggesting that agricultural production in 
some developing countries is under capitalist production. 
The brief review of the economic theories of development 
above bring to light the greater need for the incorporation and 
consideration of exogenous variables. The attempt was made to 
demonstrate that theories of development which do not consider 
these constraints as the real problems of development cannot be 
used as a guide to development. The purpose here, however, is not 
to reach a consensus on a "right" theory of development or provide 
a set of axioms and taxonomies with several concrete hypotheses. 
As it was mentioned earlier, the traditional theories of growth, 
namely, the Rostowian concept of development, were applied in Iran. 
It is also believed that various institutional as well as political 
and cultural barriers hamper the process of development. It is 
indeed the application of traditional theories and technical 
approache to development along with the presence and significance 
of these external factors which make Iran an interesting case to 
study. This is supplemented by the fact that unlike most other 
developing countries, Iran is in a most advantageous position to 
overcome its problems and establish a progressive modern 
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society. This is largely due to the abundance of its various natural 
resources, large amount of oil revenue, and a relatively small 
population. Hence, if "economic miracles" could happeny Jraji should 
have been the most likely place for it. 
It is also believed that the study of these outside variables— 
agricultural planning and policies, political and cultural factors™-
provide us with a better understanding of some of the real problems 
and restraints to appropriate changes essential for agricultural 
development. 
Thus the intent in the following chapters is to examine the 
nature and magnitude of some of the problems vrtiich impede the process 
of development in agriculture. The central focus will be the 
examination of the process of agricultural development in Iran and 
the evaluation of the government's goals and objectives and their 
realization in relation to agriculture. 
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School; and then Fisher's concept of primary, secondary, and tertiary 
production developed in 1930's. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, History 
of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954) and 
Bert P. Hoselitz, "Theories of Stages of Economic Growth," In 
Theories of Economic Growth, ed. Bert P. Hoselitz (Glencoe, Illinois: 
Free Press, 1960). I have chosen Rostow's theory as a point of 
departure for the reasons explained above. 
2 Although there is some doubt as to whether the Iranian 
Government adhered to any particular growth theory. Professor 
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growth strategy and several variations of it. See Asbjom Lovbroek, 
"State Interventionism, Industrial Growth and Planning in Iran," 
(Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oslo, 1977), p. 3 and Chapter 3. 
3 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth - A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 4. 
I^bid., p. 39. 
"W. W. Rostow, "Take-off Into Self-Sustained Growth," Economic 
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of self-sustained by using the term Take-off into Sustained Growth. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION 
Geography and Climate 
Iran, the fourth largest country in Asia, is comprised of 
approximately 1,648,000 square kilometers (528 thousand square 
miles) boardered on the north by the U.S.S.R,; on the south by the 
Persian Gulf; on the east by Pakistan and Afghanistan; and on the 
west by Turkey and Iraq. The country is divided into 23 provinces 
and territories. 
The Iranian topography is represented by mountainous regions, 
flat farming plains, deep green valleys, and arid deserts. The 
mountainous region is composed of two chains of mountains : The Zangros 
range which stretches from the northwestern part of the country down 
to the south with very high peaks that play a significant role in 
determining the rainfall distribution; and the Alborz range which 
stretches from the northwest to the northeast creating a natural wall 
between the Caspian Sea region and the rest of the country. Part of 
the northern Zagros enjoys a considerable amount of rainfall and 
vegetation whereas the southern region of it is mainly barren. The 
area in the northern part of the Alborz range flanked by the Caspian 
Sea is covered with vegetation and forests. The deserts cover a 
portion of central Iran and the area in central east stretching to 
the south. The Persian Gulf lowlands stretch from the southwest to 
the southeast.^  
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The drainage system of the country is related to the rainfall 
which is mainly determined by the mountain ranges, Thus, in the 
north where there is a high level of precipitation, there are many 
small rivers and mountain streams which flow into the Caspian Sea; 
and in the south and southwest there are relatively smaller numbers 
of rivers which flow into the Persian Gulf. The widest river is the 
Karoun River which is the only navigable river in Iran. It rises 
from the Zagros and flows south through the fertile plains of Khuzestan 
to the Persian Gulf. The longest river is Sefid-Rud which flows 
2 into the Caspian Sea. 
Most of the rainfall occurs in winter and in the northern and 
western regions. The southern and eastern areas receive little 
rainfall and constitute the arid regions covering two-thirds of the 
country. Aside from the northern and western zones which enjoy high 
precipitation, agriculture in most other areas depends on the supply 
of irrigation water. Consequently the supply of irrigation water 
has always been a main factor in determining land use and agricultural 
productivity. 
Resources 
Iran is the second largest oil producing country in the world. 
Its known oil reserves are estimated at 10,3 percent of the total 
known oil reserves of the world. The first oil concession was 
granted to a British subjoct, William D'Arcy in 1901 for a period 
of 60 years. In 1910 an income tax law was established in Iran 
which led the company, wishing to be exempt from taxation, to secure 
a new concession which also extended the length of concession for 
another 32 years. The 1950-53 period witnessed the nationalization 
of the oil industry by the popular government of Dr, Mussadeq. This 
led to the British economic embargo of Iran and the eventual 
overthrow of Mussadeq's government in an August 1953 CIA supported 
coup. A new agreement was signed in 1954 which formed an international 
consortium with Americans (40%), British (40%), Dutch (16%), and 
French (4%) as participant members. Presently, Iran produces 
about 5 million barrels of oil daily and the oil reserves are 
assumed to run out by the end of the century. The 1973-74 increase 
in the price of oil increased the Iranian oil revenues from $5 to $23 
billion. Present oil revenues of Iran is estimated at $22 billion 
per annum. The Iranian oil industry itself presents an interesting 
case to study since the industry, after 50 years of commercial 
production, is still an "enclave industry" and has not played the 
role of a "leading sector" in Iran.^  
Iran is also believed to enjoy one of the largest gas reserves 
in the world. The known reserves of natural gas are estimated to 
constitute about 17 percent of the total known reserves in the 
world. For many years, due to lack of concern and technology, the 
gas was simply burned. Eventually in 1966 an agreement was signed 
with the Soviet Union for the export of gas. Part of the agreement 
was the construction of a gas pipeline from southern oil fields 
to the Soviet border. 
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The abundance of gas ajid oil reserves does not mean, however, 
that there has been a low cost of energy in Iran, In the early 
years, though Iran was one of the largest oil exporting countries 
in the world, due to lack of roads and adequate means of transporta­
tion and storage, most of the gasoline and kerosene oil in northern 
4 
Iran was supplied by the Soviet Union at a lower price. Presently 
the domestic price of a gallon of gasoline is about the same as 
in the U.S. 
There are also large deposits of coal in Iran in various 
parts of the country, but there is only surface mining and the coal 
production is not mechanized. Furthermore, there is the abundance 
of other minerals such as iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, manganese, 
iron oxide, chromite, and gold in Iran but the exploitation of 
these have been relatively minor. The copper deposits are assumed 
to be relatively large and only second to gas and oil in terms of 
importance. Total copper reserves are estimated at one billion 
tons and it is believed that its full exploitation could make Iran 
a major copper producing and exporting country in the world. 
Population 
The population of Iran in 1978 is estimated at 35 million.^  
The rural population is estimated at about 53 percent. The rural 
population lives in approximately 65,000 villages. 
Historically the distribution of population has depended upon 
the supply of water. Consequently, the well watered areas are 
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relatively populated while the desert regions contain a limited 
population. The national average is about 15 people per square 
kilometer- However, this figure is as high as 75 persons per 
square kilometer in well-watered regions and as low as a few in 
the drylands.^  
There has been a rapid increase in the growth rate of the 
population since the second World War. This has been especially 
significant during the past decade. The present population growth 
rate is approximately 3.15 percent annually (see Table 2.1). 
There has been significant migration from the rural to 
urban areas in recent years (see Table 2.2). This has been partially 
due to lack of employment in the agricultural sector and the 
seasonal nature of agricultural production. The slums in the cities 
are full of newly arrived peasants seeking employment. Many of 
these are small peasant producers who must work in off season periods. 
Seasonal unemployment and underemployment are very high and wide­
spread. Considering the share of agriculture in GtîP, the size of 
the labor force engaged in agriculture is very high. In 1971 
agriculture contributed 17.9 percent to the GNP and employed 47.1 
7 percent of the labor force. 
Water and Land Resources 
The average annual rainfall in Iran over the past five years 
is about 300 milimeters. But the level of precipitation varies 
throughout the country (see Table 2,3), Portions of the central 
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Table 2.1. Annual compounded rates.of population growth, 1900^ 1976^  
Period Urban• Rural Total 
1900-26 0,08 0,08 0.08 
1927-34 1,50 1,50 1.50 
1935-40 2.30 1.30 1.50 
1941-56 4,40 1,40 2.20 
1956-70 5.30 1.70 2,90 
1970-76 b n,a. n.a. 3.15 
S^ources: Julian Bharier, Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 28 for 1900-1970; and 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 1976 
(Tehran; Plan Organization, 1977), p. 33 for 1971-1976. 
D^ata not available. 
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Table 2.2, Urban and rural share of population, selected years^  
Year Urban Rural Total 
1901 21,0% 79.0% 100% 
1940 22. Û 78.0 100 
1956 31,0 69.0 100 
1966 39.0 61.0 100 
1972 43.0 57,0 100 
1974 43.8 56.2 100 
1975 44.1 55.9 100 
1977 47.0 53.0 100 
S^ources; Bharair Economic Development in Iran, p. 25 for 
1901-1966 Period; Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 
1972 (Tehran: Bank Markazi, 1973), p. 101 for 1972; Annual Report 
and Balance Sheet, 1975, p. 118 for 1974-75; and Kayhan, August 3, 1978, 
p. 2 for 1977. 
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Table 2,3. Average rainfall in various cities of Iran, 1975^  
Rainfall Rainfall 
City (milimeters) City (milimeters) 
NORTH SOUTH 
Rasht 1700 Ahvaz 342 
Pahlavi 2460 Kerman 180 
Babelsar 969 Bandar Abass 351 
Tabriz 243 Boshahr 331 
Mashhad 286 Behbahan 160 
CENTRAL WEST 
Tehran 220 Kermanshah 529 
Esfahan 172 Hamedan 297 
Yazd 81 Khoramabad 125 
Semnan 125 
EAST 
Shiraz 456 
Zahedan 97 
S^ource: Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook 
of Iran, 1976 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1977), pp. 16-28. 
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and southwestern part of the country hardly see any rain. Most of 
the rainfall occurs in northern and western provinces. 
Due to insufficient rainfall in many parts of the country, 
most of the farming depends on irrigation. Historically this has 
been accomplished through the ancient ghanat system.. The ghanats 
are subterranean tunnels which bring the underground water to the 
surface. They are built by constructing series of shafts with 
decreasing depth and an underground conduit \diich connects them. 
The slope of the conduit is less than the ground surface causing 
the tapped water to be discharged above ground at the point where 
the two slopes meet. The flow of water is continuous and as the 
result a significant portion of the water is wasted. 
The construction of ghanats are very expensive and have 
historically been built by the landlords. This control over the 
supply of water has traditionally given the landlords a greater 
power and influence over the peasantry and production. Presently 
there are about 3500 ghanats (some believed to be 70 kilometers 
q 
long and 500 meters deep) in Iran bringing to surface near 10 
billion cubic meters of water annually and irrigating about 800 
thousand hectares of land (see Table 2.4). 
Another form of irrigation is through water wells. There are 
presently about 15000 wells with an estimated capacity of 10 billion 
cubic meters irrigating near 820 thousand hectares of land. There 
are also various dams which were constructed at an e:gense of $0.8 
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Table 2.4. Irrigated land area, 1972 (million hectares)^  
System of irrigation Amount of land 
Full irrigation 
Wells 0,82 
New canals 0,13 
Traditional canals 0,55 
Subtotal 1.50 
Partial irrigation 
River diversions 1,30 
Ghanats 0,80 
Subtotal 2,10 
TOTM. 3,60 
S^ource: 0. T. W. Price, Toward a Comprehensive Iranian 
Agricultural Policy (Tehran; IBPD,- Agricultural and Rural Development 
Advisory Mission, 1975). 
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billion with the objective of eventually irrigating oyer one nvLllion 
hectares of farming land. Although the government claims that it 
has reached this objective, the amount of land irrigated by the 
large scale as well as the small modern diversion dams does not 
exceed 800 thousand hectares. 
The total irrigated land is about 3.6 million hectares. But 
due to the inefficient system of irrigation and water use, about 
half of the captured water (some 30 billion cubic meters) for 
irrigation is lost in conveyance and operation. 
The total land area in Iran is approximately 165 million 
9 hectares. About half of this are deserts and wasteland. Near 
40 million hectares (41 percent) is potentially arable provided 
that adequate water is available. But due to inadequate water 
supply only 16 million hectares are potentially cultivable--of which 
about 11 million hectares receive sufficient rainfall and the 
remainder is irrigated.Not all of this 16 million hectares, 
however, is cultivated. In 1971 only 8.7 million hectares were 
cultivated.The cultivable lands are mostly in northern regions 
stretching south to Khozestan and Pars provinces. 
Major Crops 
Iranian agriculture consists mainly of crop production. 
The main crops are wheat, barley, and rice (see Table 
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2.5).* These are also important in terms of value, constituting 
12 between 35 to 40 percent of total value of agricultural production-
Wheat is the primary crop and is produced on approximately 50 
percent of the total cropped area. It serves as the staple food, 
mostly bread, and provides about half of the calorie intake of 
the population. 
Barley has a low priority mainly due to its low price value 
and usually the inferior land is allocated for its production. It 
is mainly used for feed purposes. Rice constitutes pi. :f the 
diet of most people particularly in central and northern regions. 
The area under cultivation for rice is relatively insignificant, 
13 but in terms of value it is a very important crop. Other 
cereals such as corn, sorghum and oats are also produced in Iran 
but these are insignificant both in terms of output and land 
utilization. 
Among the "industrial crops" sugar beets, sugar cane, tobacco 
and cotton are the most important items. Most sugar beet production 
takes place in northeastern province of Khorasan on irrigated 
*There is a great deal of discrepancy in the data released by 
the Iranian government. For instance, different government sources 
give as many as eight different figures regarding the output of 
wheat. Some of these are released by the same agency in the same 
year. The figures quoted in Table 2.5 for rice production in 1971 
(877 thousand tons) contradict the data made available to the author 
by the Ministry of Agriculture (597 thousand tons) and the figures 
quoted in the Bank Markazi Iran publication (1050 thousand tons) 
which ironically gives the Ministry of Agriculture as its source. As 
it can be seen there is a discrepancy of 350 thousand tons or near 
50 percent in the data released by the same source. 
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Table 2.5. Agricultural output and cultivated land, 1971 (.thousand 
tons and hectares)& 
Crop Output Cultivated land 
Cereals 
Wheat 3712 5565 
Barley 851 1446 
Rice 877 344 
Industrial crops 
Sugar beets 3772 150 
Sugar cane 578 5 
Tobacco 16 19 
Oilseeds 54 76 
Cotton (upland) 466 307 
Vegetables 
Potatoes 158 b n.a. 
Onions 109 n.a. 
Tomatoes 130 n.a. 
Other vegetables 198 n.a. 
Pulses 102 n.a. 
Tea 38 30 
S^ources: Plan and Budget Organization of Iran,, Statistical Yearbook 
of Iran, 1976 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1977>1, p. 209; and Plan and 
Budget Organization of Iran, Selected Statistics, 1972 (Tehran, Plan 
Organization, 1973), pp. 84-9. 
D^ata not available. 
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land.^  ^ The yield per hectare is very low due to inadequate 
irrigation, inferior production methods, and pest damage. Both 
tobacco and tea are produced in Iran for domestic consumption 
though due to the inferior quality of the Iranian tea some tea is 
imported for the purpose of blending,Tobacco is produced mainly 
in the northern provinces of Western Azarbaijan and Gilan. Tea 
is produced only in Gilan because of its high level of annual 
rainfall. 
The most significant cash crop in Iran is cotton which is 
also the only crop exported in a significant amount.There are 
two types of cotton produced in Iran but over 90 percent of total 
production is the Vesh or upland cotton.Cotton is mainly pro­
duced in the Gorgan plain on large mechanized farms and in rotation 
with wheat. 
There are various types of vegetables grown in Iran. The most 
important of these are potatoes, onions, and tomatoes. Also melons 
and cucumbers are produced in large quantities. In fact, these 
with bread (and sometimes with Iranian cheese similar to feta 
cheese) constitute the main diet of the lower class families. 
There are also variety of fruits and nuts produced in Iran. 
The most important among these are citrus fruits (mostly lime and 
lemon) grown mainly in the northern region by the Caspian Sea and 
the southern province of Pars; apples, grapes, cherries, peaches, 
pomegranates, plums, and figs; and dates which with bread constitute 
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l±e main staple food of people in the Persian Qulf area and afe 
grown in the same region. Dates are also the only fruit which is 
exported in a significant quantity. 
Pulses and oilseeds are grown almost everyvrtiere in Iran. The 
major pulses are chick peas and lentiles. Chick peas constituted 
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over 60 percent of total pulses produced in 1974. Most of the 
oilseeds produced are sunflower seeds. It accounts for over 60 
21 percent of total oilseeds production. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GOVERNfŒNT PLANS AND POLICIES 
The Economy: An Overview 
Over the past decade Iran has experienced a substantially high 
rate of economic growth. Table 3.1 shows the GNP in current and 
constant prices as well as the oil revenues for the 1966-76 period. 
As Table 3.1 illustrates, the annual growth rate in current prices 
has continuously been over 10 percent and has reached as high as 
72 percent in 1974. The growth rate in constant prices which provides 
a more accurate measure has been near or above 10 percent for the 
same period. 
Table 3.1 also indicates that the growth in GNP has been 
accompanied by rapid growth rate in oil revenues. In fact, the 
1965-76 period can be divided into two phases. The first phase 
1965-72 is characterized by substantial rate of growth in both GNP and 
oil revenues in current prices. During this period the annual 
rate of growth in oil revenues was relatively greater than the 
GNP. The second phase, 1973-76 period, is marked by an extremely 
high rate of growth in both GNP and oil revenues in current prices. 
As before, the drastic increases in the GNP is largely due to the 
drastic increases in the oil revenues which was caused by the 1973 
OPEC agreement and the unilateral increase in oil prices. 
As the difference between GNP in current and constant prices 
show, this growth has been accompanied by high rate of inflation. 
In 1966-72 period, a high rate of inflation was relatively lower than the 
succeeding phase. Table 3.2 shows the official cost of living index 
Table 3.1 GNP in Current and Constant 1959 Prices and Oil Revenues 
(1966 - 1976) (Billion Riais 
Year 
GNP 
(current) 
Annual 
rate of 
growth 
(%) 
GNP 
(constant) 
Annual 
rate of 
growth 
(%) 
Oil 
Revenues 
Annual 
rate of 
growth 
(%) 
1966 503.6 10.3 461.8 — 57.3 — 
1967 556.5 10.5 513.8 11.3 67.8 18.3 
1968 629.4 13.1 569.4 10.8 73.0 7.7 
1969 704.2 11.9 621.6 9.2 84.8 16.2 
1970 798.2 13.3 689.7 11.0 98.5 16.2 
1971 962.7 20.6 757.9 9.9 163.6 66.0 
1972 1227.7 32.5 905.8 19.5 201.2 23.0 
1973 1824.7 48.6 1028.9 13.6 298.0 48.0 
1974 3149.6 72.6 1181.0 14.8 1305.0 338.0 
1975 3573.0 13.4 1335.7 13.1 1302.2 - 0.2 
1976 4684.0 31.0 1535.6 15.0 1534.0 17.8 
S^ource: Bank Markazi Iran, National Income of Iran, 1959-71 
(Tehran: Bank Markazi, 1973); Bank Markazi Iran, Annucil Report and 
Balance Sheet, 1968, 1970, 1973, 1976 (Tehran: Bank Markazi, 1968, 
1971, 1974, 1977); Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical 
Yearbook of Iran, 1973, 1976, 1977 (Tehran; Plan Organization, 1974, 
1977, 1978); and Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Selected 
Statistics, 1972 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1973). 
Table 3.2 Cost of Living Index and its Main Components (1969 = 100)^ 
Goods 
and Services 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976^ 
General Index 94.3 95.1 96.6 100.0 101.5 107.1 113.8 126.1 146.5 160.5 187.5 
Food 96.1 96.6 97.6 100.0 100.4 110.1 117.2 127.0 151.3 161.5 181.0 
Clothing 97.8 97.5 97.8 100.0 102.4 105.7 111.5 129.5 145.6 157.2 176.2 
Housing 85.0 87.5 89.1 100.0 104.6 107.6 116.8 137.3 164.1 204.8 262.6 
Household 87.0 87.7 94.2 100.0 102.0 103.1 113.3 144.0 171.3 204.2 221.3 
items 
^Sources: Plari and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 1976 (Tehran: 
Plan Organization, 1977), p. 504. 
^Computed by title author based on data in Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 1977, p. 617. 
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and its main components. While with the Iranian Standards the 1966-69 
period shows a relatively low rate of increase in the general index 
and the increases in 1969-72 period can still be considered as low, 
the 1973-75 is marked by very rapid increases. Prices of some of 
the goods and services like housing and household items have more 
than doubled in a matter of a few years. 
Note that Table 3.2 is based on official data. Unofficially, 
however, Iran has always experienced double digited rate of inflation 
sometimes exceeding 50 percent. Only in early 1978 did the government 
begin to admit some higher rates than those previously announced. 
In February 1978, the Iranian Prime Minister, Jamshid Amuzegar 
announced inflation in excess of 31 percent.^  
As Table 3.1 demonstrates, oil plays a very significant role in 
the Iranian economy and has been the major contributing sector to the 
GNP and its acute growth performance. Table 3.3 shows the absolute 
contribution of oil as well as its relative share in both current 
and, deflated GNP. As it is evident, the share of the oil sector in 
the GNP has continuously risen reaching a high proportion of 44.1 
percent in 1974. Table 3.3 also indicates that this increase has 
only reached its extreme magnitude during the second phase. 
Table 3.4 substantiates the above findings as well as comparing 
the oil sector to three major sectors. The data in Table 3.4 points 
out two major changes: (1) oil as the least important contributing 
sector in 1967 has become the dominant sector claiming as high as 45.8 
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Table 3.3 Value Added in Oil in Current and Constant Prices (1966-1976) 
(Billions of Rials 
Value Value 
GNP added Ratio GNP added Ratio 
Year (current) oil (%) (constant) oil (%) 
1966 503. 6 60. 8 12. 1 461. 8 68. 6 14. ,9 
1967 556. ,5 71. 5 12. ,8 513. 8 80. 8 15. 7 
1968 629. ,4 82. 7 13. 1 567. ,4 92. 4 16. 2 
1969 704. 2 95. 3 13. .5 621. ,6 105. ,4 17. ,0 
1970 798. ,2 144. ,3 14. ,3 689. ,7 121. ,4 17. 6 
1971 962. 7 180. .3 18. ,7 757. 9 142, .1 18, .7 
1972 1227. 7 206. 8 16, .8 905, .8 149, .5 16, .5 
1973 1824, .7 531, .6 29, .1 1028 .9 165, .0 16, .0 
1974 3149, .6 1388, .0 44, .1 1181, .0 166 .8 14, .1 
1975 3573, .0 1311, .7 36 .7 1335 .7 148 .3 11 .0 
1976 4684 .0 1741, .4 37 .2 1535 .6^  160 .o" 10 .4 
"^ Sources: Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Yearbook of 
Iran, 1973, 1976, 1977 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1974, 1977, 1978). 
E^stimated and computed by the author. 
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Table 3.4. Contribution of the main sectors to the GNP (1957-1976)^  
Year Agriculture 
% 
Oil 
% 
Mine & 
Industry 
% 
Services 
% 
1967 23.1 15.5 20.1 38.0 
1968 22.2 15.9 20.7 38.7 
1969 20.9 16.8 21.2 38.6 
1970 20.0 17.5 21.0 39.2 
1971 17.8 22.0 20.6 37.6 
1972 16.3 21.4 20.0 38.7 
1973 12.8 32.2 18.2 34.5 
1974 9.6 45.8 13.9 28.3 
1975 9.3 38.5 17.4 32.1 
1976 9.2 37.1 20.0 31.3 
Source: Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Yearbook of 
Iran, 1977 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1978), p. 559. 
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percent of the GNP in 1974; and (2) agriculture's share of the GNP 
has diminished on sustained basis constituting only 9.2 percent of 
the GNP in 1976. 
The above brief general review of the Iranian economy clearly 
demonstrates that the Iranian economy is an oil-dependent economy and 
that its continued growth has required a sustained growth in the 
oil industry; But what is more important is that the Iranian oil 
industry has not played the role of the leading sector. Unfortunately, 
inquiry into this aspect of the economy and the related government 
policies is beyond the limitations of this study, and we shall only 
examine its impact beared by the agricultural sector. 
The increased oil revenues have removed all financial constraints 
for the development of the country as well as providing Iran an easy 
access to foreign exchange. This provided the Iranian government 
various policy alternatives for the utilization of the oil revenues: 
(1) continue to rely on the oil revenues as a main source of exchange 
for imported goods; (2) encourage the development of other sectors to 
the extent that domestic production at least satisfy domestic demand; 
(3) emphasize the development of other sectors with e^ gort objectives. 
The first alternative has been the policy pursued by the Iranian 
government. As Table 3.5 demonstrates, the imports have assumed 
leviathan proportions, rising from $544 million in 1959 to $12.5 billion 
in 1975. The last two columns in Table 3.5 give the increase in 
non-oil exports and the ratio of non-oil eigorts to imports. This 
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Table 3.5. Ratio of Non-Oil Exports and Total Imports of Goods and 
Services (1959-1976) (Millions of Dollars)^  
Year 
Annual gigwth Non-oil Non-oil exports-
Imports rate (%) exports imports ratio 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
544.2 
688.3 
616.6 
547.6 
513.5 
742.3 
898.4 
963.7 
1.190.3 
1,389.2 
1,542.7 
1,676.6 
2,060.9 
2.570.4 
3,737.1 
6,614.0 
11,696.0 
12,567.0 
26.5 
-10.4 
-11.2 
-  6 . 2  
45.6 
21.0 
7.3 
23.5 
16.7 
11.0 
7.8 
22.9 
27.4 
45.4 
77.0 
76.8 
7.4 
102.7 
111.5 
127.9 
114.7 
128.2 
153.1 
180.8 
157.5 
181.8 
216.9 
244.7 
277.9 
334.6 
439.8 
634.7 
581.5 
592.2 
517.7 
18.9 
16.2 
20.7 
20.9 
25.0 
20.6  
20.1 
16.3 
15.3 
15.6 
15.9 
16.6 
16.2 
17.1 
17.0 
8 .8  
5.1 
4.1 
Sources: Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 
various issues. 
Computed by the author. 
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ratio is indicative of the Iranian non-oil exports' capability to 
finance the imports. According to this data, non-oil exports have 
always paid for a small portion of the import bill. But what is more 
important is that this ratio has drastically decreased over the 1959-76 
period. While during 1959-65 the non-oil exports were capable of 
financing about 20 percent of the imports, the post 1965 period 
experienced a substantial diminish, accelerated after 1973, to a mere 
4.1 percent. 
This policy had had grave consequences for agriculture, one 
dimension of which was the total neglect of this sector accompanied 
by escalating reliance on import of agricultural goods which grew at 
even a higher rate than the annual rate of growth in total imports. 
This aspect of the government policy will be examined in Chapter 5. 
Government Planning and Programs 
One aspect of government policies and state intervention is 
reflected in its development planning first initiated in 1949. By 
1978 five plans were completed, the first two of which were seven 
year plans and the remainder each covered a five year period. Part 
of the oil revenues were assigned to the Plan Organization established 
in 1949 for the purpose of planning and development. Table 3.6 shows 
the amount of planned and actual investment during the first four 
plans. As Table 3.6 shows the total actual investment fell short 
of the total planned investment during the first three plans (data 
Table 3.6. Plan organization public investment under the four 
development plans (1949-1973) (millions of dollars)^  
First plan (1949-55) Second plan (1956-62) 
Sectors Planned % Actual % Planned % Actual 
Agric. 97.13 27.7 13.33 19.6 250.56 21.6 217.24 22.2 
& irrig. 
Trans. 102.75 29.3 20.06 29.5 404.84 34.9 387.50 39.6 
& comm. 
Ind. 70.83 20.2 31.96 47.0 89.32 7.7 92.96 9.5 
& mines 
Regional 
development -- — — — 162.41 14.0 146.78 15.0 
Social 79.96 22.8 2.65 3.9 156.60 13.5 134.06 13.7 
welfare 
& energy 
Msnpow03r — — — —— —— — — — —— —— 
others — -- -- — 95=28 8=3 — — 
Total 350.67 100.0 68.00 100.0 1160.00 100.0 978.53 100.0 
S^ource: Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, 1976 (Tehran: Echo of 
Iran, 1976), p. 311. 
I^ncludes both public and private investment. 
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Third plan (1962-67) 
Planned % Actual % 
Fourtli plan (1968-73) 
Planned % Actual % 
653.33 21.3 630.67 23.1 886.00 8,2 
746.67 24.3 717.33 26.3 1853.30 17.2 
360.00 11.7 228.00 8.4 2773.63 25.5 
93.33 3.1 96.00 3.5 416.71 3.8 
412.00 13.5 409.33 15.0 1105.44 10.2 
553.33 18.0 426.67 15.6 2602.13 23.9 
48.00 1.6 37.33 1.4 24.12 0.2 
189.33 6.2 162.67 6.0 1159.06 10.7 
10.67 0.3 20.00 0.7 33.50 0.3 
3066.66 100.0 2728.00 100.0 10853.90 100.0 
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for actual investment under the fourth plan is not available), 
although some changes in terms of investment allocation between 
different sectors can be observed. But what is more important in 
this study is the identification of priorities and the analysis 
of government objectives as well as the concrete results. Hence the 
rest of this chapter is devoted to a brief review of different plans. 
The First Plan 
The First Plan (1949-55) called for a total of 21 billion Rials 
($656 million) of public expenditure. Seventy percent of plan 
revenues were to be derived from oil revenues and foreign loans. 
The First Plan failed to achieve most of its targets. In fact, only 
20 percent of originally planned government expenditures were 
actually spent. Of this, near 40 percent of government expenditure, or 
29.5 percent of Plan Organization's actual investment were allocated 
to transportation and communication. The actual investment in 
agriculture was $13.3 million or less than 14 percent of the planned 
investment. 
The Second Plan 
The Second Plan (1956-62) , similar to the first was a non-coitpre-
hensive plan in the sense that "it did not mention the private 
sector, nor did it include the total activities of the public sector."^  
The actual investment under the Second Plan was about $978.5 million 
or approximately 84 percent of the total planned investment of $1160 
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million. In the agricultural sector the actual investment was 
$217.24 or 87 percent of the planned investment. At first glance 
those figures point out remarkable achievements, but such notions 
would soon fade away once we consider the government objectives and 
priorities in agriculture and their actual realization. 
First, it should be noted that during the Second Plan, the 
3 
rate of inflation was at approximately 45 percent, which once accounted 
for, would greatly increase the gap between the planned and actual 
investment. 
Second, the consideration of government's choice of priorities 
in agriculture for the allocation of capital and the measures 
undertaken toward the actualization of agricultural development 
goals show that such priorities and policies had had little impact 
on agricultural production or even the realization of the stated 
goals. According to the Second Plan, the government goals were 
raising production, improving and increasing exports, and the develop­
ment of agriculture.^  To accomplish these broad and abstract 
objectives, priorities were given to the construction of large 
showy dams. Two large dams, Karaj and Sefid Rud, were constructed 
at the cost of $150 million (over half of total actual investment 
in agriculture) which according to World Crops "had almost no 
detactable influence on agricultural production."^  But this 
question of priority is only one aspect of the problem. The other 
is that even though the priority was given to the construction of 
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dams, today after fifteen years, the total planned irrigation of 
the surrounding lands have not been accomplished and the Kara] dam 
has been redesigned as a water-supply dam for Tehran.^  
Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the Second 
Plan was its non-planning, void of any economic comprehension and 
analysis. As Professor Looney points out, "from an economic stand­
point, because it was divorced from economic analysis (for example, 
rates of return, cost-benefit analysis), the Second Plan must be 
considered a disaster."^  In 1962 when the Second Plan folded, the 
g 
real GNP per capita was approximately the same as in 1939. 
The Third Plan 
The Third Plan (1962-67) was perhaps the first attempt toward 
a comprehensive planning. Total planned public investment was 
$3066.7 million. The actual investment amounted to $2728 million 
or 89 percent of the planned investment. The investment in agricul­
ture was about $630.7 million or 23 percent of the total actual 
investment. The government's objectives in agriculture were again 
outlined in broad and abstract terms: (1) increasing output to 
support overall growth; (2) improving the level of rural life; and 
9 (3) improving the distribution of income. Increase in production 
with export objectives is no longer explicitly mentioned. 
But the highlight of the Third Plan was the launching of the Shah's 
White Revolution, one of the main components of which was the Iranian 
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Land Reform. All together, the White Revolution is composed of 
Nineteen Principles, some of which were proclaimed during the Fourth 
and Fifth Plans:^  ^
1. The abolition of peasant-landlord tenure system and distri­
bution of land, 
2. Nationalization of all forests. 
3. Sale of shares of government-owned industries to private 
corporations and landlords as a form of payment for the 
distributed lands. 
4. Profit-sharing arrangements in the industries covering up 
to 20 percent of net corporate earnings as an incentive 
to increase labor productivity. 
5. Right to vote for women. 
6. Creation of Literacy Corps from conscripted high school 
graduates. 
7. Creation of Health Corps. 
8. Creation of Development and Agricultural Extension Corps. 
9. Establishment of village courts. 
10. Nationalization of water resources. 
11. Reconstruction and development of the country. 
12. Reforms in areas of education and administration. 
13. Share participation of the public in industrial institutions. 
14. Reform against profiteering and corruption. 
15. Free education. 
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16. Free food for children under two years of age. 
17. Establishment of a social security system. 
18. Establishment of control over land prices. 
19. Establishment of strict financial integrity in public life. 
Many of these principles, especially principles 11-19, did not 
go beyond the stage of proclamation. Of those that were actually 
implemented and fall within the scope of this study were land reform 
(1962-71) and accompanying measures which spread over both Third 
and Fourth Plans. Different aspects of the White Revolution as 
it relates to agriculture will be examined in the following chapters. 
The Fourth Plan 
Table 3.6 shows the planned investment under the Fourth Plan 
(1968-73), but no concrete data regarding the actual investment has 
yet been released by the government. The Fourth Plan marks the 
beginning of a greater neglect of the agricultural sector and increased 
dependency on foreign imports. As Table 3.6 indicates only 8.2 percent 
of total planned investment (includes private sector) was assigned 
to agriculture compared to 21.3 percent under the Third Plan. Again 
the objectives of increased production and exports, distribution 
of income, and improving rural life were outlined for the agricultural 
sector. The growth target in agriculture was set at five percent 
per annum. 
But the actual average annual growth rate in agriculture was 
between 2 to 2.5 percent which was lower than the rate of growth in 
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population for the same period. Net import of agricultural goods 
increased from approximately 1.3 billion Rials at the beginning 
of the Fourth Plan to about 8.5 billion Rials at the end.^  ^ Chapter 
5 will examine the production targets in agriculture and their actual 
realization. 
The Fifth Plan 
The launching of the Fifth Plan (1973-78) coincided with the 
drastic increase in the oil revenues and hence the revision of the 
original plan. Table 3.7 shows the planned distribution of govern­
ment credits during the Fifth Plan. Approximately 45 percent of 
total credits is allocated tc general and military affairs. Credits 
to agriculture and natural resources amounted to 369.44 billion 
Rials, slightly below 6 percent of the total credits, which again 
points out the low priority assigned to this sector. 
Similar to other plans, top priority was given to the growth 
of the GNP, with the oil industry as the major contributing sector 
and a target average annual growth rate of 51.5 percent. (See Table 
3.8.) The planned average annual rate of growth for agriculture 
was set at 7 percent, and once again increasing production, better 
distribution of income, and improvement of rural life are outlined 
as the main objectives. 
Table 3.7. Distribution of government credits for the Fifth Plan (1973-1978) (billions of 
Rials)^  
Sulij ect 
Current credit 
for maintenance 
of operational 
status quo 
(1) 
Development credits 
Fixed 
(2) 
Non-fixed 
(3) 
Total 
(4) = (2 + 3) 
Grand total 
5 = (1 + 4) 
Eccn. affairs (total) 131.85 1911.47 
Agric. & natural resources 72.70 236.85 
Ind. & mines 13.00 414.14 
Trans. & coram. 25.60 400.00 
Oil & gas — 384.14 
Water resources & 5.57 399.24 
electricity 
Others 14.93 77.24 
Social affairs (total) 369.12 556.07 
Education 216.80 128.87 
85.93 
59.89 
6.31 
9.83 
9.90 
384.89 
205.57 
1997.40 
296.74 
420.45 
400.00 
384.00 
409.07 
87.14 
940.96 
334.44 
2129.25 
369.44 
433.45 
425.60 
384.00 
414.64 
102.12 
1310.08 
551.24 
Pub. health, medical 76.63 42.50 117,61 160.11 236.74 
service & nutrition 
Urban development 1.40 45.00 3.60 48.60 50.00 
Rural development 4.60 60.00 1.80 61.80 66.40 
Housing —— 230.00 — 230.00 230.00 
Others 69.69 49.70 56.31 106.01 175.70 
General affairs (total) 402.90 380.56 49.86 430.42 833.32 
Military affairs (total) 1968.70 — — — 1968.70 
GRAND TOTAL 2872.57 2848.10 520.60 3368.78 6241.35 
S^ource: Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Iran's Fifth National Development Plan 
(1973-78, Revised) (Tehran; Plan Organization, 1975). 
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Table 3.8. Fifth Plan's Sectoral Targets, 1973-78 (Billions of Rials, 
1972 Prices)^  
Sectors 1972 1977 
Average annual 
growth rate 
Agriculture 201.1 282.1 7.0 
Oil 216.5 1712.0 51.5 
Industry & Mining 274.4 566.0 18.0 
Services 445.8 953.9 16.4 
Gross Domestic Product 1110.8 3514.0 25.9 
S^ource: Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Iran's Fifth 
National Development Plan (1973-78, Revised) (Tehran: Plan Organization, 
1975). 
\ 
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No concrete data allowing for the analysis of the sectoral 
performance and the actual realization of the government's objectives 
during the Fifth Plan has been released by the government. The 
last available data covers the 1976 period. In fact due to 1977-78 
uprisings and political events in Iran the Plan Organization and 
the Ministry of Agriculture have actually been inoperative for 
a good part of this period. 
However, based onthe available data from various sources, 
some indications regarding the actual performance of the govern­
ment can be envisaged. Table 3.9 shows the planned and actual 
distribution of fixed capital formation under the Fifth Plan. 
The planned figures include both public and private sectors for the 
1973-78 period, but the actual figures are only for the public 
sector over the 1973-76 period. As Table 3.9 clearly demonstrates, 
the total actual fixed capital formation by the public sector 
(1036.4 billion Rials) for the first three years of the Fifth 
Plan is about one-third of the planned 3,118.6 billion Rials. 
In the area of agriculture only 79.9 billion Rials of the planned 
176.9 billion Rials (45 percent) were actually realized. This 
and other data regarding agricultural production for 1973-76 period 
(see Chapter 5) indicate that the target average annual growth 
rate of 7 percent for agriculture, as well as other sectors, could 
not be met during the Fifth Plan. 
Table 3.9. Fifth Plan's planned and actual distribution of fixed capital formation (1973-78) 
(billions of Rials)^  
Planned (1973-78) 
Subject 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector Total 
Actual (1973-76) 
Public sector 
Public affairs (total) 
Social affairs (total) 
Education 
Health 
Urban development 
Rural development 
Housing 
Social welfare 
Others 
Economic affairs (total) 
380.6 
591.5 
120,8 
42.0 
73.5 
60,0 
240.0 
9.0 
40.2 
2146.5 
694.9 
4.8 
3.7 
685.0 
1.4 
885.4 
380.6 
1286.4 
131.6 
45.7 
73.5 
60. 0 
925.0 
9.0 
41.6 
3031.9 
8.1 
27.4 
2.8 
1.0 
1.6 
1.3 
19.7 
0.2 
0.9 
64.5 
162.5 
228.5 
55.3 
12.5 
24.9 
14.8 
101.7 
1.9 
17.4 
645.4 
Agric. & natural resources 176.9 132.4 
Water & electricity 472.7 4.0 
Industry & mines 338.9 507.5 
Oil & gas 656.0 135.3 
Transportation 402.2 90.0 
Others 99.8 16.2 
TOTAL 3118.6 1580.3 
S^ources: Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, 
(1973-78, Revised) (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1975) 
and Balance Sheet, various issues. 
309.3 
466.7 
846.4 
791.3 
492.2 
116.0 
4698.9 
6 . 6  
10.0 
18.0 
16.8 
10.5 
2.5 
100.0 
79.9 
121.4 
207.7 
79.1 
118.8 
38.5 
1036.4 
Iran's Fifth National Development Plan 
and Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Reports 
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Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the Iranian economy 
as well as a brief review of the Iranian government's planning and 
policies. It has been demonstrated that over the past decade the 
Iranian economy has experienced a very high rate of growth, largely 
due to the oil industry, accompanied by continuous neglect and 
diminishing importance of the agricultural sector and a greater 
reliance on the import of agricultural products. Such results in 
agriculture are the reflection of government plans and policies 
concerning agriculture and its choice of priorities not only within 
different sectors but also among different development alternatives 
and opportunities within agriculture. Chapters 4 and 7 will 
examine the specifics of government plans, programs, and policies 
as they relate to agriculture. 
63 
FOOTNOTES 
Rastakhiz, Feb. 6, 1978, p. 21, By June 1978 the government was 
claiming that it had reduced inflation to 17.8 percent. See Rastakhiz, 
March 4, 1978, p. 4 and June 7, 1978, pp. 1^ 2. 
2 Robert E. Looney, Iran at the End of the Century (Lexington, Mass.; 
D.C. Heath and Company, 1977), p. 45. 
3 
Julian Bharier, Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970 (London; 
Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 94. 
4 Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Planning in Iran (Tehran: 
Plan Organization, 1970), p. 8. 
M^ichael Field, "Agro-business and Agricultural Planning in Iran," 
World Crops 24(March-April 1972):68. See also George Baldwin, 
Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins Press, 
1967), p. 82. 
B^aldwin, Ibid. 
L^ooney, op. cit., p. 48. 
g 
Oddvan Aresvik, The Agricultural Development of Iran (New York; 
Praeger, 1976), p. 20. 
9 
Baldwin, op. cit., p. 76. 
^^ Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The White Revolution (Tehran: Imperial 
Pahlavi Library, 1967); Kayhan International, August 9, 1975, p. 1 
and Dec. 20, 1975, p. 1; and Rastakhiz, August 17, 1977, p. 1. 
^^ Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran; An Economic Profile (Washington, D.C.; 
The Middle East Institute, 1977), p. 165. 
64 
CHAPTER 4 
WHITE REVOLUTION AND THE FARMING STRUCTURE 
Land Reform 
Prior to land reform in 1962, the Iranian agricultural system 
was controlled through the vertical landlord-tenant relationship 
pattern. Table 4.1 shows the categories of land ownership in 1960. 
Table 4.1. Categories of land ownership, 1960^ ' ^  
Proprietors No. of villages 
Total area 
(hectares) 
000 
Percent 
State land s crown 
estates 
Endowed land owned by 
religious institutions 
Large private estates 
Peasant ownership 
Total 
2500 
7500 
32500 
7500 
50000 
800 
2400 
10400 
2400 
16000 
15 
65 
15 
100 
S^ource: Bahman Niruiaand, Iran; The New Imperialism in Action 
(New York; Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 126. • 
N^ote: Estimates of number of villages ranged from 40 to 55 
thousand. Iran Almanac of 1955 classifies only 39,295 villages; 
According to its classification, number of whole villages omed by the 
crown and state are 2,947 and endowed villages 713. Iran Almanac and 
Book of Facts (Tehran: Echo, 1965), p. 520. 
As Table 4.1 indicates 65 percent of land was owned by large landlords 
as compared to 15 percent owned by small proprietors. 
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At the time of the land reform the rural population constituted 
nearly 85 percent of the total population inhabiting about 50 thousand 
villages. This population could be divided into two classes; land 
owning and landless whose characteristics are outlined below.^  
1. Landless class 
a) Peasants with contracts. Crop-sharing 
peasants who were handed a plot of land based on a verbal 
or written contract fora specified or unspecified period 
of time. The division of output was based on the owner­
ship of five "factors of production:" land, labor, 
water, seed, and implements. Sincethe majority of these 
peasants could provide only labor, their share of crop 
usually amounted to one-fifth of the total output. 
Only an estimated 10 percent of the peasants could 
provide seed or implements or owned their own oxen. 
b) Peasants without contracts. Non-tenant 
peasants who constituted nearly 40 percent of rural 
population. They were paid in cash or kind and could be 
dismissed at will. An estimated 15 percent of the 
agricultural manpower were squatters who were only employed 
during certain seasons. 
2. Landowning class 
a) Large landlords (Bozorg-Malik). These were large feudal 
landlords who owned from one fertile village up to 100 
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villages. Almost all of them were absentee landlords, 
mostly living in Tehran, and holding high government 
positions or seats in the Iranian Parliament (Majlis). 
The private estates of the Shah himself amounted to 
812 whole villages, 443 of which were in the province 
of Mazandaran. 
b) Medium landlords (Khurdeh-Malik). They owned part of a 
village or fragments of different villages. Most of 
them lived in cities and worked their farms through 
local supervisors. 
c) Small proprietors. They owned about 15 percent of the 
land and could be further classified into poor and well-to-
do peasants. The well-to-do peasants constituted a 
sizable portion of this category (224,000 or about 12 
percent). They owned between 10 to 12 hectars of land, 
an average of 11.8 heads of cattle and some draft animals 
and implements.~ Some poor peasants lacked livestock, 
draft animals or implements. Due to the high cost of 
irrigation and ghanat construction and maintenance, the 
small proprietors were mainly non-existent in areas where 
water was in short supply and most of them were concentrated 
in the province of Gilan or the fringes of Karun River in 
Khuzestan, 
The land reform was launched in 1962, It stated the following 
as its main goals: (1) destroy feudalism by breaking large landholdings; 
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(2) create a better distribution of income and improve the standards 
of living; (3) increase agricultural production and the peasants' 
_ . 3 per capita income. 
Tlie first stage of Icmd reform provided for the sale of land 
owned by large absentee landlords to the peasants. Each owner was 
given the privilege of retaining one village of his choice and 
selling the rest to the government. The payment to the landlord was 
to take place over a 15 year period at 6 percent interest. The 
lands were then sold to the peasants based on a 15 year installment 
plan at slightly over 10 percent interest and administration cost. 
Since this law applied only to individuals, nrast landlords 
avoided distribution by transferring the title of their villages to 
their children or relatives. Despite such loopholes, an estimated 
13 to 15 thousand villages, but of inferior lands, and some 700 
4 thousand families were affected. The land was allocated to sitting 
farmer-tenants in such a way as to preserve the existing cultivation 
pattern and field layout of villages and joining newly established 
5 
cooperatives was made mandatory for those who had received land. 
Despite the minute accomplishments, signs of optimism or perhaps 
justification ran very high. On Farmers' Day the Shah promised 
between 20 to 30 hectares of land to each farmer and claimed that 
Iran had gone "farther than some socialist countries like Sweden and 
Norway. 
The second stage of reform was initiated in 1954 which provided 
7 the landlords five different alternatives: 
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1. Rent the land to the peasants on the basis of the average 
net income of the past three years for a period of 30 years 
subject to five year revisions. 
2. Sell the land to the peasants, retaining a section equal to 
the share of the crop formerly received by the landlord. 
3. Sell the land to the peasants at a mutually agreed price. 
4. By mutual agreement set up a joint stock company with the 
peasants, with the landlord 's share in the company to be 
equal to his former share of the crop. 
5. Sell his share to the government to be resold to the peasants 
on terms equal to those of the first stage. 
This stage which was even more conservative than the first 
stage did not aim at the distribution of land, but rather intended 
to maintain the existing situation. Alternatives 2 and 4 were 
based on previous cropsharing relationships which the government 
itself had declared feudal. The second ïstage, as Professor Keddi 
noted, appeared to be: 
"...a regularization of the existing situation than any profound 
reform. Particularly where leases revisable every five years 
aire chosen, the landlord loses nothing and gains a government 
enforced lease, while in the other alternatives (except no. 5) 
tlie peasant may lose as much as he gains."8 
69 
In 1967 at the end of the second stage, the government 
claimed that over 2.5 million families were affected* by it, but only 
3,202 landlords chose to sell their land whereas 232 thousand of 
them decided upon leasing their lands (see Table 4.2). In fact, only 
"10 percent of families had received all or part of the land which 
9 they farmed." 
Table 4.2. Distribution of options under the second stage of land 
reforrfl^ ' ^  
No. of No. of % of 
Second stage options landlords families families 
Leased land 
a) Endowed lands 9,521° 173,104 10.6 
b) Private lands 232,366 1,243.961 76.3 
Sale to tenants 3,202 55,953 3.4 
Division on crop-share basis 25,359 157,598 9.7 
Total^  270,448 1,630,616 100.0 
S^ource: Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Year­
book of Iran, 1973 (Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization, 1974), p. 298. 
N^ote: Some tenants sold their root rights to the landlords and 
became agricultural workers. 
These are number of properties since endowed lands were owned by 
religious institution and not individual landlords. 
-J Computed by the author. 
*The term "affected" is very ambiguous. No concrete data about 
how all of these 2.5 million families were affected is given. Apparently, 
793,871 landlords who worked their own lands are included in this figure. 
Approximately 2083 villages were classified as orchards and 1225 as 
mechanized. These were exempted from distribution. But since exemption 
could also mean the application of the law, the owners of these lands 
could have been presumed affected by the law. 
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Realizing its failure, the third stage of reform 1967-71 was 
launched which reduced the above alternatives to selling or division, 
but the government has not released any concrete data regarding the 
third stage.One important aspect of this stage of reform was 
the emphasis on mechanization and the creation of farm corporations 
and cooperatives for the consolidation of the fragmented landholdings. 
The land reform proclaimed completed in 1971, exempted various 
areas from the reform. These included mechanized farms (1225 units), 
orchards (2083 villages) and villages of those landlords which had 
no sharecroppers.^  ^ Furthermore, although some tribal leaders who 
owned vast amounts of land were affected by the reform, the program 
by and large made no provisions for the pastoralists. 
Secondly, land reform in the most part distributed land to those 
peasants who were tenants with root rights. Most of the poor 
peasants received no land and continued to work as agricultural 
laborers or migrated to the urban centers to begin a new life as 
unskilled workers. As Professor Keddi notedt 
"The landless laborers and tenants who owned no tools of 
production, and who made up 40-50% of the village population, 
by and large got no land, and have been continuing their 
migration to the cities, where their position often remains 
marginal... ."12 
It should be noted that landless peasants or Khoshneshins had 
no root rights called nasgh, and land reform could not be applied to 
them. But some of these lived on landlord's land and had residence 
or space right. The landlord hired them on daily basis whenever 
needed, but could not evict them without buying their space right 
(their huts). Land reform led to the eviction of these peasants and 
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hastened their migration to the cities. Furthermore, the second 
stage allowed for the sale of root rights by the tenant peasants to the 
landlord. Once the root right was sold, the tenant could not 
receive land and became agricultural laborers. There were 13,374 
tenant farmers (saheb-nasgh) that sold their root rights. This 
figure is not shown in Table 4.2. 
Thirdly, land reform did not drastically change the previous 
power relationship in the village since it did not; (1) aim at 
complete distribution of vast amounts of land owned by large landlords; 
and (2) based the leasing of land and later its division on the 
traditional sharecropping order. As Professor Khamsi pointed out, 
the government faced two major alternatives: 
"The first, which would have served the interest of the 
peasantry, was to nationalize all landed property, or, somewhat 
less drastically, to hand over all large estates to the 
cultivators, with minimal compensation payments to landowners. 
Capitalist farming would then have unfolded on this basis. 
Since such a reform would have swept aside all the remnants 
of the feudal past, the growth of agricultural production would 
have probably been much more rapid in the long run. The 
second was to make concessions to the land hunger of peasantry 
without really reducing the power of large landowners; 
to prepare the way for capitalist farming without totally 
uprooting the vestiges of feudalism. Not surprisingly, this 
was the path which the regime, after some wavering, chose to 
follow."13 
Furthermore, where the power of large landlords was reduced, 
the reform by the merits of its land distribution and in 
the absence of an adequate credit system, allowed a small class 
of wealthy middlemen to fill the vacuum left by the large 
absentee landlords and take their place as village's 
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major money lenders.Presently, these prosperous proprietors 
along with various government agents and reform bureaucrats control 
most of the socio-economic activities of the village. One could 
conclude that the government now has a much stronger foothold in 
the rural areas and this may have been one of the primary political 
motivations for land reform. 
Fourthly, land reform did not greatly affect the distribution 
of income and living standards of the majority of rural population. 
The traditional disparities remained and "no redistribution or 
levelling of the existing disparities between different classes of 
peasants took place.This we shall discuss in detail in Chapter 
7. 
Finally, lands were distributed without any cadastral surveys. 
In most villages, documents and diagrams of land ownership layouts 
were non-existent. Each ownership was defined in terms of adjoining 
lands and natural signs such as trees or rocks. At he outset of 
reform it was felt that no cadastral surveys were necessary. Later 
problems and confusions brought about a promise by the government 
to undertake such surveys, a promise which still remains to be 
fulfilled. 
The Structure of Iranian Agriculture 
After the Land Reform 
The structure of Iranian agriculture before and after land 
reform are shown in Tables 4.3 and 4,4. 
Table 4.3. Structure of Iranian Agriculture Before Land Reform (1960)^' ^ 
Categories of No. of 
exploiters and rural families Rural population Farm area Percent of 
land ownership (1000) (1000) (1000 hectares) farm acres 
Large 
Over 100 hectares 6.81 40.06 991 8.7 
Medium 
50 to under 100 15.07 94.27 564 5.0 
10 to under 50 338.46 1,941.65 5,263 46.4 
Subtotal 360.34 2,075.98 6,818 60.1 
Small 
5 to under 10 352.64 1,859.54 2,413 21.2 
3 to under 5 272.50 1,412.85 
2,185.80 
1 to under 3 468.67 2,333.33 > 2,125 18.7 
under 1 480.02 
Subtotal 1,573.83 7,791.52 4,538 39.9 
Without land 1,284.30 5,563.35 
Total 3,218.46 15,430.83 11,356 100.0 
••'•Sources; Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, various issues; and Kenneth Piatt, Land Reform in 
Iran (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1970), p. 13a. 
^Note: All figures are rounded. No farm area data regarding the specific categories under 5 
hectares are availaljle. However, total area of farms below 5 hectares was estimated at 2,125 thou­
sand hectares or 18.7 percent of total farm areas. All of the figures in Table 4.4 are computed 
by the author based on fragmented data given in sources below. 
Table 4.4. Structure of Iranian Agriculture After Land Reform (1972)& 
Share of 
Categories of 
exploiters & 
farm size 
Families 
or farms 
(1000) Percent 
Rural 
population 
(1000) Percent 
Farm acres 
(1000 ha) Percent 
gross 
output 
percent 
Share of 
marked 
output 
Large 
over 100 hectares 7 — 36 — 1,810 12 
' 1  
Medium 77 
51 - 100 10 — 52 — 700 3 J 
11 - 50 394 16 2,048 12 7,030 46 J 
Subtotal 411 16 2,136 12 9,540 62 
Small 
6 - 1 0  434 17 2,257 13 3,180 21^  
w
 1 Ul
 
545 22 2,834 16 1,810 
41 19 1 - 2  342 13 1,778 10 490 3 
under 1 801 32 4,165 23 300 2-J 
Subtotal 2,122 84 11,034 62 5,780 38 
Pastoralists 100 — — 600 3 — — 
— 1 
17 4 
Without land 790 — 4,119 23 — 
— J 
Total 3,423 100 17,889 100 15,330 100 100 100 
Source; O. T., W. Price, Toward a Comprehensive Iranian Agricultural Policy (Tehran: 
Agricultural and Rural Development Advisory Mission, 1975). 
IBRD, 
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Comparison of the two tables leads to the following observations; 
1. There has been no significant change in total area held by 
relatively small number of families. For farms over 100 
hectares, in 1960 only 6.81 thousand families held 8.7 
percent of total farm area, whereas this has increased 
to 7,000 and 12 percent respectively. In 1960 the average 
size of farm per family within this category was 145 hectares, 
but this increased to 258 hectares in 1972. No significant 
change has occurred with respect to medium size farms. 
2. There has been a greater fragmentation of land. In 1960, 
18.7 percent of total farm areas were composed of farms 
below five hectares owned by approximately 1.22 million 
families, whereas in 1972 farms below six hectares constituted 
17 percent and were owned by 1.69 million families. This 
has been especially significant with respect to farms 
below one hectar where the number of families owning this 
size of land increased from 480 to 801 thousands. 
3. There has been a significant reduction in the number of 
families classified as landless peasants. Since the landless 
peasants did not receive any land, this change gives some 
indication as to the magnitude of the migration to urban 
centers whithin this class of rural population. 
4. There were approximately 600 thousand more families with 
land in 1972 than in 1960 (1.93 million • in 1960, 2,53 
•million in 1972). 
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Table 4.4 illustrates the present structure of the Iranian 
agriculture. It indicates that a great majority of farms in Iran 
are small farms below eleven hectares. The following classification 
can be derived from data in Table 4.4: 84 percent of farms are 
below 11 hectares; 67 percent below six hectares; 45 percent under 
two hectares; and 32 percent less than one hectare. It is evident 
that the majority of these farms are not large enough to provide 
for sufficient output for the maintenance of families farming 
them. Consequently, a large number of these farmers must work in 
the cities during off-season periods. The comparison of share of 
gross and marketed farm output by small farms indicates that while 
41 percent of gross output is produced in small farms, only 19 percent 
of the total marketed output is provided by them. Moreover, farms above 
six hectares account for a sizable portion of this marketed output. This 
clearly shows the subsistence nature of agricultural production on 
small farms and that production is mainly for own consumption and 
not cash sales. 
Furthermore, v/hile the large farms comprise 12 percent of the total 
farm land, they only provide six percent of the gross output. In fact, 
medium sized farms are the main source of domestic food supply to 
the urban centers and provide over 70 percent of the marketed 
output. 
The subsistence nature of agricultural production in small farms 
becomes even more evident when the following characteristics are 
also considered. 
1. Aside from being small, the small farms are usually frag­
mented into several smaller plots. Farms below 10 or even 
a few hectares are frequently divided into smaller plots 
separated from one another. 
2. Fragmentation of small farms makes efficient irrigation 
and application of machinery expensive and difficult. 
3. Only a limited portion of small farms are irrigated. Among 
the small farms, the total irrigated lands do not exceed 25 
percent of the total farm land and in many cases the 
irrigation is only partial irrigation. 
4. For this class of farms ghanats and springs are the main 
source of water supply. Since the flow of water is continuous 
there is a considerable amount of water wasted (see Chapter 2). 
Furthermore, due to the installation of deep wells and poor 
maintenance, the level of water has continuously dropped. 
The peasants accuse the landlords who traditionally 
maintained the ghanats, for negligence and poor maintenance. 
According to government sources, 25 percent of ghanats, 
10 percent of hand made wells, and 8 percent of springs have 
17 gone dry. 
Indeed, it is estimated that about "80 percent of the nations 
farm families are engaged in traditional agriculture at a subsis-
18 tence or semisubsistence level." Productivity is far below 
potential and farms too small to provide surplus beyond family 
consumption. Table 4.5 shows the approximate size of the farm 
necessary for a target income of $500 per person. 
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Table 4.5. Approximate size of farms required to meet a target income 
of $500 per person^ ' ^  
Present practices Improved practices 
Type of farm (hectares) (hectares) 
Dryland cereal farm 70.0 40.0 
Partly irrigated field-crop farm"^  9.0 5.0 
Intensively irrigated field-crop 5.0 3.30 
farm*^  
Rice farm 2.5 1.50 
Orchard 0.6 0.35 
S^ource: 0. T. W. Price, Toward a Comprehensive Iranian 
Agricultural Policy (Tehran: IBRD, Agricultural and Rural Development 
Advisory Mission, 1975). 
N^ote: Table is based on forecasted world prices for 1980 in 
terms of 1975 constant dollars. 
"^ Allocation of farm land to different crops are as follows: 
60% wheat, 30% sugar beets or similar crops, and 10% fallow for partly 
irrigated farms; and 90% sugar beets, vegetables or similar crops, 
and 10% fallow for intensively irrigated farms. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the data in Table 4.5. 
1. Majority of small farms cannot provide for sufficient output 
to meet the $500 target income. With the problems of 
irrigation and water supply mentioned above, many of the 
79 
small farms can only undertake the first two types of 
farming which require a greater amount of land. 
2. $500 target income cannot be met by many small farmers 
without employment in cities during off-season periods. 
3. In most cases, the change in existing practices can reduce 
the size of required land by 45 percent. But according to 
Professor Aresvik, even if productivity was "raised by 
improving supply of irrigation water and/or better farming 
practices, many farm units in Iran would still be too small 
to achieve the minimum levels of income within the next 
decade." 
Supplementary Measures: 
Farm Organizations 
Concomitant with land reform, various concepts regarding farm 
organization were also introduced in Iran. Presently there are four 
basic models of farm organizations in Iran: rural cooperatives, agro­
businesses, farm corporations, and production cooperatives. There 
are also a considerable number of independent commercial farms 
which produce a large portion of the marketed output. 
Rural cooperatives 
Many cooperative societies were organized as a supplementary 
measure to land reform. Membership in cooperatives was made 
mandatory for land recipients although others could also join. The 
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main function of cooperatives was to make credit and inputs available 
to the members and establish consumer cooperative shops. Initially, 
each cooperative covered several villages with an average membership 
of approximately 200. The managing directors were appointed by 
the government from local residents. The cooperatives were consolidated 
in 1969-72 period, each covering an average of a dozen villages. By 
the end of 1976 there were 2,886 cooperatives with 2.8 million 
members (see Table 4.6). 
Rural cooperatives do not play a significant role in Iranian 
agriculture. This is even true regarding credit and inputs, which 
shall be discussed separately, demonstrated by the many problems of 
productivity and finance. The agricultural output marketed by rural 
cooperatives is below one percent. 
Farm corporations 
The concept of farm corporations was introduced in order to deal 
with the problem of fragmented landholding. Farm corporations were 
established based on large scale amalgamation of small farms. 
Membership in corporations was made mandatory, including all land­
holders, regardless of whether they received land through land reform. 
Farmers were to turn over their land and receive corporation shares 
proportional to their landholding. Each farmer receives wages for 
his labor and dividend for his shareholdings. They are given 0.1 
hectare for their private use. By the end of 1976 there were 89 such 
Table 4.6. Characteristics of Rural Cooperatives, 1967 - 1976 ($1 = 75 Rials 
Characteristics 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
No. of cooperatives 8236 8388 81of 8298 8450 8361^ 2717 2847 2858 2886 
No. of members 1087 1260 1400 1606 1854 2065 2263 2488 2685 2868 
(thousands) 
Total capital 1270 1639 1984 2379 2769 3329 3857 4677 5690 2075 
(million rials) 
^Source; Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 1977 (Tehran: 
Plan Organization, 1978), p. 289. 
^Includes consolidation. 
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corporations covering 8,130 villages and over 318 thousand hectares 
of cultivating land (see Table 4.7). During 1969-75 period the 
highest dividend per share was 3,401 Rials ($45,45) in 1974 and the 
lowest 225 Rials ($3.00) in 1972. But these figures do not tell us 
anything about family income since the government has not released 
any data regarding the distribution of corporation shares. 
Unfortunately studies regarding farm corporations are very 
few and do not go beyond the surface. They are based on visits to 
one or two showcase farm corporations mainly in Pars Province and 
do not attempt to investigate the long term effects. One reason 
for this is the absence of any concrete data regarding corporations. 
Inquiries should be made concerning the impact of farm corporations 
on rural population, production, income, and income distribution. 
It has been argued that farm corporations have created a viable 
unit of production from fragmented lands, and in many instances have 
increased productivity through mechanization and professional 
management. But the program has created some serious problems 
with grave consequences. 
Firstly, no option was given to those who did not want to 
join the corporation. Once the establishment of a farm corporation 
was decided, all landholding farmers were forced to join or sell 
their lands. This has caused a great deal of resentment. A 1970 
study conducted by Kenneth Piatt for AID concludes; 
"Charges of coercion to farm corporations are cowraon,.,One 
observer of long experience in the land reform field, after 
Table 4.7. Characteristics of Farm Corporations, 1969-76^ ' ^  
Characteristics 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
No. of farm corporations 
No. of villages 
Cultivating land area 
(100 hectares)^  
Area cultivated (1000 hectares) 
No. of shareholders (1000 persons) 
No. of shares held by government 
individuals (1000 shares)^  
Gross revenue (million Rials) 
Cost (million Rials) 
20 
109 
n.a. 
6 . 2  
269 
19 
109 
6 . 2  
27 
157 
43 
327 
65 
525 
65 
525 
85 
778 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 87 87 132 
269 383 685 307 
n.a. n.a. 496 797 1767 2918 3345 
n.a. n.a. 312 522 1065 1874 2359 
89 
813 
77.6 77.6 99.4 169.9 231,7 231.7 310.0 318.7 
130 
8.7 15.2 22.8 22.8 32.5 33.7 
307 1381 1420 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Net profit (million Rials) 
Dividend per share (Rialsf 
n.a. n.a. 185 175 702 1044 986 n.a. 
n.a. n.a. 483 255 2287 3401 714 n.a. 
^Source: Plan, and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 1977 (Tehran: 
Plan Organization, 1978), p- 291. 
^Note: Many of the figures are rounded by the author. The reliability of these figures, 
especially monetary figures, is below average. For instance, net profit for 1972 given by Statisti­
cal Yearbook is 275 million Rials and the one given by 1977 Statistical Yearbook is 175 million 
Rials. Both yearbooks were published by Plan Organization. 
^Corporation region covers a much larger area. 
^Government shares in 1969 and 1970 were 40,648 and 1971 and 1972 period 40,847 and 44,012 
respectively. Government shares increased drastically in the following years but no exact data 
have been released. 
^Computed by the author. 
85 
interviewing farmers in eight villages included under three 
different farm corporations, stated he had found not one farmer 
who favored them, but only feelings of resentment, frustration 
and helplessness in their unsuccessful opposition."^ 0 
Secondly, farm corporations have reinforced the existing problem 
of mass migration to the cities where the market cannot absorb them. 
Since mechanization requires only few workers, many families have 
been forced to leave the village. Piatt, using American Consulate 
sources indicates that "to make sure they would go, the existing 
villages were bulldozed away, and in new villages accommodations 
were built only for the retained workers and their families. The 
ousted families in many cases were in debt for more than they received 
21 for their land equities, so departed in destitute." Studies 
undertaken by the research teams of an opposition group show that 
in Baghain Corporation located in the Province of Kerman as many as 
90 percent of the labor force became unemployed. In this region 
there were 1,045 families and a labor force of over 2,000. One hundred 
and ten families who owned land received shares ranging from 30 to 
453 depending on the size of land relinquished. But the corporation 
required only 70 permanent workers (180 in harvesting season). 
In another corporation, Darioush, located in Fare and composed of 
five villages, only 10 permanent workers (100 - 120 in harvesting 
22 
season) out of a labor force of 540 were required. 
Thirdly, the corporations have been set up in areas "with the 
best lands in Iran, with the best water supplies, and where the 
86 
23 farmers already were doing well as individual owner-operations* 
Many of the farmers complain that their income was higher before 
24 the incorporation. 
Fourthly, since the number of shares were proportional to the 
size of land, corporations have institutionalized the already 
existing disparities. Small farmers have no say in decision making 
(larger landholders also complain that government runs everything). 
In above mentioned Baghain Corporation, the distribution of shares 
were as follows: 1.8 percent had over 432 shares each; 7.2 percent 
over 120; and 92 percent between 30 to 96 shares. In 1972 
dividend per share after various deductions was 300 Rials ($4.00) 
allowing for total dividend of $120 to $384 for the 92 percent who 
had less than 96 shares. Only those with permanent jobs with 
corporation could supplement this income with their wages (60 - 90 
Rials per day), many of the remaining families had to turn to the 
cities and seek employment for at least a good part of the year. 
Similarly in Dargesin Corporation in Hamedan, 90.5 percent of share­
holders had annual dividend income below 9,000 Rials ($120) and 
some of them indicated that they earn as much as 75 percent of their 
25 total income from non-agricultural labor. 
There are many other weaknesses with farm corporations as it 
is implemented in Iran. These are alienation of farmer from his 
own land, lack of financial incentives, insecurity, and the problem 
of landless peasants who are not shareholders.^  ^ Finally^  farr 
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corporations provide only a small portion of total agricultural 
output. Their contribution together with agro-business constitute 
only 2.4 percent of national prerent surplus (see Table 4.8), 
Table 4.8. Contribution to National Prerent Surplus by Different Farm 
Classes ($1.00 = 75 Rialsf 
Classes Rials (million) Percent 
Small 
Traditional, rain-fed 
Traditional, minimal S 
partial irrigation 
Traditional, full irrigation 
Subtotal 
Medium 
Traditional, rain-fed 
Traditional, minimal & 
partial irrigation 
Traditional, full irrigation 
Subtotal 
Large 
Modern, partially irrigated 
Modern, fully irrigated 
Corporation and agro-business 
Subtotal 
Total 
4,545 
22.987 
19,650 
47,182 
7,575 
22.988 
19,650 
50,213 
9,000 
1,337 
2,625 
13,462 
110,857 
4.1 
20 .8  
17.7 
42.6 
6 . 8  
20.7 
17.7 
45.2 
8 . 1  
1.7 
2.4 
12.2 
100.0 
S^ource: Bookers Agricultural and Technical Services, Ltd. and 
Hunting Technical Services, Ltd., National Cropping Plan; Interim 
Report to Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Tehran: 
Bookers and Hunting Services, 1975). 
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Agro-businesses 
As Table 4,8 shows agro-businesses and farm corporations 
account for very small amount of national prerent surplus. But 
they take a large share of money allocated to agriculture. 
According to a report in World Crops, the largest slice of Fourth 
Plan's agricultural budget, $143 million out of $880 million was 
27 
allocated "toward the establishment of 34 large agricultural units." 
Agro-businesses were "established on virgin lands near dams or 
groundwater projects and their shares are bought by Iranians or 
28 foreign farming companies under the Agro-Industrial Act." By the 
end of Fourth Plan (1973) 60 to 70 thousand hectares were devoted 
to agro-businesses. The revised Fifth Plan provided for the alloca­
tion of 300 thousand hectares of the best irrigated land.^  ^
The government cleared the area population, bulldozed villages 
and local landholders were forced to sell their land. Ministry of 
Water and Power provided "canals for units down to 100 hectares, 
and roads down to 1000 hectares. The rest, including minor canaliza­
tion and the eitployment of laborers, is left to the companies 
under a 30-year lease. 
The most important project was near Dez dam under the Dez Irriga­
tion Project (DIP). This project initiated under the Third Plan 
had failed like most ether huge dame projects and was turned to 
agro-businesses under the Fourth Plan. At the beginning large 
complexes of over 20,000 hectares were considered, but these were 
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later divided into smaller units. Sixty-^ ight thousand of the DIP 
was carved up between six companies, the largest of which were 
Iran-California; Agro-industries of Iran and America led by an 
American of Iranian extraction. Hash em Naraghi; and Iran Shellcott, 
By March 1975 total investment had exceeded $300 million witii 45 
percent of it provided by Agricultural Development Bank of Iran 
31 in loans or equity. 
Some of the agro-business projects did not get off the ground. 
Agro industries of Iran and America began operation in 1973, but 
by 1977 the company was in debt and the government claimed mismanage-
32 
ment. Similarly, according to Financial Times in June 21, 1976, 
Shellcott was considering the abandonment of the project. In May 
1976, Tehran Economist announced that some of the most important 
33 
companies were about to dissolve because of continuous loss. 
Aside from disproportionate allocation of money and the failures 
of agro-business ventures, the projects caused a considerable 
permanent displacement of the rural population. According to World 
Crops, "Iran simply does not have the resources to absorb elsewhere 
the large numbers who will be permanently displaced... .Last year 
34 
one corporation in western Iran lost 50% of its villagers." 
Production cooperatives 
Production cooperatives are sometimes considered as a variant 
35 
of farm corporations. But they are quite different in the sense 
that the farmers retain the ownership of their land and the emphasis 
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is on polling the resources and adopting communal cropping pattern, 
cultivation, and marketing. Consequently, production cooperatives 
do not create and foster the problems of farm corporations. 
Actually, communal production, Boneh, was practiced for many 
centuries in Iran. Under feudal system, Bonehs or coimuiial fanning 
were common place. Several or more tenant families who were given 
small plots of land by the landlord polled their resources (mainly 
labor and draft animals) and produced collectively. Land reform 
led to the dissolution of this traditional system. But in 1971 
a production cooperative law was passed for the establishment of 
production cooperatives. In 1972 six such cooperatives were formed 
and by 1976 there were 35 production cooperatives covering 214 
villages and fields (see Table 4.9). 
Table 4.9. Characteristics of production dooperatives^ ' ^  
Characteristics 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
No. of cooperatives 6 9 24 34 35 
No. of villages and fields 34 44 126 181 214 
Cultivating land areas 6.6 11.2 28.2 46.6 50.6 
(1000 hectares) 
No. of land owners 1.3 2.0 6.6 9.4 9.7 
(1000 persons) 
S^ource; Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical 
Yearbook of Iran, 1977 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1978), p. 290. 
N^ote: Figures are rounded by the author. 
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Production cooperatives are favored by the farmers and are 
perhaps the best solution for the problem of fragmented farms 
provided that technology, credit, infrastructure, and inputs are 
made available to them. 
Commercial and traditional farms 
As Tables 4.4 and 4.8 indicated, large portions of agricultural 
output comes from small traditional and medium sized commercial 
farms (some of commercial farms are very large). The commercial 
farms are largely mechanized farms and orchards exempted by the land 
reform law or fertil lands retained by the landlords. Commercial 
37 farms hold near 70 percent of the land and provide about 75 percent 
of the marketed food. 
But the future of Iranian agriculture and its progress still 
depends on whether the small farms and the millions of peasants can 
scape subsistence farming. Most government programs have not succeeded 
because of misallocation of funds, selection of priorities within agri­
culture, mismanagement, and in general lack of a comprehensive develop­
ment planning for agriculture. The supplementary measures regarding 
farm organizations have not changed the face of Iranian agriculture. 
According to Tehran Economist, 85 farm corporations in 1976 accounted 
for 1.4 percent and 34 production cooperatives .03 percent of total 
38 
agricultural production. 
Supplementary Measures: Agricultural Credit 
Agricultural credit in Iran is provided by three sources: 
agricultural credit institutions, commercial banks, and noninstitutional 
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credit sources. There are two agricultural banks; Agricultural 
Cooperative Bank of Iran (ACBI) and Agricultural Development Bank 
of Iran (ADBI). Table 4.10 shows the relative importance of different 
credit sources in 1963-72 period. 
Table 4.10. Relative importance of various sources of agricultural 
credit (1963 - 1972)%' & 
Institutions 
Amount of credit 
(billion Rials) Percent 
1. Agricultural Credit Institutions 
Agricultural cooperatives 
Rural cooperative societies 
Agricultural Development Fund 
Tea Board 
Others 
Subtotal 
2. Commercial banks 
3. Noninstitutional credit 
Total 
9.0 
6 . 0  
0.4 
0.1 
5.0 
20.5 
13.2 
32.3 
65.0 
13.6 
9.0 
0 .6  
0 . 2  
7.6 
31.0 
20 .0  
49.2 
100.0 
S^ource; FAO, Perspective Study of Agricultural Development for 
Iran (Rome: FAO, 1974). 
N^ote: Figures are estimated averages. 
According to Table 4.10 agricultural credit institutions accounted 
for 31 percent, commercial banks 20 percent, and noninstitutional 
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sources 49.2 percent of total agricultural credit. This shows that 
Iranian fanners, to a great extent, still depend on middlemen and 
private money lenders for credit. Furthermore, most of the credit 
provided by agricultural credit institutions are short terra loans 
(see Tables 4.11 and 4.12). As Table 4.11 indicates over 90 percent 
of ACBI loans during 1966-76 period were under 5,000 Rials ($67 at 
current exchange rate) and that number of loans over 10,000 Rials 
($132) did not exceed five percent. Table 4.12 illustrates credits 
made available by rural cooperative societies. The average number 
of loans for 1968-76 were near one million and the average loan 
for the same period was 11,383 Rials ($152). Unfortunately, based 
on the available data, only averages could be computed. Nothing is 
known about credit distribution between short term and long term 
loans. 
Although commercial banks provide about 20 percent of agricultural 
credit, this is a very insignificant amount of total credits made 
available by commercial banks to different sectors. In 1969 only 
10 percent of total credits by banks went to agriculture and in 1976 
this had decreased to 8.9 percent.Moreover, most of this lending 
to agriculture is in the form of large loans to large agriculturists, 
40 
merchants# and agro-business. 
Furthermore, there are various constraints which limit lending 
to small farmers: 
1. Almost all lendings require collateral security. According 
to government newspaper, Rustakhiz, the collateral required is 
Table 4.11. Number and Amount of Loans Provided by Agricultural Cooperative Bank of Iran (1966-76)^' 
Year 
Total credit 
(million Rials) 
No. of 
loans 
(1000) 
No. of 
loans under 
5000 Rials 
(1000 loans) % 
No. of loans 
between 5000-10000 
Rials (1000 loans) % 
No. of 
loans over 
10,000 Rials 
(1000 loans) % 
1966 5,167 250 238 95,4 9 3,7 2 0.09 
1967 5,188 327 312 95.2 12 3.7 3 1.10 
1968 5,290 352 340 96,7 8 2.3 3 1.00 
1969 5,415 350 340 97.2 7 1.9 3 0.09 
1970 8,909 212 199 94.3 3 1.5 9 4.20 
1971 9,582 233 218 93.6 6 2.5 9 3.90 
1972 14,381 263 242 92.4 8 3.0 12 4.60 
1973 19,993 346 225 93.7 12 3.4 10 2.90 
1974 31,116 441 297 89.8 32 7.3 13 2.90 
1975 35,295 306 c n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1976 42,352 327 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
^Source: Plan and Budget Organization of. Iran, Statistical Yearbook of Iran,,1973 and 1977 
(Tehran: Plan Organization, 1974 and 1978). 
^Note: Reliability is average. There is discrepancy in figures released by the same source 
in different years. 
^Data not available. 
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Table 4.12. Credit by Rural Cooperative Societies, 1968 - 1976^ ' ^  
Year 
No. of loans 
(1000) 
Amount of loa,ns 
(million Rials) 
Average loan 
(Rials) 
1968 739 5,041 6,821 
1969 844 5,753 6,816 
1970 903 6,314 6,992 
1971 876 6,812 7,776 
1972 1,174 10,072 8,579 
1973 1,251 12,372 9,890 
1974 1,646 19,744 11,995 
1975 1,771 24,723 13,959 
1976 1,522 28,326 18,613 
Average 1968-76 1,076 12,128 11,383 
S^ource: Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical 
Yearbook of Iran, 1977 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1978), p. 239. 
K 
Note: Reliability average. 
"^ Computed by the author. Figures are rounded. 
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sometimes 20 times more than the amount of loan.^  ^ This 
excludes a great majority of small farmers and nearly all 
of the land recipients who have not yet received titles to 
their lands from access to institutional and commercial 
credit. 
2. Due to tight money and excess demand, many farmers with 
42 
collateral are not able to obtain credit. 
3. There is a great deal of institutional and bureaucratic red 
tape. The ADBI is situated in Tehran and ACSI does not 
have branches in most villages. Obtaining loans requires 
traveling to the Capital and larger cities. According to 
Rastakhiz sometimes half of the loan goes for travelling 
43 
expenses. 
According to official figures and Table 4.10, nearly half of the 
credit is provided by the middlemen and private money lenders (unofficial 
estimates run higher). Private loans are at high interest rates, 
sometimes in excess of 40 percent, and often require the purchase of 
44 
crops at low prices. According to Professor Khusravi, the financial 
power of money lenders and middlemen has increased after the land 
45 
reform, and that as much as 59 percent of landowning and 79 percent 
of landless peasants' debts are to private money lenders. 
A study by the Committee on Cooperative Affairs in 1977 indicated 
that "due to a lack of agricultural loans, farmers were forced to 
sell their products to money lenders and receive loans in return. 
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And in 1978, Rastakhiz reported that due to the failures of central 
administrators of rural cooperative societies, middlemen were able 
to make a profit of over 10 billion rials in the citrus fruit 
market, and that this has led to the bankruptcy of small producers, 
decrease in domestic production, and the import of 300 thousand tons 
48 
of citrus fruits. 
Supplementary Measures: Infrastructure 
There has been a substantial amount of investment in transportation 
in Iran: During the Fourth pian (1968-72) 5,700 kilometers of roads 
unfinished during the Third Plan were completed and 2,610 kilometers 
49 
of new asphalt roads were constructed. But most of these were for 
interconnecting cities or military purposes. According to Rastakhiz, 
"two-thirds of Iranian villages have no access to any economic 
transportation network," and that "due to lack of commercial road, 
they cannot market their surplus output.In 1976, government 
sources indicated that 19,120 Iranian villages could only be reached 
with mule.^  ^
This and lack of storage facilities has caused considerable 
damage to perishable agricultural production. The value of agricul­
tural produce wasted annually has been estimated at one billion 
J T T 52 dollars. 
Summary 
Throughout this chapter an attempt was made to evaluate some 
aspects of the Iranian Government's policies and reform programs 
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launched under the Third and Fourth Plans. The results of the study 
indicate that land reform and accompanying measures have not resolved 
the Iranian agricultural problems nor have they ameliorated the lot 
of majority of the landless and landowning peasantry. 
Just as in the past, today Iran is still in need of effective 
land distribution and changes which can set the stage for moderniza­
tion of agriculture and enable the peasantry to escape the subsis­
tance agricultural production. But such distribution and structural 
changes cannot and should not be expected from the present government. 
Professor Baldwin who took an active part in planning process in 
Iran sums up the situation as follows: 
"Land reform, like so many reforms in Iran, cannot be assessed 
except in terms of Iranian political behavior. Seen from this 
perspective, no Iranian land reform is likely to achieve its 
aims until there have first been much more fundamental changes 
in the political system than have yet occurred. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
The agricultural development in Iran and the performance of the 
agricultural sector could be evaluated in several ways. One method 
of evaluation is the examination of agricultural output and its rate 
of growth as an indication of performance. But changes in output in 
a given period do not tell us anything about the changes in produc­
tivity and per capita output which are a more accurate criteria for 
evaluation than the output alone. 
It should be noted at the outset that the discrepancy and the 
scarcity of the data largely limits the selection of the criteria 
for performance of the agricultural sector. Quantative information 
on the development of the Iranian agriculture prior to I960's is 
relatively scarce and generally unreliable, and the official data 
regarding the more recent years are largely inflated and contra­
dictory. The discrepancy in the official data originating from 
the same source is sometimes over 60 percent. This is particularly 
true with regard to the data concerning agricultural output. These 
limitations, however, aside from making our task more difficult and 
arduous, do not extensively affect the quality of our inquiry if 
we utilize several difference criteria for evaluating the performance 
of the agricultural sector and thereby minimize the chances of inaccur­
acies in our analysis. Thus the following analysis of the performance 
of the agricultural sector will examine output; yield of major crops 
as well as yield according to the size of farms; import of 
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agricultural commodities; per capita food and agricultural output; 
and the sectoral as well as subsectoral growth rates for agri­
culture. 
Production of Major Crops 
Let us first begin by examining the shares of various subsectors 
in the Iranian agriculture. Table 5.1 presents these relative 
shares in agriculture added value for the 1966-73 period. As it 
is evident, crop production accounts for a lions share of the total 
value added. Until 1971, this share was above 70 percent and since 
then it has remained at about 65 percent. The recognition of this 
significant share is very important since a large portion of the 
crop output value added is claimed by the three major cereals, 
wheat, rice and barley. Thus the performance of the agricultural 
sector is very much linked to the production of these crops. 
Livestock accounts for about 30 percent of the total value 
added. Its share of the total value added has increased from 26.8 
percent in 1966 to 30.3 percent in 1977. Unfortunately data on 
livestock production is very scarce and thus will not be discussed 
in detail in this chapter. Forestry and fishery account for a 
very small percentage of the total value added, and their growth 
does not significantly affect the overall growth rate of the agri­
cultural production. 
Table 5.2 provides production data regarding major agricultural 
commodities. As Table 5.2 demonstrates the production of major 
Table 5.1. Share of agricultural subsectors in agriculture value added, 1966-73 (percents)^  
Subsector 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Crop output 71.8 71.7 72.2 72.5 73.3 71.5 67.2 64.1 65.1 62.6 
H
 
LD 64.3 
Livestock^  26.8 26.1 26.1 25.9 25.2 27.0 30.8 33.0 32.1 34.5 32.4 32.7 
Forestry 1.0 0.7 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.3 
Fishery 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 2.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 
S^ources: Bank Markazi Iran, National Income of Iran, 1959-71 (Tehran: Bank Markazi, 
1974), p. 25 for years 1966-71 and Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1977 
(Tehran: Bank Markazi, 1978), pp. 170-71 for years 1972-78. 
I^ncludes games. 
Table 5.2. Production of major agricultural commodities, 1963-77 
(1000 tons)&' b 
1963 1964 1965° 1966° 1967 1968 1969 
Cereal 
Wheat 3000 2600 3000 3190 3800 4400 4100 
Barley 740 718 935 1080 1035 1160 1140 
Rice 860 800 845 875 960 980 1020 
Industrial Crops 
Cotton 402 389 488 371 378 545 520 
Sugar beets 1191 1028 1411 2280 2830 3410 3480 
Sugar cane 248 292 392 383 430 450 530 
Tobacco 11 19 26 25 22 19 19 
Tea 50 42 50 59 68 81 76 
Vegetables 
Potatoes 370 380 410 418 420 420 437 
Onions 149 156 167 166 178 187 267 
Tomatoes 160 166 173 187 186 202 210 
Others 
Pulses 102 101 113 126 140 158 205 
S^ources: Bank Markazi Iran, National Income of Iran, 1969-71 
(Tehran; Bank Markazi, 1973), pp. 30-31 for years 1963-71; Plan and 
Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 1977 (Tehran: 
Plan Organization, 1978), p. 209 for years 1972-74; and Ministry of 
Agriculture for years 1976-77. 
R^eliability: Average for 1963-72, below average for 1973-77. 
T^here is a significant discrepancy in data for these years. Data 
for 1965-66 are deflated and for 1974-1977 are inflated. 
D^ata not available. 
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1970 1971 1972 1973 1974° 1975° 1976° 1977 
4260 3700 3900 4546 2884 4650 5100 4800 
1083 900 1000 1158 751 1190 1300 1110 
1060 1000 1200 937 826 1300 1034 1260 
502 458 550 560 645 716 426 535 
3860 3980 4100 4086 3749 4597 5272 4150 
540 580 600 1075 1105 1100 800 900 
18 18 24 17 15 14 18 15 
79 65 88 93 96 80 88 116 
416 380 400 503 354 480 500 627 
244 200 258 205 136 260 290 210 
210 210 126 287 276 
d 
n.a. n.a. n.a 
204 200 176 197 186 200 204 187 
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crops, particularly the industrial crops has increased since 1963. 
The annual variations in output partly reflect the fluctuations in 
weather conditions and the reallocation of land among various crops 
but are also largely due to the incidence of disease and pests. 
The growth rate in production, however, has been relatively 
slow, sometimes below the rate of growth in population and often 
below the government targets under different plans. Table 5.3 
shows the average growth rate of crop production under different 
plans. Few significant conclusions can be drawn from the data on 
this table. First, the average growth rate among major cereals 
produced has been very slow and in one case negative. This is of 
great importance once we consider the fact that over 77 percent of 
the cultivated land is devoted to the production of three major 
grains; wheat, barley and rice and together they constitute about 
40 percent of total value of agricultural production. Second, the 
growth rate of most crops have generally deteriorated under Fourth 
and Fifth Plans. This is even true about the industrial crops 
which enjoyed a very high rate of growth under the Third Plan. The 
growth rate in both sugar beets and sugar cane have declined 
drastically since the Third Plan, and the growth rates of both cotton 
and tobacco are negative under the Fifth Plan. 
Increases in output shown in Table 5.2 are largely due to 
increases in land under cultivation which in some instances grew 
more rapidly than the growth in output (see Table 5.4). The available 
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Table 5.3. Average growth rate of crop production under different 
plans (percents)^  
Third Plan Fourth Plan Fifth Plan 
Product (1963-67) (1968-72) (1973-78) 
Cereals 
Wheat 6.0 1.0 3.9 
Barley 7.2 -2.2 4.0 
Rice 5.7 3.8 3.1 
Industrial Crops 
Cotton 3.6 3.9 -2.3 
Sugar beets 24.0 8.7 1.2 
Sugar cane 15.4 8.0 7.4 
Tobacco 6.6 -2.5 -9.0 
Tea 7.9 2.8 5.7 
Vegetables 
Potatoes 3.1 -1.2 10.7 
Onions 3.9 7.3 8.7 
Tomatoes 3.8 2.1 n.a.b 
Other 
Pulses 9.0 8.2 1.2 
S^ource: Bank Markazi Iran. 
D^ata not available. 
Table 5.4. Area under cultivation for different agricultural products, 
1968-77 (1000 HA)a 
Sugar 
Years Wheat Barley Rice Cotton beets 
1961-65 3580 990 342 280 130 
1968 4804 1062 318 340 148 
1969 5100 1200 360 380 153 
1970 5327 1385 484 320 169 
1971 5565 1446 344 307 150 
1972 5469 1519 377 309 146 
1973 6325 1656 338 332 166 
1974 5973 1404 353 380 159 
1975 5993 1532 461 290 189 
1976 5631 1481 460 295 198 
b 
1977 6000 1500 460 n.a. n.a. 
S^ources : Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook 
of Iran, 1977 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1978), p. 270; Ministry of 
Agriculture and Natural Resources of Iran; F AO, Production Yearbook, 
1974 (Rome; FAG, 1975); and FAG, Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural 
Economics and Statistics, various issues. 
D^ata not available. 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
7 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
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Tobacco Potatoes Tomatoes Onion Pulses 
17 50 16 14 180 
17 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
14 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
19 n.a, n.a. n.a. 210 
21 52 20 16 220 
16 53 22 18 423 
21 50 22 17 479 
14 55 22 17 n.a. 
n.a.^  68 22 17 n.a. 
n.a. 65 23 18 n.a. 
113 
data for 1951-77 period indicates that the area under cultivation 
has increased for almost every major crop. Substantial increases can be 
noted for cereals and sugar beets, both of which have experienced 
deteriorating rates of growth in output since the Third Plan. 
Average Yield for Major Crops 
The fact that increases in output are largely due to increases 
in land area under cultivation can be further substantiated by 
examining the average yield per hectare for the major crops. Table 
5.5 shows the yield per hectare for the major cereals and industrial 
crops. According to these data increases in output cannot be linked 
to the introduction of improved technology since over the 1961-77 
period the yield per hectare has remained about the same or declined 
for every crop except sugar beets. The last three columns in 
Table 5.5 show the 1972-77 average yields for Near East, Latin 
America, and Africa. For every crop the average yield in the Middle 
East is greater than in Iran. In fact the average yield in Iran is 
more comparable to the average yield in Africa. Figure 5.1 summarizes 
the data in Table 5.5 for the three major cereals. 
It may be pointed out that since the area under cultivation has 
increased, the stagnant average yields for cereal may be due to the 
utilization of marginal lands. Of course, the addition of marginal 
lands would have some dampening effect on the overall average yield, 
but the available data suggests that the marginal lands are not the 
Table 5.5. Yield of major crops (100 KG/HA)^  
Product 1961-65 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Wheat 8.0 9.2 8.3 8.0 6.7 6 .2  
Barley 7.9 10.9 9.5 7.8 6.2 6.6 
Rice 29.1 27.7 28.3 21.9 29.0 31.8 
Cotton b n.a. 16.0 13.7 15.7 14.9 17.8 
Sugar beet 192.0 230.1 227.4 228.4 265.3 280.8 
Sugar cane n.a. 112.5 1325 1350 1160 857 
Tobacco n.a. 11.2 12.7 12.9 9.5 11.4 
S^ource: Derived from Tables 5.1 and 5.3 for years 1969-77; and 
FAO, Production Yearbook, 1974-77 (Borne: FAO, 1975-78) for first and 
last three columns. 
D^ata not available. 
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Near Latin 
East America Africa 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Average 1972-77 
7.2 4.8 7.6 9.1 8.0 12.6 14.5 7.7 
7.0 5.4 7.7 8.8 7.4 11.4 12.2 8.6 
27.7 23.4 28.2 22.5 27.4 37.9 18.8 13.4 
16.9 17.0 24.7 14.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
246.1 235.7 243.2 266.2 n.a. 290.2 337.7 248.3 
1190 1227 1222 889 1000 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
10.6 7.1 10.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Figure 5.1. Yield of major cereals in Iran 
117 
primary reason for stagnant average yields. This premise rests 
upon two assumptions: 
1. If the government's claims regarding the development of 
agriculture are true, it would be reasonable to assume that 
such a development would have more than offset the effect 
of marginal lands. It should be noted that the Iranian 
agriculture during the period under consideration has 
experienced'. 
a. land reform which according to government claims has 
eradicated the traditional feudal system and increased 
the productivity by providing many new incentives for 
increased production and growth; 
b. continuous excess demand for agricultural commodities 
demonstrated by the magnitude of imports and the findings 
of various studies which should provide an incentive for 
improved productivity; 
c. a rapid rate of growth in the GNP and real incomes; 
d. increased application of technical inputs; 
e. the reorganization of farming structure and the consolida­
tion of small and scattered plots. 
2. The yield in mechanized farms have also been stagnant and 
in some cases declining. 
Table 5.6 shows the utilization and application of technical 
inputs for the 1964-75 period. These data clearly show a very signifi­
cant increase in the application of technical inputs. Of course. 
Table 5.6. Utilization and application of technical inputs, 1964-75^  
Improved Seeds 
(1000 ton) Fertilizers (1000 tons) Harvester-
Year Wheat Cotton 
Sugar 
beet Nitrogen Phosphate Potash 
Tractors 
(1000 units) 
Trasher 
(1000 units) 
1964 7.20 6.10 2.39 15.5 14.1 .17 n.a. ^  n.a. 
1965 9.00 5.52 3. 50 24.0 15.0 .20 14-5 O.95C 
1966 16.88 9.16 3.. 23 32.0 15.0 .20 16.0 
1967 12.75 4.57 3.,42 46.0 28.0 .13 17.5 
1968 14.59 5.36 4.59 49.0 26.0 .19 20.0 
1969 10.40 5.37 4.,91 55.0 30.0 .20 20.0 
1970 25.58 7.10 4.95 65.0 29.0 .43 21.0 1.65^  
1971 66.42 11.40 5.04 107.3 69.3 .45 21.5 
1972 72.80 19.57 4.92 123.8 75.8 .87 23.0 
1973 71.00 22.36 4.95 194.1 133.3 1.06 25.0 1.95 
1974 136.42 24.15 4.39 188.5 141.4 2.56 27.0 2.05 
1975 126.01 18.83 4.89 190.0 142.5 3.50 29.0 2.15 
1976 203.3 152.5 2.67 30.0 2.20 
S^ources: Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook, 1973, 1977 (Tehran; 
Plan Organization, 1974, 1978); FAO, FAQ Production Yearbook, various issues ; United Nations, 
Statistical Yearbook, 1974 (New York: U.N. 1975), p. 100; and FAO, Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics, vol. 1/4 (April 1978), p. 20. 
T^he amount of tractors in use for 1961-65 period was 11.3. 
A^verage for 1961-65. 
A^verage for 1969-71. 
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Table 5.5 shows the increase in total application of technical 
inputs and data regarding the distribution of chemical fertilizers 
and tractors among specific crops is not available. But considering 
the fact that about 75 percent of the cultivated land is devoted 
to the production of wheat, it is obvious that the application of 
these technical inputs has also substantially increased the production 
of wheat and other cereals. Furthermore, data regarding the utiliza­
tion of improved seeds indicate that wheat experienced the greatest 
increase in application of improved seeds from 7.2 thousand tons in 
1964 to 126 thousand tons in 1975. But as Table 5.5 indicated, the 
yield per hectare for wheat has remained about the same since 1961. 
It should be noted that the above discussion does not suggest a high 
rate of technological progress in Iran. Indeed the state of Iranian 
agriculture is still very traditional. According to FAO data in 
1975 there was only one tractor per one thousand hectares in Iran, 
the same as in 1970. The number of harvesters per one thousand 
hectares was zero."'" 
Nevertheless, one should think that substantial rise in the 
application of the technical inputs as demonstrated in Table 5.6 
would be sufficient to offset the impact of the marginal lands on 
average productivity. But the root of the problem appears to be in 
the distribution of these inputs. 
It can be reasonably assumed that the allocation of technical 
inputs have been highly uneven with the farm corporations and 
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agribusiness claiming a disproportionate share. This was certainly 
true with regard to the allocation of credit which was discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
The available data indicate that under different categories 
of farm sizes; the greatest proportion of tractor use and utilization 
of chemical fertilizers occurred in farms over 50 hectares. In 1974 
among farms about 100 hectares, 83% of the farm area was plowed with 
tractois whereas about 80% of land area for farms around two hectares 
2 
were plowed by human labor and draft animals. 
Supposing that marginal lands are the cause of low average 
yields one would suspect that the larger and mechnized farms should 
have experienced a substantial increase in yield. Let us examine 
this proposition in detail. 
In Chapter 4 we discussed the various forms of farm organizations 
and it was shown that farm corporations and agribusiness in general 
have not been successful. In fact, the findings in Chapter 4 
indicated that among the various existing forms of farm organizations 
the production cooperatives which were comprised of small producers 
were the most successful. In case of farm corporations it was shown 
that the net profits and dividends per share were meager and 
fluctuating. Of course, returns per share is only one indicator for 
the performance of the large and mechanized farms. We can now examine 
different aspects of these farms by introducing the findings of this 
and other studies. 
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According to studies conducted for the Iranian Government by 
SCETIRAN Consulting Engineers, under equal conditions, the traditional 
farms have the largest yield per hectar. The SCETIRAN study 
classifies the cultivated land for wheat into four major categories 
based on rainfall, variability of percipitation (CV), the degree of 
risk, and potential average yield per hectare criteria:^  
Category This category includes Average Rainfall Levels (ARL) 
below 250 mm; the Coefficient of Variability (CV) above 0.30; 
Potential Average Yield (PAY) below 300 KG/HA; and the Risks of 
Ruin (RR) around 25 percent. 
Category II; ARL < 300 mm; CV = 0.30 to 0.35; PAY = 500 to 600 
KG/HA; and RR = 15 to 20 percent. 
Category III; ARL < 300 ram; CV low; PAY = 700 to 800 KG/HA; and 
RR = 10%. 
Category IV; ARL = 300 to 400 mm; CV < 0.30; PAY > 1000 KG/HA: 
and RR = 5%. 
The results of the SECTIRAN study is summarized in Figure 5.2 
where the average net added value per hectare given the risks of 
ruins according to different categories is measured under traditional, 
semi mechanized, and mechanized systems of production. Under all 
four categories, the traditional system experienced a higher average 
net added value per hectare than both semi mechanized and mechanized 
farms. These are astounding results which point out the failure of 
large farms due to various institutional constraints and verify the 
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Figure 5.2. Average net value added per hectare 
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conclusions reached in Chapter 4 regarding farm corporations and 
agribusiness. 
But let us investigate further. Table 5.7 provides data regarding 
cultivated area, seed use, output and yield per hectare for three 
major grains under different categories of farm size. The data 
speak for itself and requires no extensive discussion. For instance, 
in the light of data in Table 5.5 and the knowledge that large 
farms utilize a disproportionate amount of technical inputs, the 
yield per hectar for wheat is one of the lowest for lands over 50 
hectare; and the yield per hectare for rice has the lowest yield for 
enterprises over 100 hectares. 
It can therefore be safely concluded, that the growth rate in 
the production of some of the major crops has been due to the increase 
in the amount of cultivated land and not productivity and that the 
stagnant average yield for major cereals is largely due to the 
stagnant state and nature of the Iranian agricultural production. 
According to the SECTIRM study; 
"When cereal production increases it seems more due to an 
increase in area than an increase in yield. The farming 
methods used are often rudimentary, even if they are becoming 
increasingly mechanized. A similar remark can be made as 
regard sowing. 
Agricultural Imports 
As it was mentioned earlier, because of rapid increases in oil 
revenues, Iran has experienced a rapid growth rate in GNP and 
Table 5.7. Harvesting area, seed application, output, and yield for 
selected crops under different farm size classifications, 
1974 
Measures; Harvested area (100 HA); output and seed 
(1000 MT); yield (one MT)^  
Wheat 
area 
Categories harvested seed output yield 
Under 1 HA 5.3 10.1 83.7 1.6 
1 to under 2 HA 11.5 18.0 111.5 1.0 
2 to under 5 HA 62.1 81.6 409.6 0.7 
5 to under 10 HA 113.0 122.3 543.0 0.5 
10 to under 50 HA 291.0 254.2 1007.3 0.4 
50 to under 100 HA 37.7 36.3 200.0 0.5 
100 HA and over 77.0 85.9 531.5 0.7 
S^ource: Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical 
Results for Agriculture, 1974 (Tehran; Plan Organization, 1976). 
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Barley Rice 
area area 
harvested seed output yield harvested seed output yield 
1.4 2,6 20.0 1.4 4.3 5.5 117.8 2.7 
2.0 3.0 20.0 1.0 9.4 11.5 230.9 2,5 
13.9 16.4 84.8 0.6 12.7 13.1 291.6 2.3 
38.5 28.9 131.4 0.5 3.6 3.5 81.7 2.3 
69.7 60.6 268.7 0.4 4.2 37.8 79.7 1.9 
7.9 6.9 45.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 9.9 2.7 
16.9 20.2 181.4 1.1 0.8 0.6 14.4 1.7 
V 
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consequently the real incomes. This, of course, has affected the 
demand for food causing higher prices and shortages of various 
commodities. One would suspect that this would be a sufficient 
reason for increasing productivity. But this has not been forth­
coming largely due to the incoherent government agricultural policies 
which have overlooked the plight of the millions of small peasant 
producers (some aspects of these policies concerning farm organizations 
and distribution of credit were discussed in Chapter 4 and others 
will be discussed in the following chapter). The government's 
e}^ lanation for the lagging production is that small farmers are not 
generally responsive to normal economic incentives. The 
government's solution has been the concentrated emphasis on farm 
corporations and agribusinesses and a heavy reliance on imports. 
In fact, given the increased expenditure on agricultural 
goods, the imports can be viewed as another indicator, although an 
indirect one, for evaluating the performance of the Iranian 
agricultural sector. It should be noted that in 1966 Iran was a 
net exporter of agricultural goods, but by 1976 it has become a 
substantial importer. Table 5.7 shows the import of major agricultural 
commodities since 1966. Drastic increases in imports can be noticed 
for every agricultural products This is particularly true for the 
import of food and animals which increased from a meager $60.3 million 
in 1966 to $1.15 billion in 1976. Every major food category, 
Table 5.7. Import oif major agricultural commodities, 1966-76 (million dollars? 
Commodity 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Total merchandise 
Total ag. products 
Food & animais 
Live animals 
Meat 
Cereals 
Sugar 
Fruit & veg. 
Others 
Crude materials 
Animal & veg. oil 
Agricultural 
Requisites 
928.3 1194.0 1408.9 
119.5 96.9 142.4 
60.3 46.0 84.8 
1.7 2.4 
0.6 0.8 
2.0 
0.5 
16.1 
17.8 12.9 
1.6 1.0 
22.1 22.0 
Beverages & tobacco 0.3 
7.9 45.9 
8.2 
0.3 
1.2 
26.3 
0.6 
19.9 23.3 25.6 
39.0 27,3 31.3 
29.7 40.2 43.8 
1525.6 
100.9 
45.2 
5.9 
4.4 
1.5 
5,9 
1.0 
26.5 
0,6 
27,4 
27.7 
41.7 
1648.0 2081.2 2543.2 3770.0 
121.2 253.6 304,7 433,3 
51.4 173.3 192.4 310.3 
8,7 8.0 12,7 23,8 
4,3 5,3 6,3 20,8 
4,7 104,9 93.2 114,4 
4,9 10,8 25,7 76,2 
1,1 2,6 3,7 17,5 
27,6 41,7 50,6 57,6 
0,6 2,7 3.5 5.2 
27.1 31.8 50.8 56.9 
42.2 45.8 58.0 60-1 
43,5 50,0 72,6 76,8 
5979.0 
1263.9 
957.6 
29,9 
42.4 
539.5 
142.6 
79.1 
124.2 
10.9 
69.5 
255.9 
168.2 
11852.1 
1960.2 
1602,9 
67.6 
111.4 
566.2 
452.5 
132.3 
183.0 
15.7 
84.6 
257.0 
408.5 
12841.8 
1479.8 
1154.7 
85.5 
111.3 
321.8 
244.9 
179.0 
212.3 
77.2 
98.1 
149,8 
241.4 
Sources: FAO, FAO Trade Yearbook^  1972-77 (Rome: FAO, 1973-78). 
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especially meat and cereals, has experienced exceedingly high rate 
of increase in imports. 
The limited data for 1977-78 suggests that the import of major 
food items has escalated even more rapidly. The import of wheat for 
1977 was estimated at 1.5 million tons, more than twice the amount 
in the previous year. Rice imports increased from 3.1 million tons 
in 1975 to 5 million tons in 1977.^  Similarly, the import of sheep 
and goats increased to 2.5 million heads, a rise of 45 percent. The 
import of both poultry meat and eggs also rose by 83 and 30 percents 
respectively.^  
This sharp rise in imports has made Iran the largest Mideast 
cash market for U.S. farm products. In 1977, the U.S. exports of 
agricultural commodities to Iran cimounted to about half the size of 
7 
exports to USSR. Israel, Australia, and France are the other major 
suppliers. This continuing decline in Iran's rate of self sufficiency 
is a direct consequence of government's "oil for food" policy which 
we discussed in Chapter 3. 
Admittedly, the rising imports is partly due to the rapidly 
rising demand for food products, but they also indicate that under 
the conditions of excess demand the agricultural sector has not 
experienced an adequate rate of growth. Studies indicate that the 
rate of growth in agriculture has been slightly below the rate of growth 
in population. We can now turn to examine this matter in more 
detail. 
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Per Capita Food and Agricultural Output 
We can use the indices of per capita food and agricultural 
production as another criterion for performance of the agricultural 
sector. Table 5.9 and Figure 5.3 provide the relevant data for this 
analysis. The reader should be warned that the indices are based 
on inflated official data for 1974-77 (see footnotes to Tables 5.2 
and 5.8). But nevertheless, the data clearly indicate, that the 
general trend of the indices is only slightly above the original. 
The Growth Rate of the Agricultural Sector 
The reader should note that since 1963 Iran has experienced not 
only a land reform, but also booming oil revenues and a rapidly 
growing GNP. However, under the last three plans the growth rate 
in the agricultural sector has fallen drastically short of the 
government's targets. During this period agriculture has actually 
experienced a very slow rate of growth, perhaps slightly below the 
rate of growth in population. 
Table 5.9 provides the official rates of growth for agricultural 
value added. The official growth rate for crop production was 
6.4 percent under the Third Plan, but fell to 3.3 percent under the 
Fifth Plan. It should be recalled that crop output coii$)rise over 
65 percent of the total value added in agriculture. The overall 
official growth rate for agriculture is 4.8, 3.9, and 4.6 percent 
under the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Plans respectively. The actual 
Table 5.8. Indices of per capita food and agricultural production, 1959-71 = 100^ ' ^  
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978= 
Agriculture 101 102 101 97 105 105 106 104 109 109 103 
Food 100 101 101 97 105 105 106 106 110 111 105 
S^ource: FAO, Production Yearbook, 1977 (Rome: FAO, 1978), pp. 73-80. 
N^ote: Data provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for 1970-74 period are 
extensively lower: 1960-65 = 100, 1970 = 102, 1971 = 95, 1972 = 102, 1973 = 104, and 1974 = 
102. See U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Agricultural Situation in Africa and West Asia," 
Foreign Agricultural Report No. 108 (May 1975), p. 42. 
1978 figures are computed by the author based on preliminary estimates provided by 
the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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food 
agriculture 
1969-71 = 100 
120 
100 
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 Years 
Figure 5.3. Indices of per capita food and agricultural 
production 
Table 5.9. Official growth rates of agricultural value added, 1963-78 (percents)^  
Third Plan Fourth Plan (1968-72) Fifth Plan (1973-78) 
(1963-67) Actual Planned Actual Planned 
Crop output 6.40 3.90 3.30 5.90 
Livestock^  0.70 3.50 6.70 8.30 
Forestry 5.56 10. 30 10.80 
Fishery 5.80 7.50 
Total 4.80 3.90 5.0 4.60 7.0 
S^ource: Bank Markazi Iran, National Income of Iran, 1959-71 (Tehran: Bank Markazi, 1974), 
p. 28 for years 1963-67; Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1972 (Tehran: 
Bank Markazi, 1973), p. 198 for years 1968-72; and Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report and Balance 
Sheet, 1977 (Tehran: Bank Markazi, 1978), pp. 170-71 for years 1973-78. 
Includes games. 
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growth rates under the Fourth and the Fifth Plans were both lower 
than the planned growth rates of 5.0 and 7.0 percent. 
But as various studies indicate the official rates of growth 
are inflated and the real rates of growth for agriculture were 
substantially lower. The real rate of growth during the Fourth Plan 
was estimated at about 2 to 3 percent which was about the same or 
lower than the rate of growth in population. According to Aresvik: 
"Analysis of three related indicators—expenditure, according 
to household expenditure surveys; imports; and prices—suggest 
the following conclusions regarding the performance of the 
agricultural sector in terms of output over the period 1959-72; 
over the period as a whole, agricultural output grew at about 
the same rate as the population. In the Fourth Plan, however 
the rate of growth was probably slower than the population. 
The finding of the international sources, including those 
invited by the Iranian Government, also suggest a slower rate of 
growth for agriculture than the population during the Fourth Plan: 
"According to the information I have been able to gather, the 
growth rate of the agricultural sector during the Fourth Plan 
was between 2 to 3 percent and the livestock production had 
either zero or negative rate of growth.^ Concerning the 
growth rate during the Fourth Plan, BIRD has stated that the  ^
growth rate was slower than the rate of growth in population." 
The studies of the growth rate during the Fifth Plan suggest 
an even greater exaggeration in official figu^ res: 
"...the real growth rate in agriculture is considerably lower 
than the official figures; that is little more than 2.5 percent 
or less than annual increase in population."^ ® 
Even the more optoraistic estimates by foreign observers indicate 
a growth rate slightly above the population: 
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"But in recent years agricultural production has just managed 
to keep a little ahead of the annual population growth rate 
of over 3 percent. 
Conclusion 
The preceding discussion suggests that the performance of the 
Iranian agriculture in terms of the output has been very poor, 
especially for a country which has experienced a tremendous growth 
rate in GNP and increasing amount of oil revenues which had removed 
all financial constraints for the development of agriculture. 
Land reform, increased oil revenues and hence greater investment in 
agriculture, and application of greater amount of technical inputs 
have not substantially changed the face of the Iranian agriculture. 
The yields for major crops have remained about the same. The stagnant 
productivity is a direct consequence of the stagnant state of the 
traditional methods of production. Whatever increases in output 
which were accomplished have been largely due to the increase in 
the size of farming area. The addition of marginal lands has not 
played a dominant role in overshadowing the rising productivity on 
other lands. But even if this was not true, it would only indicate 
a very slow rate of technological progress in agriculture. 
As the discussion in this and preceding chapters indicate, the 
problem of the Iranian agriculture stems from the low priority 
which agriculture receives in government development planning and 
the misplaced priorities within the agriculture itself. The development 
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of the Iranian agriculture requires a long run policy devoted to 
a comprehensive and uprooting changes in agriculture which is a 
hopeful wish from the present government. 
Even with moderate changes, potential for accomplishing self-
sufficiency within a relatively short period exists. An FAO study 
of the Iranian projected demand and supply up to 1990 under two 
alternative "medium" and "high" plans indicate that by 1990 Iran 
has the potential to become self-sufficient in almost every major 
12 
crop as well as livestock production. This indicates that given 
the selection and implementation of appropriate policies, relative 
self-sufficiency could be realized in the short run. In Chapters 
6 and 8 we attempt to explore some of the possible and essential. 
changes required in order to accomplish and fulfill this task. 
136 
FOOTNOTES 
F^AO, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (February 1978):13. 
2 
Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Results for Agriculture, 
1974 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1976), Tables 15 and 260. 
C^enter for National Spatial Planning, Rural Geography, Document 
No. 2 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1976), pp. 78-88. 
"^ Ibid., p. 85. 
F^AG, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 1 (May 1978), pp. 29-37. 
See also Michael E. Kurtzig. "U.S. Farm Exports to Iran Rebound," 
Foreign Agriculture 15 (October 1977):2-4. 
D^erived from data in FAO, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 1 (June 
1978):23, 29, 37. 
7 
Aubrey C. Robinson. "Iran Emerging as Top Cash Customer for 
U.S. Farm Products in Middle East," Foreign Agriculture 16 (December 
1978);6-9. 
0 
Oddvar Aresvik, The Agricultural Development of Iran (New York: 
Praeger, 1976), p. 52. 
9 
Rene Domone, Few Observations Concerning the Situation of the 
Iranian Agriculture, Persian Translation (Tehran: n.p., 1976), p. 6. 
"^^ Robert E. Looney, A Development Strategy for Iran Through the 
1980S (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 76. 
^^ Charles Treakle, "Iran's Approach: Import Commodities Plus 
Skills," Foreign Agriculture 13 (May 1975):6. 
12 
FAO, Perspective Study of Agricultural Development for Iran 
(Rome: FAO, 1974). 
137 
CHAPTER 6 
PRICE STABILIZATION AND PRICE FLOOR POLICIES 
As it was mentioned in Chapter 4, about 80 percent of the 
farm families in Iran are engaged in traditional agriculture at 
a subsistance or semisubsistence level. The average farm land 
per family is near 1.4 hectares with an annual net revenue 
yield of approximately 50 thousand Rials (= $665).^  Considering 
the fact that the average size of a farm family is 5.4 persons 
per family it is obvious that in the majority of cases the farm 
income must be supplemented with non-farm employment. 
Although under each Plan the government has stated that raising 
rural income is one of its major objectives, nevertheless it has 
traditionally followed a policy of maintaining a low level of prices 
for agricultural commodities. This was accomplished through reliance 
on inports and the worsening of terms of trade against agriculture 
as the result of rising prices of manufactured goods. Obviously 
increasing rural income requires rapid introduction of improved 
technology and increased productivity. However, low level of income 
which does not allow for savings and capital accumulation, lack of 
adequate price incentives, and the failure of government development 
policies are the major impediments to achieving high growth rate 
and development in agriculture. 
In this chapter we examine two related aspects of government 
market regulation policies in agriculture: price stabilization and 
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price floor programs. Since wheat plays a significant role in the 
Iranian agriculture and because of the greater availability of 
data concerning this crop, the major emphasis of this study will 
focus on wheat. 
Since early I960's the government has launched an intervention­
ist program for major cereals, particularly wheat, for the purpose of 
maintaining stable prices for bread and providing economic incen­
tives for increased productivity and adoption of inproved technology. 
The primary objective of the program was to guarantee sufficient 
supply for consumption and maintain stable prices for both producers 
and consumers. The program was implemented through the Cereal 
Organization which was responsible for purchasing surplus output 
in good crop years and thereby building the reserve stock and 
ensuring the supply in bad years through reserve release and imports. 
Since the program required adequate storage facilities, the 
Cereal Organization in conjunction with related ministries was 
empowered to establish storage capacity. 
However, neither of the primary objectives of the price 
stabilization program have been accomplished. Table 5.1 provides 
the average wholesale prices of major crops for 1965-78 period. 
As it is indicated in Table 6.1 the wholesale price of the major 
crops have not been stabilized and the fluctuations in certain 
years are very significant. Since wheat and barley constitute a 
sizeable portion of agricultural production and total value added 
Table 6.1. Average wholesale prices of major crops (Rials/kilogram)^  
Crop 1966 1967 1963 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1977 1978 
Wheat 7.4 6.0 5.5 6.1 7.7 8.4 7.1 7.9 12.6 10.6 11. 3 13.5 
Barley 4.1 4.6 4.5 4.1 5.8 7.3 5.1 6.4 9.8 9. 3 8. 7 10.6 
Rice 27. 3 29.8 30.8 29.2 29.3 32.3 34.9 37.5 55.6 70.0 89. 0 91.2 
Local cotton 37. 7 37.6 42.0 38.6 37.8 42.2 50.0 59.4 71.9 IL5.0 1L8. 0 95.0 
Potatoes 6.1 9.1 7.3 6.0 6.6 12.2 12.1 7.2 10.8 18.5 19. 6 19.8 
Onions b n. a. n.a. 8.5 7.6 5.3 6.1 8.5 7.1 7.6 12.0 20. 0 20.0 
Beans 14.1 13.8 15.5 13.1 14.4 19.6 29.6 27.9 27.1 32.0 60. 0 76.0 
Peas 16. 5 14.1 13. 2 11.2 11.7 19.6 31.4 26.4 22.3 23.0 36. 0 38.0 
S^ources: Ministry of Agriculture and Tehran Economist, various issues. 
D^ata not available. 
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in agriculture, the fluctuation in prices carry significant conse­
quences for the development of agriculture. The high level of 
price risk and uncertainty reduces the effectiveness of the price 
mechanism as a viable means of providing economic incentives for 
adoption of improved technology. 
Table 6.2 shows the national and regional domestic wholesale 
price variations for wheat. The national variations are obtained 
by averaging available seasonal province prices in the given years. 
However, due to the limitation of the data, price information from 
every province could not be obtained and for some years as few as 
only six provinces are used in calculating the average high and low 
wholesale prices. 
As Table 6.2 indicates the domestic price variations for wheat 
are significant. For the 1972-78 period the variation at the national 
level was as high as 26 percent in 1977. The minimum variation 
during this period was 2.3 Rials or 10 percent. Similar results 
can be observed for regional variations with a minimum of 15 percent 
in 1978 and as high as 53 percent in 1972. 
It is clear from the data in the above two tables that the 
objective of stable prices has not been accomplished. In fact, the 
urban population has been faced with inflationary food prices 
especially in post 1970 period. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the index 
numbers of agricultural and general wholesale prices as well as 
retail prices of food and cost of living for the 1964-74 period. 
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Table 6.2. Variations in domestic wholesale prices of wheat, 
1972-78 (RialsAilograms)^  
National variations Regional variations 
Year Low High % Low High % 
1972 6.7 8.0 19 5.7 8.7 53 
1973 . 6.8 8.8 29 6.1 8.3 36 
1974 9,0 10.8 20 8.3 9.7 17 
1975 9.2 11.2 22 8.7 10.1 21 
1976 9.3 11.6 25 8.8 10.6 20 
1977 10.3 13.0 26 9.8 12.2 25 
1978 12.7 14.0 10 11.5 13.2 15 
S^ources; Ministry of Agriculture; and Tehran Economist, various 
issues. 
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Table 6.3. Index numbers of agricultural and wholesale prices 
(1970 = 100)3 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Agricultural 93 93 92 92 94 100 118 126 133 164 
products 
General 93 93 93 94 97 100 107 113 124 144 
S^ource; FAG, FAQ Production Yearbook 1975 (Rome; FAO, 1976), 
Table 147. 
Table 6.4. Index numbers of retail prices of food and cost of living 
(1970 = 100)^  
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Food 96 95 97 97 99 100 107 116 124 144 
Cost of 93 93 94 95 98 100 104 111 122 139 
living 
S^ource; FAG, FAQ Production Yearbook, 1975 (Rome; FAO, 1976), 
Table 148. 
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During 1965-69 period the index numbers for both general and 
agricultural products are relatively stable, but the post 1970 period 
indicates a rapid rise. The same results can be observed for the 
retail prices of food. Furthermore, Tables 6.3 and 5,4 also indicate 
that the wholesale prices of agricultural products and the retail 
prices of food have risen more sharply than the general wholesale 
prices and cost of living. 
The government's failure to stabilize wholesale prices is 
directly associated to two aspects of its stabilization program: 
(1) ineffective purchase-sale program of major crops during the 
periods of excess demand and excess supply; and (2) ineffectiveness 
in establishing price floors and minimum price guarantees. 
As it was pointed out above the nexus of the stabilization 
program was to purchase excess supply during good harvesting years 
and to eliminate excess demand through sales from reserve stock 
and imports during bad crop years. In order to fulfill this task 
the Cereal Organization was empowered to establish storage capacity 
and adequate facilities. 
In practice, however, the program was never effectively 
implemented. Table 6.5 provides relevant information regarding wheat 
production and annual purchase and sales by the cereals Organization. 
It can be seen that government's purchase as a percentage of total 
output is very insignificant and with wide variations. Furthermore, 
the stock of wheat at the end of each year has experienced drastic 
Table 6.5. Aggregate wheat production and annual government sale and purchase, 1966-1976 
(1000 tons and Rials/KG)® 
Stock at Annual purchase Stock at 
Wholesale beginning Annual as % of total Annual end of 
Year Output price of year purchase output Imports sales year 
1966 3190 7.4 89-0 197.2 6.0 188.2 241.9 232.5 
1967 3800 6.0 232.5 246.3 6.4 23.7 73.2 369.1 
1968 4400 5.5 369.1 244.7 5.6 53.3 306.2 
1969 4100 6.1 306.2 9. 3 0.0 102.9 209.6 
1970 4260 7.7 209.6 4.0 0.0 118.3 310.6 19.7 
1971 3700 8.4 19.7 0.8 0.0 845.7 804.4 61.8 
1972 3900 7.1 61.8 5.0 0.0 601.8 524,8 143.9 
1973 4546 7,9 143.9 3.1 0.0 543.3 593.7 96.6 
1974 2886 12.6 96. 6 116.2 4.0 1355.3 1370.8 208.5 
1975 4650 10.9 208.5 496.7 10.7 1284.7 1553.8 436.2 
1976 5100 10.6 436,2 793.9 15.6 830.4 1649.1 411.5 
S^ources: Columns 2 and 3 from Tables 5.2 and 6.1; Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, 
Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 1976 (Tehran; Plan Organization, 1977), p- 236 for 1966; and Plan 
and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 1977 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 
1978), p. 235 for 1967-76 period. 
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fluctuations. This inadequate level of purchase and stock buildup 
is therefore, a major cause for the failure to stabilize prices. 
Initially, lack of storage facilities provided a constraint 
to an effective storage and supply control program, but with the 
construction of additional silos increasing the capacity to near 
one million tons silo capacity can no longer be considered as a 
significant limitation. As Table 6.5 indicates the reserve stock 
has never approached full capacity. 
Although total silo capacity cannot be considered as a significant 
constraint, the distribution of storage facilities are a limiting 
factor. Most silos are located at the provincial capitals and there 
is little storage at the village level. Lack of adequate roads and 
high cost of transportation do not permit the small peasant farmers 
to t.a}!;e advantage of the government silos and minimum price 
guarantee. As it was pointed out in Chapter 4, the rural cooperatives 
which were formed for the purpose of marketing the output of local 
producers account for the purchase of less than one percent of 
aggregate output. Consequently, small producers are constantly 
threatened by heavy losses and are left at the mercy of the 
middlemen and money lenders. 
The other aspect of government policy—the establishment of 
price floors—has also failed to accomplish the stated objectives. 
Concomitant with the price stabilization program, the government 
initiated the minimum price guarantee program to reduce price 
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uncertainties and fluctuations in farmers' income. But the govern­
ment's purchasing price has often been below the market price and 
sometimes below the cost of production. Prior to 1974, the guaranteed 
minimum price for wheat was 6 Rials (= $0.08) per kilogram. As 
price data in Table 6.5 indicate, the market price has been below 
the guaranteed price only during 1967 and 1968 period and that the 
difference for both of these years is not very significant. In 
1974 the government announced new minimum prices for major agricul­
tural commodities. 
Table 6.6 provides information regarding the purchasing price 
by the Cereals Organization for selected main crops. The guaranteed 
price for wheat was raised to 10 Rials (= $0.13) per kilogram and 
the newly established price floor for barley was set at 7.5 Rials 
{= $0.10) per kilogram. The purchasing price for corn, sugar beets, 
and soybeans were established at 9.5, 2.3 and 24 Rials per kilogram 
respectively. 
Again the comparison of tiiese government guaranteed prices with 
the price information in Table 6.1 clearly shows that the price 
floors are still unrealistic and in many instances substantially 
below the market price. But even if the price floors were higher, 
few farmers would be able to take advantage of the guaranteed price 
since there are no local systems of delivery and storage. Such an 
infrastructure constraint and the government's failure in its purchasing 
program reduces the effectiveness of any price floor policy as a 
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Table 6.6. Government-guaranteed prices for selected major crops, 
1975 (Rials/kilogram) & 
Minimum price 
Crop (Rials/kilogram) (U.S. dollars/kilogram) 
Wheat 10.0 0.13 
Barley 7.5 0.10 
Com 9.5 0.13 
Sugar beets 2.3 0.03 
Soybeans 24.0 0.32 
S^ource: Cereals, Sugar and Tea Organization. 
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means of protecting the producers income. Thus the only alternative 
open to small producers is to sell their output to the local middle­
men often up to 40 percent below the announced price floor and usually 
2 in payment toward previous credit advances, A 1968 CENTO study 
indicates that in some areas the wheat price was 3.5 Rials per 
3 kilogram in 1967 and 4.5 Rials in 1968. These prices were sub­
stantially below the minimum guaranteed price. 
Various studies indicate that at government guaranteed minimum 
prices the farmers can have an annual revenue slightly above cost 
of production. Table 6.7 provides information about cost of wheat 
production for peasant producers for 1972-73 period in Talebabad 
Village. It should be noted that the cost information is approximate 
and that the original study by Professor Safinezhad did not include 
the cost of family labor.According to Table 6.7 the total cost 
of production per hectare of wheat land is 6000 Rials (= $80) 
excluding family labor and 9000 Rials (= $120) including family 
labor. It should be noted that the author's estimate of own labor, 
3000 Rials per hectare is a very low figure considering prevalent 
wage rate in Talebabad. Furthermore, storage and transportation 
costs are not included. 
To calculate the approximate revenue and net revenus we must 
make certain assumptions: the peasant farmer is able to sell all 
output at the market price; or the peasant producer is able to sell 
all output at the government guaranteed price. This assumption 
149 
Table 5.7. Cost of production per hectare for wheat on peasant farms 
in Talebabad Village, 1972-73 
Item Kilogram and Rials Kilogram and U.S. dollars 
Plowing 500 6.67 
Disc 250 3.33 
Seed 500 6.67 
Harvester 1500 20.00 
Grinding 450 6.00 
Miscellaneous^  300 4.00 
Rent 2500 33.33 
Total 6000 80.00 
Family labor^  3000 40.00 
Total cost 9000 120.00 
D^oes not include storage and transportation cost. 
'^ Estimated by the author. 
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enables us to preclude the possibility of sale to middlemen at 
rates below market price or the guaranteed price, a practice which 
as discussed above is quite common. 
Table 6.8 provides relevant information concerning revenue, cost 
and net revenue per hectare of wheat land in Talebabad Village. 
The yield per hectare is 2000 kilograms which compared to the national 
average is very high. The national average yield per hectare for 1973 
was about 7.2 kilograms (see Table 5.5 in Chapter 5). The estimated 
market price is 8.5 Rials per kilogram, an optimistic figure since 
the average annual market price for wheat in the same period was 
below 8 Rials (see Table 5.1). If we account for the family labor 
cost and assume all output is sold at the market price, the net 
revenue per hectare would be approximately 7958 Rials (= $226). 
If family labor is included and all output is sold at the government 
minimum price, the net revenue would be approximately 3000 Rials 
(= $56). 
The average size of land for the landowning peasants in Talebabad 
is 10 hectares per family. Thus under optimistic calculations the 
annual average net revenue per family in 1972-73 in Talebabad was 
about $1060 if all output was sold at the market price and $560 
if all output was sold at the government guaranteed minimum price-
If we extend this analysis nationwide, the results would be 
very discouraging. Talebabad is a relatively prosperous village 
with fair supply of water and fertile land. Considering that the 
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Table 6.8. Approximate revenue, cost and net revenue per hectare for 
wheat in Talebcibad Village, 1972-73 (Kilograms, Rials and 
U.S. dollars) 
Item Kilograms and Rials Kilograms and U.S. dollar 
Yield 2000 2000 
Market price/KG 8.5 0.113 
Total revenue from 
Market sale^  16958 226 
Total cost^  9000 120 
Net revenue 7958 106 
Government guaranteed 
price 
6.0 0.08 
Total revenue from 
Sale to government^  12000 160 
Total cost^  9000 106 
Net revenue 3000 56 
D^oes not include hay. 
D^oes not include storage and transportation cost. 
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national average yield per hectare for wheat in 1973 was 7.2 kilograms 
and assuming that in other areas the total cost is not substantially 
below that estimated for Talebabad, it becomes apparent that many 
peasant producers had an average cost of production at about the 
same or below the minimum guaranteed price. 
In 1974 the government increased the guaranteed price of wheat to 10 
Rials per kilogram. But the new price floor was still unrealistic 
since the post 1973-74 escalated rate of inflation had substantially 
increased the price of resources. 
Table 6.9 shows the prices paid by the Iranian farmers per 
100 kilograms of plant nutrient for 1970-74. The prices of all 
fertilizers over 1970-73 period were steady or even in some cases 
declining. The 1974 prices, however, indicate substantial increases. 
The last column in Table 6.9 shows the 1973-74 percent increase 
in prices. The highest increases can be observed for ammonium nitrates 
which experienced a 57% rise. With the exception of Urea, 14 percent, 
in all cases the price rise was over 20 percent. Unfortunately 
concrete data about the post 1974 prices of fertilizers do not exist, 
but the scattered evidence suggests that the price hike has continued 
at an even more rapid rate. Similar observations can be made in 
regard to the prices of machinery. For instance, in the past two 
decades the price of a combine has increased by over 100 times 
whereas the price of wheat has only increased by about 50 percent. 
Table 6.9. Prices paid by the Iranian farmers per 100 KG of plant nutrient^  
Prices in. Rials Prices in U.S. dollars^  1973-74*^  
Type of fertilizer 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 % Increase 
Nitrogenous fertilizer 
Ammonium sulphate 2667 2238 2238 2238 2524 35.2 29.5 29.5 29.5 36.3 23 
Ammonium nitrates 1673 1673 1673 2000 2885 22.1 22.1 22.1 26.4 41.5 57 
Urea 1783 1728 1673 1876 1957 23.5 22.8 22.1 24.8 28.2 14 
Phosphate fertilizers 
Superphosphate, 25% 
PgOg, or over 1772 1717 1674 1774 2174 23.4 22.7 22.1 23.4 31.3 34 
Potash fertilizers 
Potassium sulphate 1640 1640 1640 1700 2000 21.6 21.6 21.6 22.4 28.8 29 
S^ource; FAO, ]?AO Production Yearbook, 1975 (Rome; FAO, 1976), Table 144. 
C^alculated by the author. 
1^972 exchange rate of $1.00 = 75 Rials. 
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It should also be noted that the announced price floor was not 
only below the domestic market price but also less than the price 
paid by the government for the purchase of wheat in the international 
market. For example, in 1974-75 the price paid at the port of delivery 
for the U.S. wheat was 12-13 Rials. 
Of course, most of the small peasant producers in Iran do 
not utilize machinery and chemical fertilizers in production. The 
reasons are obvious in the light of the above discussion and the low 
income received by the farmers. But it is this very subsistence 
nature of the Iranian agriculture and the continuous presence of 
excess demand which necessitates an effective pricing policy. To 
break away from this viscious circle of poverty a fair guaremteed 
price or imput subsidy and credit must be established. Otherwise 
one cannot e^ gect the adoption of improved technology and modern 
inputs in the absence of viable economic incentives and given the 
low income of rural families. 
Most recent studies on government guaranteed price suggest 
that the price floor for wheat should be set at 15 Rials (= $0.20) 
per kilogram. This conclusion is based on the computation of the 
national average cost per hectare for the irrigated and rain-fed 
lands. Tables 6,10 and 6.11 suifûnârizê the relevant data for the 
calculation of average cost on both types of lands. 
Both tables give the cost breakdown for wheat production on 
one hectare of irrigated and dry lands. The total cost does not 
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Table 6.10. Cost of production on one hectare of irrigated wheat land 
Items Rials - KG U.S. dollars - KG 
Rent 
Plowing - disc - sowing - planting 
150 KG seed 
100 KG ammonium phosphate 
150 KG urea 
Labor cost for fertilizer application 
in fall and spring 
Cost of weed extermination 
Labor and capital cost for water 
Harvesting cost 
Others^  
Total cost*^  
Average yield per hectare'^  
r*r\C! f' y V-î 1 <-\rrv*pTn 
10000 
1000 
1800 
1200 
1500 
500 
1800 
4000 
4500 
5470 
31779 
2500 
12.7 
133.3 
13.3 
24.0 
16.0 
20.0  
6.7 
24.0 
53.3 
60.0  
72.9 
423.9 
2500.0 
on 
S^ource: Derived from George Sergisian, "The Price of One Kilogram 
of Wheat Should Not Be Below 15 Rials," Tehran Economist 1203 (July 16, 
1977), pp. 29, 50. 
I^ncludes packaging and interest on 6 month loan at the annual 
rate of 14 percent. 
b^oes not include storage, transportation to the silo and own labor 
cost. 
'^ Average yield is calculated based on the estimate of 3500 KG per 
hectare in good years and 1500 KG per hectare in bad years. 
156 
Table 6.11. Cost of production on one hectare of rain^ fed wheat land^  
Item Rials - KG U.S. dollars - KG 
Rent 1000 13.3 
Plowing - disc - planting 1000 13.3 
60 KG of seeds 720 9.6 
100 KG of urea 1000 13.3 
Labor cost for fertilizer 
application 
250 3.3 
Harvesting cost 1500 20.0 
Others^  1238 16.5 
Total cost*^  6708 89.4 
Average yield per hectare 550 550.0 
Average cost per kilogram 12.2 0.16 
S^ource: Derived from George Sergisian, "The price of one kilogram 
of wheat should not be below 15 Rials," Tehran Economist 1203 (July 16, 
1977), pp. 29, 50. 
I^ncludes packaging and interest on 5 month loan at the annual 
rate of 14 percent. 
*^ Does not include the storage and transportation to the silo and 
own labor cost. 
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include cost of storage, transportation to the silo, and own labor 
cost. The total cost on irrigated lands amounts to 31779 Rials 
(= $423.9) per hectare. With an optimistic national average yield 
of 2500 kilograms per hectare on irrigated lands, the average cost 
per kilogram is 12,7 Rials (= $0.17). Similar computation in Table 
5.9 for dry lands yields average cost of 12.2 Rials (= $0.16). 
Thus given these figures and considering the unaccounted costs, 
if the government aims to pursue the guaranteed price policy, it 
should set the price at approximately 15 Rials (= $0.20). 
In view of the fact that the average international price of 
wheat for the same period was about 12-14 Rials per kilogram, it 
may be argued that the government guaranteed price of 15 Rials would 
be very high and would tend to maintain farms which are inefficient 
and low in productivity and that the elimination of inefficient and less 
productive farms through competition is a natural course in the 
development of agriculture. But even under the most favorable 
conditions.in agriculture, due to the externalities and absence of 
compétition in other sectors labor may still hang back in agri­
culture despite of declining income.^  
In developing countries such as Iran, the primary problem is 
not so much the elimination of small farms by the more advanced 
mechanized farms—a consequence of the development of capitalist 
production in agriculture—but rather elevating the country's 
agriculture from its subsistence state. It is obvious 
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that the presence and knowledge of advanced technology does not 
necessarily mean its substitution for the more traditional methods 
of production. Advanced technology is only adopted when its price 
relative to traditional resources declines and the uncertainties 
associated with it are reduced to a minimum. In a country like 
Iran, this would require initial incentives, provided by the 
government. Furthermore, the already crowded urban areas with 
substantial level of unemployment are not ready to absorb additional 
surplus labor. Thus, the productive exit of labor from agriculture 
requires first the development of capitalist production in agriculture 
itself; and second, a viable and growing industrial sector to absorb 
the additional unskilled labor. Indeed it would be difficult to 
consider the transfer of labor in developing countries such as 
Iran as productive for such a transfer is the manifestation of the 
bankruptcy of the agricultural sector and a direct consequence of 
the prevalent abject poverty rather than the growth of mechanized 
and advanced capitalist farms. 
If we free ourselves from the illusion that Iran is a country 
with capitalist mode of production and come to grips with its 
semi-feudal nature, then it would become clear that the development 
of the country is very much dependent upon the development of its 
agriculture and that the latter requires a well-intentioned and 
comprehensive planning. At the center of such a planning lies the 
objective of raising rural income through increasing productivity 
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and investing in high yielding inputs such as human capital. Fair 
and realistic government price guarantee and/or subsidies is only 
a beginning in the correct direction. But even a reasonable price 
guarantee, if it is not part of an overall comprehensive development 
planning, could not be effective in improving the lot of millions 
of Iranian peasantry. 
The following are several recommendations which can ameliorate the 
floor pricing policy. But it should be pointed out that such measures 
are only meaningful within the context of a comprehensive development 
planning for agriculture, a formidable task which based on the past 
ej^erience cannot be fulfilled by the Shah's government. 
1. The establishment of storage facilities at the local level 
and a low cost system of transportation to the market. 
Presently, the government silos are located at the provincial 
capitals. Lack of adequate means of transportation does not 
enable the small peasant producers to take advantage of 
the market prices as well as government guaranteed price. 
2. The purchasing government organization should be willing 
to buy all output supplied to it at the announced minimum 
price. One reason for the discrepancy between the price 
floor and the market price is that the Cereal Organization 
has not been able to purchase all output offered, or to 
supply the commercial market at times of excess demand in 
order to maintain stable prices. 
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Provide a realistic and fair minimum price floor. The 
computations in this chapter indicate that the price floor 
should be set at near 15 Rials per kilogram of wheat. If 
the problem of excess demand is going to be solved through 
increasing domestic production rather than relying on 
imports, then sufficient incentives for increasing 
productivity and adopting improved technology should be 
provided. Fair minimum price guarantee is one of the 
methods of reducing the uncertainties faced by the small 
peasant producers. 
Price floors should be announced well in advance in order 
to be effective and payments to farmers should be in cash 
upon delivery with minimum amount of red tape and delays. 
In order for the government's role in stabilizing prices 
to be effective a much greater percentage of aggregate 
output should be purchased by the purchasing organization. 
So far the governments average annual purchase has amounted 
to about 5% of total output which is not significant in 
having a real impact on prices. The more advisable rate 
would appear to be near 10-20 percent of the aggregate 
output or 30-50 percent of the marketed output. This greater 
government role does not only help to stabilize prices, 
but along with fair minimum prices and easy system of delivery 
helps to reduce the high price risks faced by the small 
farmers. 
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6. Establishment of adequate grading system. 
7. Establishment of centers for agricultural services at the 
local level and making price informations readily available 
to the small producers, 
8. Creation of radio programs responsible for providing infor­
mation regarding prices, government programs, and modern 
production techniques. 
9. Providing easy and low interest credit as an incentive for 
adopting improved technology. 
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FOOTNOTES 
^Ali Moheet, "Principle Methods for Mechanization of Agriculture 
in Iran," Tehran Economist 1244 (May 6, 1978);26-27. 
2 Oddvar Aresvik, The Agricultural Development of Iran (New York: 
Praeger, 1976), p. 147. 
^CENTO, Report of the CENTO Ad Hoc Working Party on Fertilizers 
(Islamdabad: CENTO, 1968). 
^Most data used in the following discussion concerning Talebabad 
is derived from Javad Safinezhad, Boneh (Tehran; Tûss Publication, 
1974). 
^See Earl 0. Heady, Agricutural Policy Under Economic Development 
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1962). 
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CHAPTER 7 
RUmL WELFARE AND SOCIAL SERVICES 
The ultimate objective of agricultural development is to increase 
the welfare of the rural as well as urban population. Of course the 
subject of welfare rests on value judgment and therefore leads to 
varying concepts depending on individual's world outlook. 
The Iranian government's concept of welfare, however, is broad 
and ambiguous. Nevertheless, in its development plans, it has 
consistently emphasized the improvement of rural welfare as its 
primaxy objective.^ For the purpose of this dissertation and in 
order to provide a framework of analysis we can specify certain 
general aspects of welfare for which there appears to be a relative 
universal consensus. 
1. Monetary aspects such as increase in rural real income and 
equitable distribution of income expressed in terms of 
improved nutrition and housing, and the ability to purchase 
the necessities. 
2. Increase and improvement in public goods and services such 
as health, education and transportation. 
A third aspect of welfare, the nonmonetary aspects, could also 
be identified. These could be ej^ressed in terms of a feeling of 
accomplishment and fulfilled aspirations; and a greater participation 
in socio-political and developmental activities with a sense of 
pride and cohesive support for them. 
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This chapter will attempt to briefly examine certain aspects 
of welfare such as distribution of income, household expenditure, 
health and education in rural Iran. 
Distribution of Income 
There is a very limited and often unreliable data on income 
distribution in Iran. This problem of fragmentation and reliability 
of data is particularly true concerning the rural areas and does 
not allow for historical comparisons of income distribution. All 
the available government data suggest that the distribution of income 
has worsened during the past two decades. This is especially true 
regarding the urban areas for which the data are not as scarce. 
Table 7.1 shows the share of different segments of urban popu­
lation in total expenditure. According to the table the share of 
top 20 percent has increased from 51.79 percent in 1959 to 55.56 
percent in 1973. In contrast over the same period the shares of 
both middle and lower 40 percent has decreased. In 1959 the middle 
40 percent accounted for 27.54 percent of the total household expendi­
ture whereas in 1973 their share had declined to 26.06 percent. 
The lower 40 percent experienced an even greater reduction from 
13.90 in 1959 to 11.96 in 1973. 
Table 7.2 shows the decile and cumulative distribution of 
household expenditure for both rural and urban areas in 1972. 
The data indicate greater inequality in expenditure for urban areas. 
Tl.ie share of lower 20 percent of the urban households was 5.73 
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Table 7.1. Shares of expenditure in urban areas (percentage)^ 
Share of Share of Share of 
Gini top 20 middle 40 lower 40 
Years coefficient percent percent percent 
1959 0. ,4552 51. ,79 27. ,54 13. ,90 
1969 0. ,4710 52, ,91 26, 96 12. 99 
1970 0. 4849 54. ,30 26, .05 12. ,71 
1971 0, .5051 55. 48 25 .49 11. ,65 
1972 0. 4916 55. 33 26 .29 11, .88 
1973 0, .4946 55, .56 26 .06 11, .96 
^Source: Bank Markazi Iran as compiled and presented in Robert 
E. Looney, A Development Strategy for Iran Through 1980s (New York: 
Praeger, 1977), p. 49. 
Table 7.2. Decile and cioimnulative distribution of household expenditures, 1971 (percentage)^ 
Deciles 
low to high Rural areas Cumulative Urban areas^ Cumulative Total Cumulative 
1 2. 79 2 .79 1 .34 1 .34 1, .96 1 .96 
2 3. 82 G .61 2 .39 3. 73 3. 51 5 .59 
3 5. 04 11. 65 3. 60 7, .33 4. ,37 9. 84 
4 5. 90 17. 55 4. 32 11. 65 5. 14 14. 98 
5 6. 98 24, .53 5, .66 17. 31 6. 24 21, . 22  
6 8. 14 32 ,  .67 6. ,94 24. ,25 8-,39 29. ,61 
7 9. 56 42. ,23 8. 57 32. ,82 8. 51 38. 12 
8 12. 10 54. 33 11. 70 44. 52 11. ,88 50. 00 
9 14. 48 68. 81 16. 00 60. .52 15. 80 68. ,80 
10 31-19 100. 00 39. 48 100. 00 34. 20 100. 00 
^Sources; Computed based on data from Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Survey 
of Household Expenditure (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1971 and 1973). 
^There is a discrepancy in the data provided by the statistical center of Iran for distri­
bution of household expenditures in urban areas. Data published in 1971 give a greater unequal 
distribution than a 1973 publication concerning the same year. 
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compared to 6.61 for the rural areas. Furthermore, tJie share of 
top 20 percent of households in urban areas was 55.48 compared to 
45.67 in the rural areas. 
It should be noted that the above discussion is based on 
official data released by the Iranian government. Independent 
studies show a greater inequality. For instance, a special report 
by the International Labor Organization published in 1973 indicate 
that the top 10 percent of the households accounted for 40 percent 
2 
of expenditure compared to only 8 percent for the bottom 30 percent. 
Furthermore, inequality in household expenditure do not indicate 
the absolute disparaties in consumption nor the inequality in income. 
The decile distribution shows us only what percentage of total 
expenditure was spent by a certain category. The 1973 survey of 
the rural households, for example, indicates that in 1972, 67.5 
percent of the rural households had an annual expenditure below 
60,000 Rials (= $800) while 1.1 percent of the households had 
annual consumption expenditure above 240,000 Rials (= $3200).^ 
In addition, consumption expenditure disparaties are only an 
indication of inequalities in income distribution. Studies show 
that the income disparity is usually greater than household consump­
tion expenditure inequalities. For instance, the aforementioned 
1973 ILO study indicates that the income inequalities in Iran are 
high even by the standards of developing countries; 
"Even if we assume conservatively that the income inequality 
corresponding to the expenditure inequality is only one-r^fourth 
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higher, we get a Gini coefficient ranging from 0»65... .to 
0.75....Such coefficients are extremely high, higher than 
any country in East and Southeast Asia, considerably higher 
than in western countries and probably as high or higher than 
in Latin American countries for which data are available. 
We can consider the problem from a different perspective by 
deriving the per capita private consumption expenditure. Table 7.3 
shows the urban-rural ratio of private consumption expenditure per 
capita for 1966-75, hereinafter referred to as the "gap ratio." 
In 1966 the urban per capita consumption expenditure in current 
prices was 20625 Rials (column 2 f 3) compared to 9127 Rials for 
the rural areas, and the urban/rural per capita gap ratio (column 
4 T 7) at 2.26. Although per capita expenditures in current prices 
for both rural and urban areas increased by 1975, the urban-rural 
gap ratio also increased to 4.60, over double of the initial amount 
in 1966. 
The increase in gap ratio demonstrates that not only the dis­
parity of income within rural and urban areas had increased, but 
that the gap between the city and the country has also deteriorated. 
Some Iranian economists and panagyrists of the government's 
policies have suggested that the increase in income inequalities 
and the deterioration of the gap ratio is an indication of economic 
growth.^ Such proposition rests on the traditional grovTth theories 
which claimed the disparities in income distribution were a precondi­
tion for economic growth. Based on the assumption of a linear 
keynesian consumption function and a higher rate of savings by the 
Table 7.3. Urban-rural ratio of private consumption expenditure per capita (current prices)^ 
Year 
Urban Urban Rural Rural 
cons. ejç). Urban per capita cons- exp. Rural per capita Urban/rural 
(billion population cons. exp. (billion population cons. exp. per capita 
Rials) (1000) (Rials) Rials) (1000) (Rials) gap ratio 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
202 
223 
262 
295 
344 
381 
487 
649 
941 
1201 
9794 
10350 
10856 
11361 
11896 
12398 
12931 
13496 
14014 
14687 
20625 
21546 
24134 
25966 
28917 
30731 
37661 
48088 
67147 
81773 
146 
149 
161 
169 
178 
174 
204 
250 
302 
332 
15995 
16443 
16722 
17037 
17360 
17622 
17889 
18149 
18482 
18688 
9127 
9062 
9628 
9920 
10253 
9874 
11404 
13775 
16340 
17765 
2 . 2 6  
2.38 
2.51 
2 .62  
2.82 
3.11 
3.30 
3.49 
4.11 
4.60 
Source: Derived from data in Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook 
of Iran, 1976 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1977), pp. 33 and 548. 
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rich, it was argued that the disparities would allow a greater 
private investment to initiate and sustain economic growth. Today 
such assertions are largely rejected within the framework of the 
traditional growth theories. It is argued that the reduction 
in the income disparities would increase the effective demand 
for consumer goods and products from the industrial sector among the 
lower class and reinforce the industrialization drive.^ 
The Iranian government's attitude toward inequalities in income 
and gap ratio is best summarized in the following lucid passage 
from a memo by the Plan Organization: 
"Much of the evidence in economc literature suggests that the 
income distribution tends to widen during the early stages of 
economic growth, to stabilize as the economy matures and then 
to narrow as the process of economic growth begins to filter 
down to all segments of the population. 
The use of "trickling down" theories by the government is actually 
a system of justifying the inequalities in income distribution and 
legitimizing the government's policies in pursuit of traditional 
growth theories. Consequently, by adhering to such a viewpoint, 
the government is bound to consider the inequalities in income not 
as a problem but a sign of progress and prosperity. 
Employment 
As in the case of income, concrete data regarding the labor 
force over a long enough period of time to allow for the computation 
of the index of labor productivity in agriculture does not exist. 
Historically, agriculture's share of the total labor force decreased 
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from 3.4 million (.53.5 percent) in 1959 to 3»7 million (41,9 percent) 
in 1971.8 
Table 7.4 provides data on the active labor and unemployment 
according to sex, rural and urban areas classification for 1971. 
The total labor force for the whole country was 8.1 million or 28.7 
percent of the population. Of this 7 million or 85.4% (48.4% of 
population) were male and 1.1 million or 13.6% (8.1 percent of 
population) were female workers. The division of the labor force 
between sexes and among rural and urban areas was as following: 
5-2 million or 64% (31.5% of population) in rural areas from which 
4.4 million or 85% (31.5% of rural population) were male workers; 
the total labor force in urban areas was 2.9 million or 36% 
(34.8% of total population) among which the male workers accounted 
for 2.6 million or 90% (43.7% of total population) of the urban 
labor force. 
Comparison of women's share of the labor force in both rural 
and urban areas shows that women constitute a very insignificant 
portion of it. Females account for only 15% of rural and 10 percent 
of the urban labor force. This stands for the low position held 
by the women in the Iranian society. In general the incidence of 
female employment in both rural and urban areas falls heavily on 
the lower income families. 
Furthermore, of the 7.2 million employed workers in 1971, 
9.9 percent or over 700 thousand were children under the age of 14. 
Table 7.4. Active labor force and unemployment according to sex, rural and urban areas 
classification, 1971 (million persons)^» ^ 
Classifications 
Total 
population 
Active 
labor 
force 
As a % of 
total 
population Unemployed 
As a % of 
active labor 
force 
Country 28.3 8.1 28.7 0.9 11 
Itole 14.5 7-0 48.4 
c 
n. a. 
Female 13,8 1.1 8.1 n-a. 
Rural areas 16.5 5.2 31.5 0.2 6 
Male 8.5 4.4 51.8 n.a. — 
Female 8.0 0.8 10.2 n.a. — 
Urban areas 11.8 2.9 34.8 0,7 14 
Male 6.0 2.6 43.7 n.a. — 
Female 5.8 0.3 5.2 n.a. 
^Source; Compiled from Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 
1977 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1978), pp. 40-43. 
^All figures are rounded. 
^Data not available. 
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Of this approximately 426 thousand (12,5% of the labor force in 
agriculture) were employed in the agricultural sector and 220 
thousand (15.8% of the labor force in the industrial sector) were 
9 
employed by the industrial sector. 
Table 7.4 further shows the level of unemployment for the 
country as well as the urba,n and rural areas., The figures for 
1971 were 11% for the country, 6 and 14 percent for the rural and 
urban areas respectively. 
Table 7.5 shows the average weekly hoTJirs of work, wages and 
salary of agricultural workers according tO' geographical classifica­
tion in 1972. According to the last row in Table 7.5 the average 
weekly hours of work for the agricultural workers was 54 hours 
with the average weekly wage and salary of 557 Rials ($7.0). The 
figures in the last two columns give lihe a\'erage wage rate per hour 
(column 3 and 4 divided by column 2). Thus the average hourly 
wage rate of the agricultural workers for the entire country was 
10.3 Rials or 13 cents. Such low wage rates again substantiate 
our earlier findings, namely, the very low income of rural families. 
Many agricultural workers in Iran are Khoshneshines--landless 
peasants and squatters (see Chapter 4). The latest figures in 1979 
estimate the Khoshneshins as 20 percent of the rural population. 
Some of the Khoshneshins are actually the victims of land reform 
since prior to the land reform and according to the traditional laws 
they enjoyed residence or space rights. The landlord employed them 
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Table 7.5. Average weekly hours of work, wages and salary of agricul­
tural workers according to geographical classification, 
1972a 
Province 
Average weekly 
hrs. of work 
Average weekly 
wage and salary 
U.S. dollars Mais . 
Average wage and 
salary per hour 
U.S. dollars Rials 
Central 57 9.5 760 0.17 13.3 
Gilan 43 14.5 1156 0.34 26.9 
Mazandran 44 7.8 627 0.18 14.3 
E. Azerbaijan 45 6.7 534 0.15 11.9 
W. Azerbaijan 45 6.1 491 0.14 10.9 
Kermanshah 65 5.5 443 0.09 6.8 
Khozestan 63 11.4 911 0.18 14.5 
Pars 62 6.9 553 0,11 8.9 
Kerman 49 4.1 328 0.08 6.7 
Khorasan 50 4.7 378 0.09 7.6 
Esfahan 56 7.8 622 0.14 11.1 
Sistan 44 4.3 343 0.10 7.8 
Kurdestan 68 5.7 458 0.08 6.7 
Hamedan 63 8.6 688 0.14 10.9 
Chahar Mahal 59 7.5 603 0.13 10.2 
Loreston 65 9.4 754 0.14 11.6 
Ilam 64 2.9 231 0.05 3.6 
Boyer Ahmad 68 7.2 578 0.11 8.5 
Boshahr 59 4.6 368 0.08 6.2 
Cemnon 58 9.5 761 0,16 13.1 
Average of 
country 
54 7.0 557 0.13 10.3 
^Compiled from Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical 
Yearbook of Iran, 1977 (Tehran: Plan Organization,'1978), pp. 58-59, 
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on daily basis but could not evict them without purchasing their 
space right (their huts), Land reform led to the eviction of 
these peasants and the ultimate migration of a majority of them to 
the urban areas. Another component of the Khoshneshins are farmers 
who prior to the land reform had root rights (Saheb-nasgh) which 
were purchased by the landlords. There were actually 13,374 
tenant farmers who according to the land reform laws sold their 
root rights and became agricultural wage earners and Khoshnesihins., 
As it can be seen in Table 7.5, the average weekly hours of 
work and wage rate varies according to geographical divisions. In 
some provinces, the average weekly hours of work is over 60 hours. 
There is a correlation between long hours of work and low wage rate 
per hour. Most provinces which have an average weekly hours of 
work over 60 hours also have a hourly wage rate below 10 Rials or 
13 cents. With the exception of few provinces, most regions with 
low wage rate and high average weekly hours are heavily populated 
by national minorities. Both Kermanshah and Kurdistan Provinces 
with average hourly wage rate of 6.8 and 6.7 Rials respectively are 
populated by the Kurdish minority. Tribal concentration can also 
be found in Haiti, Boyer-Ahmad and Boshehr Provinces. 
There is not sufficient data to relate hours of work and wage 
rate to the productivity of land. However, there is a concentration 
of low wage rate and high average weekly hours in the southern 
regions where the land is less fertile and the water more scarce. 
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Furthermore, there are no sufficient data to compare the changes 
in average income and the cost of living. But according to a 1977 
government report in the official newspaper, Rastakhiz, prices of 
commodities in the past twenty-five years have increased between 
2 to 200 times. According to Rastakhiz the average cost of living 
for a petty government employee had increased by 45 times whereas 
the average salary within the same period was 18 times more than 
the initial year in 1952. In addition, according to the Rastakhiz 
calculations, a simple government employee is faced with a monthly 
deficit of 4400 Rials ($58.5) which necessitates holding of a 
second job.^^ 
Health and Education 
Health and education are of vital and critical importance to 
agricultural development since improvements in the utilization of 
resources and adoption of new technology requires trained and able 
itianpower. Hence the development of agriculture in developing 
countries requires not only raising the level of literacy, but also 
training the farmers for improving farming efficiency. 
Like many other developing countries Iran suffers from a high 
rate of illiteracy. Despite large amounts of oil revenues, because of 
the low priority assigned to education and the meager allocation of 
development funds, the gains in education have been less than 
satisfactory. This is particularly true about the rural Iranian 
women, 89 percent of whom according to the offical government 
statistics were illiterate. 
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Table 7.5 shows the rate of illiteracy according to sex, rural 
and urban area classification. The 1966 figures represent the rate 
of illiteracy for population over 7 years of age and the 1968-75 
figures the illiteracy for the population over 6 years of age. It 
should be noted that the illiteracy data in Table 7.6 are official 
data released by the Iranian government. These are not in accordance 
12 
with UNESCO estimates and the unofficial estimates show a lower 
level of gains. 
According to Table 7.6, 58.2 percent of the total population 
were illiterate in 1975. The rate of female illiteracy for the 
country was 70 percent. The rate of illiteracy in the rural areas 
was 75.4 percent. The division of sexes in rural areas for 1975 
shows the illiteracy rate of 64.5 and 89.1 for male and female 
population respectively. 
The literacy caitçaign in rural Iran has been very auch directed 
toward enabling the peasants to read and write rather than a 
comprehensive educational program. Still today about 90 percent of 
schools in rural areas are one-room schools lacking rudimentary 
facilities. The low income of poor peasants which necessitates the 
mobilization of the entire family for production limits attendance 
for at least during the production seasons. 
It is obvious that with such a high rate of illiteracy, programs 
aimed toward training the farming fam.ilies in modern techni<jues and 
improving farming efficiency would be very difficult since these 
programs require the itdnLmun ^ill of reading and writing. 
Table 7.5. Rate of illiteracy in rural and urban Iran, selected years (percentage)^ 
Rural areas Urban areas Country 
Year^ Male Female Aggregate Male Female Aggregate Male Female Aggregate 
1966 74.6 95.7 84.9 38.5 61.1 49.6 59.9 82.1 70.6 
1968 70.2 94.2 81,7 33.5 55.9 44.4 55.4 78.6 66.6 
1971 68.1 91.7 79.6 31,3 51.9 41.4 52.3 74.5 63.1 
1972 67.2 91.3 78.6 31.4 52.5 41.7 51.0 74.0 62.0 
1975 64.5 89-1 75.4 27.9 47.9 37.6 47.4 70.0 58.2 
^Source; Statistical Center of Iran and Ministry of Labor. 
^Seven years of age and over for 1966, six years of age and over for 1968-75. 
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Table 7.7 shows the distribution of literate rural population 
according to sex and level of education in 1972, According to these 
official statistics only 13.1 percent of rural population had between 
one to six years of schooling. Only 1.9 percent of the rural 
population had some years of secondary education (3,4% of rural 
male and 0.4% of rural female population). The figures for post 
high school education show that only 5 thousand out of a total rural 
population of near 17 million had above high school degrees. 
Of course, one reason for such low figures is the out migration 
of the more educated rural population to the urban areas. But the 
examination of the data for urban areas also provide discouraging 
results. The statistics for the same year in the urban areas 
indicate that 17.8 percent had some secondary education and only 
1.9 percent had post high school education. 
In general, low rural income and dissatisfaction with government 
programs are responsible for low level of motivation and enrollment. 
For instance, according to a 1978 study by ILO, only 30 percent of 
13 
children between the ages 6-12 were enrolled in rural schools. 
Furthermore, there is a very high dropout rate in the rural areas 
and outright dissatisfaction with government programs. Government 
educational programs use the rural schools as a propaganda channel 
for the establishment and reinforcement of the central government's 
authority. Often the content and curriculum are not related to 
the needs of the local people. Pioneering research by a well-known 
Table 7.7. Distribution of literate rural population according to sex and level of education, 
1972 (1000 persons)^ 
Levels of % of rural % of rural % of rural 
education Male male pop. Female female pop. Aggregate population 
Primary school 1724 20.8 490 5.9 2214 13.1 
(1-6) 
Secondary school 291 3.4 34 0.4 325 1.9 
(7-12) 
Post high school 4 — 1 — 5 — 
^Source; Statistical Center of Iran, Survey of Human Power, 1972 (Tehran: Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs, 1972). 
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Iranian educator, Samad Behrangi, shows that most subjects and 
contents are alien to the rural children and the knowledge of it 
14 
would have little practical use for them. 
The data regarding health in rural Iran are scarce and contra­
dictory. General health information showed a life expectancy of 
51 years in 1973 and an infant mortality rate of 120 per thousand 
in 1972.^^ But the infant mortality rate in rural areas should be 
higher than the infant mortality rate for the country. 
Table 7.8 shows the population per physicians, dentists and 
hospital beds. Despite substantial gains in the area of health 
within the past two decades, the health conditions in Iran are 
backward compared to other Middle Eastern countries. In 1976 the 
population per physician was 2502, one of the lowest in the Middle 
East. According to the 1973 U.N. Statistical Yearbook, in 1972 nine 
of the Middle Eastern countries had a better ratio of population 
per hospital bed than Iran (e.g. 243 for Bahrian, 525 for Iraq, 
207 for Kuwait, 260 for Lebanon, 173 for Israel, and 479 for Turkey). 
The distribution of health facilities in the country provides 
a more discouraging picture. In 1972, 47 percent of the physicians 
and 57 percent of the dentists were in the Tehran area. In the 
capital city area the population per physician was 880 while in the 
17 
Province of Ilam, this ratio was as high as 14,900. 
There are actually no data regarding the distribution of 
physicians and hospital bads among the urban and rural areas. 
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Table 7.8. Population per physicians, dentists and hospital beds' 
Items 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
No. of physicians 
Population per 
physician 
No. of dentists 
Population per 
dentist 
No, of hospitals 
No. of hospital 
beds 
Population per 
hospital bed 
8970 10201 11054 11760 12440 13428 
3301 2981 2825 2725 2643 2502 
1290 1347 1730 1846 1803 1725^ 
22951 22574 18051 17357 18232 19474 
500 
822 
474 485 
751 
493 498 
727 703 721 
525 
36000 40480 42960 45602 45604 53944 
623 
^Sources: Compiled from Plan Organization of Iran, Statistical 
Yearbook of Iran, Various issues, and Bank Markazi Iran, Annual 
Report and Balance Sheet, various issues, 
^Does not include unlicensed dentists. 
'^This figure appears to be inflated. 
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Table 7.9. Regional distribution of physicians and hospital beds, 
1976* 
Population 
No. of per No. of Population 
Province physicians physicians Hospital beds per bed 
Central 6567 1054 23552 294 
Gilan 380 4152 2254 700 
Mazandran 515 4630 2268 1051 
E. Azarbaijan 699 4570 3521 907 
W. Azarbaijan 277 5072 1327 1059 
Kerxnanshah 220 4619 1002 1014 
Khozestan 855 2545 3653 596 
Pars 583 2960 2560 780 
Kerman 228 4772 835 1303 
Khorasan 889 3675 4916 665 
Esfahan 836 2362 3883 509 
Sistan 127 5191 382 1726 
Kurdestan 127 6157 439 1781 
Hormuzgun 116 3995 180 2575 
Hamedan 157 6921 887 1225 
Lorestan 146 6335 441 2097 
Yazd 119 2993 683 522 
Boshehr 110 3140 193 1790 
Chahar Mahal 92 4286 208 1896 
Zanjan 72 8042 205 2824 
Ilam 32 7632 60 4070 
Cemnan 144 3374 445 1092 
Boyer-Ahmad 37 6615 50 4895 
Country excluding — 3887 — 878 
central province 
^Sources: Compiled from Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, 
Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 1977 (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1978), 
pp. 33, 105, 111. 
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Table 7.9 shows the regional distribution of physicians and hospital 
beds in 1976. According to these data, there is a high degree of 
unequal distribution for both physicians and hospital beds, The 
population per physician is over 4500 for many provinces and as 
high as 8042 for Zanjan compared to 1054 in the Central Province. 
The average population per physician for the entire country 
excluding the Central Province was 3887. The same results can also 
be seen for population per bed. The ratio for some provinces like 
Zanjan and Boyer-Ahmad is sixteen times higher than the Central 
Province. Although Table 7.9 does not show the distribution of 
population per dentist, similar conditions can be observed. For 
instance, according the 1977 Bank Markazi report, there was one 
dentist for every 5000 persons in the Tehran area compared to one 
18 
every 61,000 persons in the Ham Province. 
General Remarks 
Throughout this work the subsistence and traditional nature of 
the Iranian agriculture has been emphasized. The findings in this 
chapter are consistent with the earlier discussion and indicate 
low income and standards of livings for most of the rural population. 
The following two tables are introduced to provide a general 
description of the rural welfare. 
Table 7.10 shows the composition of average rural family for 
1966-73 period in both Iranian and U.S. currency. The average 
monthly expenditure increased from 3989 Rials (= $53) in 1966 to 
Table 7.10. Average monthly expenditure of an average rural family, 1966-73^' ^  
Year 
Total 
(Rials) 
Total 
(U.S. 
dollars) 
Food 
(%) 
Clothing 
(%) 
Water 
& heat 
(%) 
Housing 
(%) 
Health 
& trans. 
(%) 
Home 
appliances 
(%) 
Others° 
(%) 
1966 3989 53 60,0 11.7 8.5 3.6 8.5 4.0 3.7 
1967 4387 59 62.1 11.0 7.8 3,4 5.1 4.6 6.0 
1968 4005 53 64.4 8.6 7,0 3.5 6.1 3.7 6.7 
1969 3958 53 66.5 7.8 6.4 4.5 5.6 3.1 6.2 
1970 4179 56 66.8 6,8 5.2 5.9 6.3 3.2 5.8 
1971 4985 67 64.0 8.7 5.3 4.3 6. 0 3-8 7.9 
1972 4940 66 65.5 8.1 5.5 4.3 2.9 3.2 7.2 
1973 5985 80 60.2 10.2 4.7 4.3 3.9 4.8 7.9 
^Source: Compiled from Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 
1976 (Tehran; Plan Organization, 1977). 
^Average rural family has 5.4 members. 
^Calculated by the author based on 1972 exchange rate of $1.00 = 75 Rials. 
^Includes recreation, education, home repair and services, and miscellaneous personal 
ejipenditures. 
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5985 Rials (= $80) in 1973. Over 60 percent of the monthly expendi­
ture were on food. Official government data show that a huge portion 
of the expenditure on food was spent on bread and cereals; 42,8 
percent in 1966, 42.5 in 1972, and 39,5 in 1974.^  ^
If we accept the assertion that growth and prosperity would 
lead to a declining percentage of household expenditure on food, 
then the data in Table 7.10 does not reflect substantial changes. 
In fact, the expenditure on food as a percentage of total household 
expenditure increased over the 1966-71 period. Of course, this is 
partly due to the unequal distribution of income, but that too 
indicates that a majority of the rural population have not benefited 
from whatever gains which have been made. 
Table 7.10 shows only the average monthly consumption in rural 
Iran. Examination of the regional disparities in expenditure would 
provide a better picture of the conditions. Table 7.11 shows the 
rural domestic consuirption in selected provinces for 1972. As it 
can be seen, the domestic expenditure is as low as 2,716 (= $36.2) 
in some provinces. This is well below the average for rural Iran 
shown in the last row. Similarly, in some provinces more than 
70 percent of household expenditure is spent on food. This would 
leave little for expenditure on consumer gOôds and the products of 
the industrial sector. A look back at Table 7,10 shows that during 
1966-73 the percent expenditure on clothing and home appliance 
hardly increased and for some years it actually experienced a con­
sistent decline. 
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Table 7.11. Domestic consumption in the rural areas in 1972^  
Province Rials/month % on food 
Khorasan 3,052 70.8 
SiStan Baluchestan 2,716 68.6 
Kerman 3,660 70.9 
Central 4,900 63.3 
Azerbayejan (West) 5,428 71.2 
Azerbayejan (East) 7,972 56.2 
Semnan 3,653 68.8 
Khuzestan 6,325 72.4 
Gilan 8,261 62.2 
Iran rural 4,940 65.5 
S^ource: Statistical Center of Iran. 
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Table 7.12 shows some of the characteristics of living condi­
tions in rural Iran in 1976. According to this dala 80 percent of 
the head of the households were illiterate and 45 percent of them 
had no literate ïseirber. Eighty'-one point two percent of them lived 
in mud huts containing no metal, cement or bricks. In addition, 90 
percent of homes lacked piped water, 86 percent had no electricity 
and over 98 percent were without private bath. Only one percent 
owned automobiles, 7.2 percent motorcycles and 10.6 percent bicycles 
indicating that horses and mules are still the standard means of 
transportation. 
The last two columns in Table 7.12 show the breakdown for the 
lower and upper income categories. Two generalizations could be 
made from the data in these columns. First, it gives us some indica­
tion of the living conditions for the lower income families and its 
comparison with the higher income bracket. For instance, 78.7 
percent of the low income families had no literate member compared 
to 10.4 percent for the high income families. Forty-two point one percent 
of the low income families had no employed member of the household 
compared to 100 percent employment for the upper income families. 
In general, the data in the column for poor families show us 
unbearable conditions of abject poverty. It should be noted that 
some 20 percent of rural families fall in this income category. 
Second, by observing the data for the upper income families, we 
can see that even for most of the rich the living conditions are 
Table 7.12. Some characteristics of standards of living in rural Iran, 1976 (percentage)^  
Item 
% of 
total rural 
households 
% of households with 
under 2500 Rials 
($40) monthly income 
% of households with 
over 100,000 Rials 
($1333) monthly income 
Illiterate head of household 80.0 83.3 27.6 
No literate member in household 45,1 78.7 10.4 
No enployed member 7.4 42.1 6.0 
Live in mud huts 81.2 90.0 46.0 
Own automobile 1.2 0.8 33.1 
Own motorcycle 7.2 2.7 16.2 
Own bicycle 10.6 3.1 28.1 
Own television 2.4 0.7 41.8 
Own refrigerator 5.6 1,2 41.8 
CXm radio 52.0 21.2 52.0 
Have piped water 10.0 5.5 49.5 
Have electricity 13.8 5.1 49.5 
Have telephone 0.6 0.0 2.3 
Have bath 1.5 0.3 3.0 
l^an and Budget Organization of Iran, Survey of Rural Household Budget, 1976 (Tehran; 
Plan Organization, 1978). 
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not satisfactory. For example, over half of those families had 
no piped water or electricity or owned other essentials. This in 
itself is the manifestation of the backwardness of the Iranian 
rural areas and an indication that the country's growth has been 
a growth without development. 
The preceding discussion demonstrates that despite the 
government's stated objectives of raising the rural income and 
attaining a better distribution, fifteen years of planning and large 
oil revenues sometimes in excess of 20 billion dollars per annum 
have not changed the face of much of the Iranian agriculture nor the 
lot of many of the Iranian peasantry. 
Of course; this is a direct result of government's attitude 
and policies in relation to the agricultural sector. Corrective 
policies are only meaningful within the scope of the wider and 
more comprehensive planning and policies for the entire economy. 
The welfare of the rural population can best be improved when the 
role and importance of agriculture in the process of development 
is realized and growth concomitant with development engulfs the 
whole country rather than disproportionately benefiting a segment 
of the population. The following chapter attempts to summarize 
some of the major problems faced by the Iranian agriculture and 
explore the possible remedial policies. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has attempted to examine the nature of the 
development of agriculture in Iran and to evaluate state planning 
and policies in relation to agriculture. Chapter 1 briefly 
reviewed some of the economic theories of growth and development 
as well as identifying those which were pursued and applied in 
Iran. It was pointed out that most of these theories consider the 
government as a primary force in promoting and enhancing the develop­
ment of the country. This necessitated the underlying assuirption 
that the governments themselves are the agents of modernization. 
We hypothesized, however, that the governments and the associated 
institutions themselves could become a barrier to the process of 
development by emphasizing growth rather than development and by 
determining economic goals, sectoral and intersectoral priorities 
which are reflective of only small segments of the population 
who are disproportionately represented in the government. Thus 
it was stated that many of limitations to development stem from 
the exogenous variables to the agricultural development process, 
namely, the political, cultural and institutional barriers which 
should be considered. The central focus of the study, therefore, 
was placed on examining the process and nature of agricultural 
development as well as evaluating the government's goals and 
objectives and their realization. 
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Chapter 3 provided a brief overview of the Iranian econoiry. 
The results indicated that Iran has experienced a rapid rate of 
growth accompanied by a high rate of inflation. But it was also 
found that the oil industry has been the primary factor and the 
largest contributing sector to this growth while the share of 
other sectors in the GNP has remained the same for the industry 
and declined for both agriculture and services. Furthermore, 
the growth of the economy was accompanied by a greater dependency 
on imports, particularly for agricultural commodities. In the 
case of agriculture the formulation of an "oil for food" policy 
and a pattern of continuous neglect of the agricultural sector was 
identified. 
Chapter 3 also examined the government planning and programs. 
Five government plans were reviewed in order to identify the objec­
tives, the sectoral and intersectoral priorities, and the allocation 
of development funds among the various sectors and projects. It 
was found that agriculture consistently received low priority 
and that the allocation of the financial resources within agriculture 
were biased toward highly capital intensive projects such as the 
construction of large dams and the establishment of agribusiness. 
In additionj the study of government targets and the actual results 
revealed a wide gap between the specified targets and their 
actualization. 
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Chapter 4 evaluated the results of the Iranian land reform 
initiated during the Third and Fourth Plans. It was found that 
the reform did not accomplish even the conservative objectives it 
had set out to achieve. Many exemptions in the law allowed the 
landlords to retain a good portion of their lands and between 40 
to 50 percent of the village population by and large received 
no land. Furthermore, the traditional disparities within the 
village were not greatly affected. Chapter 4 also evaluated the 
post reform structure of farming and the various forms of farm 
organizations. It was found that the majority of the Iranian 
farm families were engaged in traditional and subsistance agri­
culture. The government's emphasis in the structural changes 
was largely placed on the creation of agribusinesses and farm 
corporations which were accomplished by the forced eviction 
and relocation of the local peasantry. The evaluation of both of 
these farm organizations showed low rate of return and substantial 
inefficiency. 
Chapters 5 and 6 examined agricultural production and govern­
ment price floor and stabilization policies. Using various criteria 
in order to evaluate the performance of the agricultural sector, 
it was found that rate of growth has been very low, probably 
equal or slightly below the population growth rate, and the 
yields for major crops stagnant. It was also found that government 
market interventions had not succeeded in stabilizing prices of 
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agricultural commodities and the government guaranteed prices 
were too low to provide sufficient incentives or adequate income. 
Finally, Chapter 7 examined the rural welfare. The available 
data indicated deteriorating gap between the rural and urban sector 
and worsening of the distribution of income. Furtliermore, it was 
found that the majority of the rural population still lived under 
primitive conditions with low standards of living. 
It should be pointed out here that all research and most of 
the writing of this work was undertaken prior to the overthrow 
of the Shah's regime and the Pahlavi Dynasty in February 1979. 
The level and magnitude of dissatisfaction which embraced every 
strata of the Iranian society, particularly among the workers and 
peasantry, actually substantiates many of our findings and is 
a clear evidence of the fallacies of the government policies. 
Many problems of the Iranian agriculture and government policies 
discussed in this work were common themes in the expression of 
peasantry dissatisfaction in the revolution. 
Of course, the direction and objectives of the new regime 
are not yet clear. But all the available evidence indicates that 
Iran could undergo some fundamental economic and socio-political 
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changes in the future. Accordingly, the following discussion and 
recoimendations are made in the light of the recent changes and 
with the hope that the new government will move toward introducing 
and devising comprehensive and progressive programs for the Iranian 
economy that are reflective of the needs and aspirations of the 
masses of people rather than the interests of a small ruling class. 
Comprehensive Planning 
Which is Reflective of the People's Needs 
In Chapter 1 we indicated that various theories of economic 
growth and development emphasized the role of government in 
initiation and promotion of development. At the foundation of such 
concepts lies the assumption that the state can perform the role 
of modernizer. It is the fallacy of this assertion which we 
have tried to e^ o^se. When we speak of central planning and 
state intervention we must also examine the problem of the primary 
actor—the nature and formation of the state itself—and have a 
better understanding of the end and means and the distinction between 
them in the planning process. As Charles Bettelheim distinctly 
and simply points out: 
"In general, and not only in economics, a plan, in our 
sense, consists of the totality of arrangements decided 
upon in order to car-ry out a project. The idea of a plan 
is thus definable by two elements: (1) a project, that 
is, an end which one proposes to achieve; (2) the arrange­
ments decided upon in order that this end may be achieved, 
that is the determination of the means. 
But it is the state which determines the end as well as the 
means to attain it. Hence, the natuire of the state itself becomes 
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a critical issue. In general, the state is the reflection of 
social class, and in case of Iran representative of a very small 
class once called the rule of one thousand and one families. 
Thus the determination of the objectives and the means is subject 
to the nature and balance of representation of the social forces. 
As Lovbiroek'. points out 
"The planning process is a process where subjective formula­
tions of the objective needs of the different social classes 
are given different priorities. The formulation of goals 
and priorities in national planning takes place within the 
state apparatus. The logical conclusion from this is that 
the interests of the social classes that control state 
power also determines which goals for the planning process 
will be given priority. 
In Iran this process of planning was not certainly reflective 
of the objective needs of the poor, namely, the great number of 
workers and peasantry, but rather the expression of class interests 
of a small ruling class composed of feudal landlords and nascent 
bourgeoisie. 
Of course,- the ruling class was not a cohesive group with 
well-defined objective and means to accomplish them. There were 
contradictions between the old and new, between the traditional 
and feudal elements and the rising bourgeoisie, between the state 
and private sector, and within the private sector between the 
national capital and internationally dependent capital. These 
contradictions were reflected in the process of planning, in 
defining the end and means and in the ranking of priorities. Thus 
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the procGss of planning itself became a mechanism to establish 
a compromise between these various social forces. For instance, 
land reform which intended to eradicate the existing feudal relation­
ships permitted the landlords to retain possession of one village 
or its equivalent. The me.chanization of farms under the program 
of agribusinesses proceeded with foreign and dependent capital 
and by forcibly evicting the small and medium sized producers. 
Often the failure of policies and the genesis of the problems 
are seeked in the theory of planning or the contradiction between 
the theory and the praxis of planning rather than in the a priori 
assumption of the state as a modernizing agent. While theoretical 
and technical shortcomings may be the source of problems, we 
propose to look beyond the technical questions and the substance 
of plans for in order to understand these we must understand the 
leitmotif and the prime movers behind them. 
Throughout this paper we have emphasized the need for a 
comprehensive planning for agriculture while stressing that the 
Shah's government was not capable of fulfilling this task. 
Similarly, the problem faced by the present government is not only 
the realization of the need for a comprehensive planning but also 
the need for a development strategy within which the heiarchy of 
both sectoral and intersectoral priorities are the reflection of 
the needs of the people and are determined through their free and 
active participation. Indeed the success of the government 
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depends on its realization of the objective needs of the masses 
of peasantry and the subjective formulation of them in a democratic 
process of planning and on whether the determination of objectives 
and the means to attain them are reflective of the interests and 
aspirations of the rural masses. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to some of the major 
limiting factors faced by the Iranian agriculture as well as the 
primary components of a development planning and strategy which 
could resolve them. It should be emphasized here that the 
recommendations made are based on limited data and sketchy informa­
tion. Much research is yet needed in order to fully comprehend 
the nature of the problems, the objective needs and priorities 
within agriculture. 
Preliminary Research 
and Collection of Data 
Probably the first step to begin is creation of an agricultural 
investigatory committee or task force composed of scientists, 
government representatives, and representatives of rural population 
to investigate the real nature of the problems faced by the Iranian 
agriculture. Indeed research and collection of data are essential 
before any comprehensive agricultural strategy could be formulated. 
There are still too many unknowns about the Iranian agriculture 
and the discrepancy and scarcity of data limits us in fully under­
standing and locating all the shortcomings and problems of the 
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agricultural sector. Research is needed in essentially every aspect 
of the Iranian agriculture. Surveys of production and consumption 
and accurate estimations of population, demand and supply are 
required in order to determine the per capita consumption of food 
and the needs of the country. Dietary surveys should be undertaken 
in order to determine the quality, composition and nutritive 
value of the food consumed. Research regarding the infrastructure, 
the correct form of farm organization, appropriate methods of 
technological improvements, etc. are some of the other areas which 
need to be investigated. 
In general, inquiries into the nature of the problems and 
needs in agriculture and evaluation of various objectives and 
means to reçoive them should be the central focus of the preliminary 
research. 
Production Expansion Strategy 
In order for Iran to achieve self-sufficiency within the next 
two decades a comprehensive development strategy to increase 
production and thereby the welfare of the rural population is 
required. Two major components of such a strategy are discussed 
below, others will be treated separately in this chapter. 
Changes in farming structure 
The main problems in the agricultural sector are poverty, 
both in absolute and relative terms, and traditional and subsistence 
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fanning. This is partly because of small and fragmented plots of 
land too small to provide sufficient income; and the neglect of 
a substantial portion of the peasantry, the Khoshneshins or landless 
peasants. Hence the restructuring of farming is essential- The 
government may decide on the redistribution of the lands which were 
exempt under the land reform or retained by the landlords. There 
are still many large landlords whose lands could be distributed. 
But the distribution of land will not solve the problem of frag­
mentation and would actually augment it. Thus serious attention 
should be paid to this problem and the correct form of farm structure 
selected. The selection of a new type of farm organization 
requires great deal of research and pondering as well as input by 
the peasantry themselves. Our study indicated that among the 
existing farm organizations, production cooperatives were the most 
successful and the best form of farm structure. 
The production cooperatives have actually historical roots in 
Iran. The communal production, Boneh, was practiced for many 
centuries and under the feudal system several or more tenant families 
who were given small plots of land by the landlord polled their 
resources and produced collectively. This concept of Boneh could 
be used to create new and modern cooperatives where collective 
cropping pattern, cultivation and marketing is established. 
Changes in production inputs and technology 
Several studies, including one by the FAO, concerning the 
future prospects of the Iranian agriculture indicate that the country 
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has the potential of attaining self-sufficiency in many major 
crops as well as livestock and poultry by 1990. Actually Iran 
has all the financial resources to facilitate a technological 
revolution in all areas of biological, chemical, mechanical and 
human factors. Studies should be conducted in order to determine 
the optimum blend of these factors and the ways and means by 
which a more rapid diffusion and introduction of improved tech­
nology can be accomplished. 
Substantial increase in output could be accomplished through 
increasing the efficiency of land and water management. Of the 
total water available for agriculture about 50 percent is wasted 
and the remainder is used inefficiently. Therefore, rapid develop­
ment of irrigation water and increase in efficiency in all areas 
of land and water utilization should receive high priority. 
But increases in efficiency require skilled manpower which is 
quite scarce in Iran. The majority of the Iranian peasantry are 
illiterate and others lack adequate general and technical knowledge. 
Farmers need to learn about cropping plans, how to control them, 
and how to produce different crops efficiently in order to achieve 
high yields. Thus investments in education and training, the 
expansion of research and extention services would almost become 
a prerequisite for not only increasing efficiency but also intro­
ducing new technology. 
In the area of biological inputs a strong and widespread 
campaign to introduce seeds of high yield variety is essential.. 
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Presently, the high quality seeds have been introduced in only 
limited areas and in limited quantity. Research should be under­
taken to find high yield seeds best suited for the Iranian land 
and weather conditions or by crossing foreign and local varieties. 
Furthermore, increase in locally improved seeds and production 
should also be emphasized. 
In the area of chemical inputs a derive for the expansion ' 
of fertilizer consumption and pesticides is necessary. Many of 
the Iranian peasantry, particularly the small peasant producers, 
do not use chemical fertilizers. The chemical inputs are one of 
the most important means of increasing agricultural productivity 
and its consumption should become common and universal practice. 
Research and study should be undertaken to determine the/Optimum 
application according to soil and water, climatic conditions 
and crop variety. In addition, the need for an efficient fertilizer 
distribution and credit system should be recognized. Yields could 
also be increased by initiating an extënsive plant protection 
program and expanding the use of insecticides and other plant 
protection chemicals. 
Increase in mechanization is another element of a progressive 
agricultural development plan. Increase in the use of tractors, 
tools and equipments for cultivation, adequate machinery for land 
leveling etc. should all be encouraged. Consolidation of the 
fragmented lands would facilitate this process. 
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Thus, selection of appropriate farm organization, seeds of 
high yield variety, mechanization, greater fertilizer application 
and pesticides, improved efficiency of water and land management, 
development of skilled manpower are the key elements of the 
Iranian agricultural revolution. 
It should be recognized that the accomplishment of such a 
task requires substantial expenditure on human aspects such as 
education and training of manpower. Thousands of specialists 
are needed to demonstrate and implement the various aspects of the 
program. Indeed the Iranian agricultural revolution requires its 
vanguard of dedicated specialists for the introduction and diffusion 
of the new technology and training of the rural population. 
Thus investment in research, education and training of skilled 
manpower should receive top priority. 
Furthermore, success of the development strategy depends 
on creation of adequate government and local institutions to 
efficiently plan and implement various programs; an appropriate 
pricing and subsidization policy; and proper infrastructure and 
marketing channels. These aspects of development program will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Agricultural Pricing, 
Marketing and Subsidization 
As it was discussed in Chapter 5, the yields and productivity 
have been generally low and stagnant in the Iranian agriculture. 
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The rate of growth in production has been about the same as population 
resulting in consistent excess demand and greater dependency on 
imports. Furthermore, it was demonstrated in Chapter 6 that lack 
of adequate price guarantees and price stability compounded by 
many other uncertainties impeded the adoption of improved technology 
and desire to increase output. Agricultural pricing and subsidization 
policies normally have a twofold objective of providing an incentive 
for increasing productivity and maintaining a fair level of income. 
Both of these objectives are to be accomplished while maintaining 
relative price stability and fair food prices for the urban sector. 
To eliminate these problems government should devise a pricing 
and subsidization strategy which aim to stabilize prices as well 
as providing price supports for agricultural commodities and 
subsidization of both producers and consumers. 
It should be recognized that the crux of the problem is low 
yields and productivity. Hence subsidization can help to improve 
productivity and the expansion of output. In order to accomplish 
this task, the subsidization should be in areas which lead to 
high expenditure in land and water development; high yielding 
inputs such as new seeds, fertilizers, crop protection chemicals, 
tractors and machinery, and modern tools. 
Price supports should also be an essential component of the 
pricing strategy because of the following reasons : 
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1. Price supports and guarantees could be discriminatory and 
be applied to a specific commodity, 
2. Price supports and guarantees reduce the price risks and 
uncertainties. 
3. Price supports and guarantees stimulate the efficient use 
of traditional inputs such as family labor as well as 
modern inputs. 
In general, the objective of the price support and guarantee 
is to provide an insurance against price fluctuations and provide 
attractive prices for the producers in order to stimulate increasing 
productivity and output as well as keeping a fair level of rural 
income. 
It should be noted that at the center of the government 
pricing and subsidization policy is the objective of increasing 
productivity rather than raising prices. If price supports and 
guarantees are cost based and are used in conjunction with input 
subsidization the ultimate result would be a decrease in cost 
per unit of output and thereby lower price guarantees. Presently 
high prices in Iran are due to high cost of production and marketing 
and low productivity. Fair minimum prices based on cost of pro­
duction as Chapter 6 indicated, would require a price level above 
the international prices. But in order to achieve reasonable 
levels of self-sufficiency in agriculture and increase productivity, 
the minimum price guarantees are necessary. 
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Furthermore, price guarantees and subsidies should be accompanied 
by subsidization of low income urban families. The importance of 
this measure is realized when we recognize the fact that over 
65 percent of the low income urban families' expenditure is on 
food. 
Price stabilization should be another component of the 
government strategy. This could be partly accoitplished by 
expanding the government purchasing cind storage program. As it 
was discussed in Chapter 6, in order for the government to have a 
sufficient iitçsact on prices, over 30 percent of total production 
should be purchased. The purchasing organization should buy 
all output offered to it at the announced prices. Moreover, these 
prices should be announced well in advance as to guide the farmers 
in their production planning. 
It should be noted that the government's price control and 
stabilization program requires efficient organization and strong 
administration. Thus elaborate planning and institutional designs 
are necessary. The price control planning and administration 
should concern itself with not only stabilization of prices of 
agricultural commodities but also the control of general prices 
and inflation. In this area particular attention should be paid 
to the control of rising prices of industrial goods and production 
inputs in order to improve the terms of trade for agriculture and 
reduce the gap between the per capita incomes of urban and rural 
areas. 
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The need for substantial changes in the marketing system should 
also be recognized. Presently, the small peasant producers are at 
the mercy of the middlemen and money lenders. In addition, there 
is a gap between marketing and production. The marketing system 
basically serves several large urban centers. There is little 
interaction between demand and supply and the feedbacks from changes 
in the consumer demand are restricted. 
The separation between the market and production paralyzes 
the operation of the price system. The differences between the prices 
received by the farmers and the retail prices in the urban areas 
is exceptionally high. The farmers' share of the retail price is 
sometimes as low as 20 percent. Part of the price differential 
is due to the high transport and risk cost. This could be improved 
as the result of the development of infrastructure discussed 
elsewhere in ..this chapter. Such developments would not only 
link the market to producers and reduce price differentials, but 
also allow the farmers to take full advantage of government 
guaranteed prices. 
Aside from structural changes in transport, storage and 
processing, the development in marketing and distribution of 
food requires strong and efficient organizations and administration. 
The cooperatives created during the Shah's rule were neither 
efficient in operation nor effective in changing the market structure. 
At best, they accounted for less than one percent of the output 
purchased. Strong and responsible cooperatives should be established 
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for the purpose of providing a distribution channel for both inputs 
and outputs. The peasant producers dependency on middlemen 
could be reduced through the effective use of the cooperatives 
and by using the proceeds from the sale of output for the cost 
of input advances. The cooperatives could also function as the 
source of credit. 
Infrastructure 
In the light of the discussion in the text of this work we 
need not to reiterate the importance of infrastructure for the 
development of the Iranian agriculture. Iran is in need of both 
capital intensive and capital extensive agricultural infrastructure. 
The following categories can be identified as areas which require 
substantial changes and improvements for the development of 
agriculture. 
Irrigation system and water supply 
As it was pointed out in Chapter 2, about 50 percent of the 
captured water for irrigation is wasted. The present irrigated 
land area is about 3.8 million hectares. Studies have shown that 
the potential for ej^ anding the irrigated land area to 5.6 million 
hectare exists. However the future irrigation projects should not 
only emphasize the ejqjansion of the irrigated land area but also 
increase the efficiency of water management. Irrigation efficiency 
is low and estimates indicate that only about 20 percent of the 
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irrigated lands receive optimal water supply. Thus improvements 
in use of water resources would greatly contribute to increasing 
production. 
In the past, the emphasis in the irrigation development programs 
was placed on large showy dams which did not only require substantial 
capital investment, but seldom achieved the objectives of irrigating 
the land areas intended for. The land area irrigated by these 
dams have consistently been substantially below the targets set 
by the government. Thus greater utilization of the already 
built storage dams is essential. Estimates show that the irrigated 
land area below these dams could be expanded by 800 thousand 
hectares (about double of the present amount). 
The irrigation development program should also be directed 
toward the construction of canals, distributaries, drainage systems, 
and restoration of ghanats. As it can be recalled from Chapter 2 
about 800 thousand hectares of land are irrigated by the traditional 
ghamat system which were usually constructed and maintained by the 
landlords. The land reform and the lack of financial resources 
for the maintenance and restoration of ghanats led to the slow 
deterioration of the systems to the extent that presently about 30 
percent of the existing 3500 ghanats are dry. But the greatest 
prospects for expanding the irrigated land area lies in the 
exploitation of ground water through the construction of new canals. 
Construction of additional canans and the improvements in the 
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present ones, both in the areas of water collection and distribution 
network, will increase the volume of water captured and provide 
a better irrigation of particularly cereal crops. In addition, 
efforts should be made to reduce the volume of water lost in 
canals through seepage and thereby increase the amount of available 
water. 
Furthermore, government supported and local based programs 
should be devised for land leveling, drainage, pump irrigation, 
and other improvements which could lead to more efficient soil and 
water management. It should be noted that many of the required 
irrigation development projects are relatively small scale projects 
and their success depends on the level of government aids and its 
ability to mobilize the local rural population. 
Marketing channels and facilities 
As it was pointed out in Chapter 4 two-thirds of the Iranian 
villages have no access to a transportation network and in 1975 over 
19000 villages could only be reached with mule. Obviously, lack 
of commercial roads limits the marketing of agricultural output. 
Construction of roads and creation of an adequate transportation 
network is essential in order to spur production and expand the 
market in the subsistence areas. 
In addition, emphasis on storage and construction of additional 
silos at the local level is necessary. Presently, the short­
coming is not so much in the total silo capacity, but in lack of 
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any storage at the village level. In the absence of adequate 
transportation facilities and local network of storage, producers 
cannot take advantage of the potential market and the losses 
incurred due to deterioration after harvest could be substantial. 
Creation of both transportation and storage networks will also 
reduce the dependency of small producers on the local middlemen. 
Furthermore, establishment of specialized processing plants 
and wholesale facilities on the regional basis will both reduce 
the wastage and simplify transportation. The processing plants 
would also provide a new source of employment for rural population 
and many themselves become an incentive for improving food quality, 
supply and distribution. In fact, diversification and establish­
ment of agricultural related industries in rural areas is essential 
in order to reduce the exodus to the urban areas. 
Credit and financial institutions 
It should be recognized that in traditional agriculture 
easy and low cost credit is a key factor in overcoming agricultural 
stagnation. As it was discussed in Chapter 4, about 50 percent 
of agricultural credit is provided by noninstitutional sources 
at exuberant rates of interest. Moreover, most institutional 
loans were small short term loans requiring high collateral 
security. 
Increase in institutional credit and elimination of externalties 
in lending and flow of credit will substantially reduce peasant 
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dependency on the middlemen and informal money lenders as well as 
reducing the cost and thereby providing greater incentive for 
increasing production and use of improved technology. 
In addition, in order to increase the availability of capital 
to the agricultural sector, following changes can remove some of 
the constraints to institutional lending 
• Revise the criterion for collateral security. Under 
the old system the required collateral was sometimes 
about 20 times more than the size of the loan. 
e Provide more long term loans. 
o Reduce bureaucratic red tape. 
a Establish institutional branches in the rural areas. 
Presently, the Agricultural Development Bank of 
Iran is situated in the capital city and the Agricultural 
Cooperative Bank has no branches at the village level. 
It is estimated that the amount spent for travelling 
expenses and acquiring the loan sometimes amounted 
to half of the loan. 
Education 
Throughout this thesis we have stressed the subsistence nature 
of the Iranian agriculture with traditional patterns of production. 
I-ÎGst production methods are traditional and the tools primitive 
and simple. A good portion of farm output is for own consumption. 
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Lack of storage facilities and means of transportation limits the 
market and low income and high price risks leave no room for 
innovations and increased production. 
It is obvious that the development of agriculture requires the 
knowledge of modern agriculture and scientific methods. Thus 
education becomes a prerequisite for the transformation of a 
traditional agriculture into a modern sector. 
Given the high rate of illiteracy in rural Iran, a strong and 
widespread caiig)aign is essential. The spearhead of such a drive 
should not only be directed toward the elimination of illiteracy, 
but also toward educating and training of rural population in the 
more efficient use of resources. For this substantial public 
investment is required. Additional schools must be built and more 
teachers trained. Furthermore, the rural population should be 
motivated and be willing to participate and apply the newly 
acquired knowledge and skills. Part of the motivation comes from 
increase in rural income and reduction in need for family child 
labor, another from observing the success of others who have applied 
new techniques. But above all, the question of motivation and 
willingness is very much linked to the problem of trust in 
government policies, a sense of satisfaction from participation 
in development efforts and pride in being able to shape one's 
own destiny and contribute to the progress and the well-being of the 
society. 
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Thus the role of government in rural education becomes very 
critical. The government agencies and personnel should be welcomed 
and looked upon as a part of the community rather than agents of 
the central government and alien to the local problems and needs. 
The curricula and subject matter should be oriented toward the needs 
of the local inhabitants and the methods of instruction appropriate 
for the type of knowledge to be transmitted and for the level of 
understanding of those receiving it. 
Literacy programs directed toward adult population should not 
only include literacy training of adults and other forms of social 
welfare training, but be also oriented toward the production problems 
of the peasantry. The adult literacy program should actually be 
a functional literacy program dealing with various aspects of peasant 
life and both practical and technical problems of the farmers. 
Job related subjects such as irrigation, pesticides, animal husbandry 
etc. should be emphasized rather than abstract concepts. For this 
a method of integrating social aspects with technical content 
can be adopted. For instance, suppose the technical content 
involves weeding and the use of a new tool—the push hoe. The 
integrated system of instruction could emphasize the following 
aspects ;^ 
1. Technical topic; the importance of keeping crop free from 
weeds. This could include purpose of weeding, when to 
weed, methods of weeding and improved tools. 
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2. Practical demonstration: The improved tool, in this case 
the push hoe, is demonstrated to the class and the adults 
are given the opportunity to use the hoe and experience 
its superiority over the older types, 
3. Social aspects: could include subjects such as the 
development of tliis specific tool throughout history. 
This can also embrace geographical as well as historical 
elements (i.e.: by showing and discussing how peoples 
of other countries approach similar problems according to 
their environment and natural resources. The important 
aspect is that technical achievements are the result of 
a long and arduous process in which many people have 
contributed. 
In general, concomitant with battling illiteracy and 
enhancing the perspective and vision of the peasantry, adult education 
and extension programs should aim to realize the following objec­
tives; (1) create a framework of attitudes conductive to acceptance 
of new technology and motivate the peasantry to adopt and apply 
modem inputs and recognize the link between these changes and the 
fulfillment of their aspirations; (2) provide the peasantry 
sufficient information concerning the new technology; and (3) train 
the farmers in the areas of efficient management. 
Furthermore, the literacy and adult education programs should 
not only be directed toward the farm families and emphasize 
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agricultural skills. First, adult education programs should also 
be directed toward the nonfarm population who serve the peasants 
locally. Second, adult education programs should also aim to 
train both farm and nonfarm people in skills other than farming in 
order to prepare those who migrate to the urban areas for nonfarra 
types of eirployment, but more importantly, to train skilled manpower 
locally for the promotion of diversification and creation of small 
scale industries (i.e.: processing plants ètc.) in the rural 
areas. 
Creation of vocational schools for both young and adult 
rural population can also train and arm the local peasantry with 
both farrtdng and industrial skills. This will help to increase 
the productivity in food production as well as in other nonfarm 
economic activities. 
Finally, extensive educational programs require training of 
adequate teaching staff who are trained in both teaching methods 
and approach appropriate for the realization of the specific 
educational goals in the rural areas. Hence establishment of rural 
teachers colleges with general rural orientation is essential. 
Rural educational programs could also include the following 
recommendations and experimental projects. 
9 Creation of regional agricultural research center, 
o Creation of agricultural laboratories and experiment 
stations. 
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e Creation of local agricultural and educational radio 
programs. 
e Creation of sample modern farm for each 20^30 villages 
which can be used as a farm workshop for dramatic 
demonstration of new technology and modern inputs. 
e Creation of travelling agricultural teams which would 
visit different villages, set up workshops to demon­
strate new tools, modern inputs and production tech­
niques, and provide short term teaching sessions. 
Health and sanitation 
One of the major problems in the area of health is the 
scarcity of medical staff and facilities as well as its distribution 
in the country. As it was discussed in Chapter 7 the population 
per physicians and dentist in some provinces is as high as 8000 
and 15000 respectively. Therefore, the establishment of additional 
medical schools., hospitals, and health facilities is necessary for 
the improvements in public health and rural welfare. Ways should 
also be found to attract the estimated ten thousand Iranian 
physicians who reside and practice outside of Iran. In addition, 
improvements should be made in distribution of physicians, dentists, 
and health facilities. Presently, the concentration is in the 
central province and a few large cities. The possibility of 
subsidizing medical students, particularly students from rural 
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areas in return for specific years of services in rural areas 
after graduation should be explored. 
Substantial improvements are also required in the following 
areas : 
e Elimination of open sewer systems. 
« Establishment of sanitary and health standards. 
• Creation of rural medical training and first-aid 
schools with the objective of training medics and 
medical personnel. 
e Creation of sanitary water supply. 
e Creation of rural educational health and hygiene 
programs. 
Soil conservation and land development 
As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, the potential arable land 
area in Iran is about 40 million hectares given adequate supply of 
water. Presently, about 16 million hectares are cultivable, but 
under 10 million hectares are actually cultivated. Development and 
expansion of the la:,d area could substantially increase total 
production. In addition, soil conservation programs aimed at 
maintaining soil fertility and preventing the loss of cultivated 
lands are also necessary. 
The following are some additional areas which need improvement 
for the development of agricultural infrastructure; 
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e Crop and animal protection, 
» Disease and pest control. 
« Packaging and grading services. 
It should be noted that the aforementioned structural changes 
require institutional changes. Effective development of the 
infrastructure involves the mobilization of the local masses and 
therefore appropriate formal and informal organizations. One 
central point stressed in this work has been the institutional 
constraints which inçeded the development of agriculture. Distrust 
and dissatisfaction with the Shah's regime was exceptionally high 
and the Shah's created institutions and agencies were looked upon 
as the oppressive arms of the central government to establish its 
authority and rule. In general, the local institutions should 
be reflective of people's aspirations, responsible and responsive 
to their social and economic needs. 
Once again, we must reiterate that the preceding recommenda­
tions and discussions are based on the findings in this work many 
aspects of which were constrained by insufficient data. Meticulous 
research is needed in every field of the Iranian agriculture. 
No comprehensive planning for the rapid development of agriculture 
could be effectively devised and implemented without first fully 
understanding the true nature and scope of the. problems faced by 
the Iranian agricultural sector and carefully examing the range of 
possible remedial strategies and the means by which they could be 
overcome. 
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But one thing is certain, in order to achieve relative self-
sufficiency in this century, the future path of the Iranian agri­
cultural transformation must be a revolutionary path, a course of 
widespread and serious campaign in every front and aspect of 
agriculture. Actually, among the developing nations, Iran is 
perhaps in the best advantageous position to launch an agricultural 
revolution and facilitate the rapid development of the agricultural 
sector. It has the abundance of its various natural resources, 
large amount of oil revenues which remove most financial constrants, 
a relatively small but innovative and ingenious population, all of 
which are supplemented by the recent enthusiasm and fervor for the 
reconstruction of the country and the establishment of a progressive 
modern society. It must be remembered that the oil revenues will 
deplete by the end of the century and if Iran is determined to 
stand on its owa two feet—agriculture and industry—it must 
begin to take the initiative now. 
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FOOTNOTES 
^Charles Bettelheim, Studies in the Theory of Planning (Bombay ; 
Asia Publishing House, 1959), p. 3. 
2 Asbjorn Lovbroek, "State Intervention, Industrial Growth and 
Planning in Iran," (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oslo, 1977), 
pp. 124-25. 
3 I am indepted to my colleague Dr. Haibatollah Baghi for the 
substance of discussion on functional literacy and integrated system 
of instruction. 
225 
SELECT BIBLIOGSAPHY 
Books and Articles 
ftrauzegar, Jahangir. Iran: An Economic Profile. Washington, D.C.: 
Middle East Institute, 1977. 
Amuzegar, J. and Fekrat, M. A. Iran; Economic Development Under 
Dualistic Conditions. Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1971. 
Aresvik, Oddvar. The Agricultural Development of Iran. New York: 
Praeger, 1976. 
Armajani, Yahya. Iran. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1972. 
Askari, Hossein and Cummings, John. "Food Shortages in the Middle 
East." Middle Eastern Studies 14(October 1978): 326-351. 
Avery, Peter. Modern Iran. London: Earnest Benn Ltd., 1965. 
Badii, Yousef. "A Development Program for Iran." Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Cincinnati, 1973. 
Baldwin, George. Planning and Development in Iran. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 
Bank Markazi Iran. Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1963-1977. 
Tehran; Bank Markazi, 1964-1978. 
Bank Markazi Iran. National Income of Iran, 1959-71. Tehran; 
Bank Markazi, 1972. 
Behrangi, Samad. Inquiry Into Educational Problems of Iran. Tehran: 
Bamdad Publication, 1969. 
Berstien, Heniry, ed. Underdevelopment and Development—The Third 
World Today. London: Penguin Books, 1973. 
Bettelheim, Charles. Studies in the Theory of Planning. Bombay : 
Asia Publishing House, 1959. 
Bharier, Julian. Economic Development of Iran, 1900-1970. London: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. 
225 
Bharier, Julian. "The Growth of Towns and Villages in Iran, 1960-66." 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 8(January 1972): 
51-61. 
Bill, James A. "Modernization and Reform from Above; The Case of 
Iran." The Journal of Politics 32(February 1970);19-40. 
Bill, James A. The Politics of Iran—Groups, Classes and Moderniza­
tion. Columbus, Ohio; Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972. 
Blase, Melvin G. and Goodwin, Joseph B. eds. Readings in International 
Agricultural Economic Development. New York ; MSS Educational 
Publishing Co., 1970. 
Bookers Agricultural and Technical Services Ltd. and Hunting 
Technical Services Ltd. National Cropping Plan, Interim 
Report to Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Tehran : 
Bookers and Hunting Services, 1975. 
Center for National Spatial Planning. Rural Geography, Document No. 2 
(Tehran; Plan Organization, 1976). 
CENTO. Conference on National and Regional Agricultural Development 
Policy. Ankara; CENTO, 1968. 
CENTO. Report Conference on Agricultural Extension. Ankara: 
CENTO, 1967. 
CENTO. Report of the CENTO Ad Hoc Working Party on Fertilizers. 
Islamabad: CENTO, 1968. 
CEîîTO. Report on the Second Meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Fertilizers. Ankara; CENTO, 1971. 
CENTO. Travelling Seminar on Farm Tools and Implements. Ankara; 
CENTO, 1968. 
Chenery, Hollis, et ed. Redistribution with Growth. London; 
Oxford University Press, 1974. 
Cline, William R. Potential Effects of Income Redistribution on 
Economic Growth. New York: Praeger, 1973. 
Confederation of Iranian Students—National Union. Research on 
Economic-Political Conditions in Iran. Paris; CIS-NIA, 1978. 
227 
Connell, John. "Economic Changes in an Iranian Village," Middle 
East Journal 28(Summer 1974);309-314. 
Craig, Daniel. "The Impact of Land Reform on an Iranian Village." 
Middle East Journal 32(Spring 1978);141-154. 
Dehbod, A. Landownership and Use in Iran. Tehran: Inaco Ltd., 1971. 
Denman, D. R. The King's Vista—A Land Reform Which has Changed the 
Face of Persia. London; Geographical Publications, Ltd., 1973. 
Domone, Rene. Few Observations Concerning the Situation of the 
Iranian Agriculture. Persian Translation. Tehran: n.p., 1976. 
FAO. FAQ Trade Yearbook, 1972-1977. Rome: FAO, 1973-78. 
FAO. Iran Country Development Brief Food and Agriculture Sector. 
Rome: FAO, 1974. 
FAO. Land Reform, Land Settlement and Cooperation. Rome: FAO, 1972. 
FAO. Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics. 
Rome: FAO, 1977—. 
FAO. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. Rome: FAO, 1976—. 
FAO. Perspective Study of Agricultural Development for Iran. 
Rome: FAO, 1974. 
FAO. Production Yearbook, 1960-76. Rome: FAO, 1961-77. 
FAO. Report to Government of Iran. Soil Fertility Survey and 
Establishment of Soil Fertility Unit. 3 volumes. Rome: FAO, 
1966. 
FAO. Report to the Government of Iran: Agricultural Marketing 
Report No. 2897. Rome: FAO, 1970. 
FAO. Report to the Government of Iran. Assistance in tiie Planning 
and Design of Irrigation and Water Development Projects. 
Rome: FAO, 1970. 
Feder, Ernest. "Land Reform Under the Alliance for Progress." 
Journal of Farm Economics 47(August 1965):652-668. 
Fei, John C. H. and Ranis, Gustov. Development of the Labor Surplus 
Economy : Theory and Policy. Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1964. 
228 
Field, Michael. "Agro-business and Agricultural Planning in Iriin." 
World Crops 24(March-April 1972):68-72. 
Freivalds, John. "Farm Corporations in Iran. An Alternative to 
Traditional Agriculture." Middle East Journal 27(Spring 1972); 
185-194. 
Gerschemkron, Alexander. Economic Development in Historical Per­
spective . Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1962. 
Girvan, Norman. "The Development of Dependency Economies in the 
Carribean and Latin America." Social and Economic Studies 
22(March 1973):1-33. 
Gittinger, J. P. Planning for Agricultural Development—The Iranian 
Experience. Planning Experience Series No. 2. Washington, D. C. : 
Center for Development Planning, 1965. 
Griffen, Keith. The Political Economy of Agrarian Change : An 
Essay on Green Revolution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1974. 
Guerrero, Amado. Philippine Society and Revolution. Kong Kong; 
Ta Kung Pao Publishers, 1971. 
Hakimi, A. H.; Nahrier, H.; and Eghbal, K. Farm Mechanization in 
Iran. Study no. 8. Reading; University of Reading, 1969. 
Hammeed, Kamal and Bennett, Margaret. "Iran's Future Economy." 
Middle East Journal 29(Summer 1975):418-432. 
Hayami, Yujiro and Rutton, Vernon W. Agricultural Development; 
An International Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1971. 
Hayden, L. J. "Living Standards in Rural Iran." Middle East Journal 
3(1949):140-150. 
Heady, Earl 0. Agricultural Policy Under Economic Development. 
Ames: Iowa State University, 1962. 
Heady, Earl 0. "Process and Priorities in Agricultural Development." 
In Economic Development of Tropical Agriculture, pp. 59-77. 
Edited by W. W. McPherson. Gainesville, Florida; University of 
Florida Press, 1968. 
Helfgoth, R. B. and Schiavo-Campo, S. "An Introduction to Develop­
ment Planning." UNIDO, Industrialization and Productivity 
Bulletin. New York: United Nations, 1970. 
229 
Hill, F. F. and Mosher, Arthur T. "Organizing for Agricultural 
Development." U.S. Papers Prepared for United Nations Conference 
on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of 
the Less Developed Areas. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1962. 
Hoselitz, Bert F., ed. Theories of Economic Growth. Glencoe, 
Illinois: Free Press, 1950. 
Hubbs, John A. "Land Reform in Iran: A Revolution frm Above." 
Orbis 7(Fall 1963):617-630. 
Hung, Hua. "New Development in Sino-Iranian Friendly Relations." 
Pekin Review 36(September 8, 1978):5-9. 
Hung, Hua. "The International Situation and China's Foreign Policy." 
Pekin Review 40(October 6, 1978):12-17. 
ILO. Employment and Income Policies for Iran. Geneva: ILO, 1973. 
Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, 1965-76. Tehran: Echo of Iran, 
1965-76. 
IRAUST. Kermanshahan Agriculture and Livestock Development Project. 
Final Report to Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 
Tehran: IRAUST, 1974. 
Jacqz, Jane W., ed. Iran: Past, Present and Future. New York: 
The Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976. 
Johnson, V. W. "Agriculture in the Economic Development of Iran." 
land Economics 36(November 1960):313-321, 
Johnston, Bruce F. and Kilby, P. Agriculture and Structural 
Transformation. London: Oxford University Press, 1975. 
Johnston, Bruce F. and Mellor, J. W. "The Role of Agriculture in 
Economic Development." American Economic Review 51(September 
1961);566-593. 
Jorgenson, Dale ». "The Development of Dual Economy." Economic 
Journal 71(June 1961):309-334. 
Keddi, Nikki R. "Stratification, Social Control and Capitalism in 
Iranian Villages; Before and After Land Reform." In Rural 
Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, pp. 364-402. 
Edited by Richard Antoun and Illiya Harik. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1972. 
230 
Keddi, N. R. "The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 1800-1959; 
An Overview." The International Journal of Middle East Studies 
2{January 1971):3-20. 
Keddie, N. R. "The Iranian Village Before and After Land Reform." 
Journal of Conteanporary History 3 (July 1968) : 69-91. 
Khamsi, Farhad. "Land Reform in Iran." Monthly Review 21(June 1969); 
20-29. 
Khosravi, Khosro. Research on Rural Society of Iran. Tehran; 
Payam Publishers, 1976. 
Khosravi, Khosro. Sociology of Rural Iran. Tehran; Tehran 
University, Institute of Social Study and Research, 1972. 
Kristianson, B. H. "The Agrarian Based Economic Development of 
Iran." Land Economics 36(June 1960);1-13. 
Kurtzig, Michael. "Iran's Imports of U.S. Farm Products Soar in 
Fiscal '75." Foreign Agriculture 13(October 1975);2-4. 
Kurtzig, Michael. "U.S. Farm Exports to Iran Rebound." Foreign 
Agriculture 15(October 1977):2-4. 
Kuznets, Simon. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality." American 
Economic Review 45(March 1955):l-28. 
Kuznetsona, N. A., ed. Iran; Sobornik Statey (Iran; A Collection 
of Articles). Moscow: Nauka Press, 1971. 
Lambton, A. K. S, Landlord and Peasant in Persia. London; Oxford 
University Press, 1969. 
Lambton, A. K. S. The Persian Land Reform, 1962-66. London; 
Oxford University Press, 1969. 
LeBaron, Allen. "Projecting Iranian Agricultural Demand and Supply." 
Iranicua Journal of Agricultural Research 2(October 1973):1-10. 
LeBaron, Allen; Malsk M. Mohtadi; and Beutlsr, Ivan F^ Long Term 
Projections of Supply and Demand for Selected Agricultural 
Products in Iran. Logan, Utah; State Univ. Press, 1970. 
Lenin, V. I. The Development of Capitalism in Russia. London; 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1957. 
Lenin, V. I. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. New 
York; International PulDlishers, 1939. 
231 
Leys, Colin. "Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes." 
Journal of Contemporary Asia 7(March 1977):80-102. 
Looney, Robert E. Income Distribution Policies in Semi-industrialized 
Countries. New York: Praeger, 1975. 
Looney, Robert E. A Development Strategy for Iran Through the 1980s. 
New York: Praeger, 1977. 
Looney, Robert E. Iran at the End of the Century. Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1977. 
Lopes, Francisco Lafaiete de Padua. Inequality and Growth; A 
Programming Model with Application to Brazil. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Center for International Affairs, Harvard 
University, 1973. 
Lovbroek, Asbjorn. "State Interventionism, Industrial Growth and 
Planning in Iran." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oslo, 
1977. 
Mandelbaum, K. The Industrialization of Backward Areas. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1947. 
Marty, Alvin L. "Professor Jorgenson's Model of Dual Economy." 
Indian Economic Journal 12(April-June 1965):437-441, 
McPherson, W. W., ed. Economic Development of Tropical Agriculture. 
Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1968. 
Mehran, Farhad. Income Distribution in Iran: The Statistics of 
Inev^ualxty. Geneva: International Labour Office, World 
Employment Programme Research Working Papers, 1975. 
Mellor, J. W. "Increasing Agricultural Production in Early Stages 
of Economic Development: Relationships, Problems and Prospects." 
Indian. Journal of Agricultural Economics 17(April-June 1962): 
29-467 
Miliband, Ralph. The State in Capitalist Society. London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson- 1969. 
Miller, William. "Hosseinabad: A Persian Village." Middle East 
Journal 18(Autumn 1964):483-498. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Preliminary Agricul­
tural Survey, 1970-76. Tehran: Ministry of Agriculture, 
1971-77. 
232 
Moheet, Ali. "Principle Methods of Mechanization of Agriculture 
in Iran." Tehran Economist 1244(May 6, 1978):26-27. 
Myrdal, Gunnar. Asia Druma; An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. 
New York; Pantheon Books, 1968. 
Nair, Kusum. Blossoms in Dust. New York; Praeger, 1962. 
Nirumand, Bahman. The New Imperialism in Action. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1969. 
Nowshirvani, Vahid F. and Knight, Alice. The Beginning of Commercial 
Agriculture in Iran. New Haven, Connecticut: Economic Growth 
Center, Yale University, 1975. 
Nurkse, Ragnar. Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped 
Countries. New York; Oxford University Press, 1953. 
Olson, Raymond W. Dryland Wheat Production and Research in Iran, 
Final Report to Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 
Tehran: Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 1968. 
Oshima, H. T. "The Ranis-Fei Model of Economic Development; 
Comment." American Economic Review 53(June 1963);448-452. 
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. The White Revolution of Iran. Tehran: 
Imperial Pahlavi Library, 1967. 
Perkins, Maurice and Witt, Lawrence. "Capital Formation: Past and 
Present." Journal of Farm Economics 43(May 1961);333-343. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. Fou^rth National Development 
Plan, 1968-1972. Tehran: Plan Organization, 1968. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. Income Distribution Proj ections 
for Iran. Tehran; Plan Organization, 1974. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. Iran's Fifth National Develop­
ment Plan (1973-78, Revised). Tehran: Plan Organization, 1975. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Planning in Iran= Tehran; 
Plan Organization, 1970. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Planometrics and General 
Economy Bureau. A Twenty Year Macro-economic Perspectives for 
Iran, 1972-1992. Tehran: Plan Organization, 1974. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, Planometrics and General 
Economy Bureau. Quarterly Economic Statistics for Iran. Tehran: 
Plan Organization, 1975. 
233 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. Selected Statistics, 1972. 
Tehran: Plan Organization, 1973. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. Statistical Results for 
Agriculture, 1974. Tehran; Plan Organization, 1976. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 
1968-77. Tehran; Plan Organization, 1969-78. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. Summary of the Fifth National 
Development Plan, 1973-1978. Tehran ; Plan Organization, 1973. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. Survey of Rural Household 
Budget. 1970-76. Tehran; Plan Organization, 1971-78. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. Survey of Rural Household 
Expenditure, 1968-1976. Tehran: Plan Organization, 1969-1978. 
Plan and Budget Organization of Iran. Third Development Plan 
1962-67—Final Report. Tehran: Plan Organization, 1970. 
Piatt, Kenneth. Land Reform in Iran. Washington, D. C. ; USAID, 1970. 
Price, 0. T. W. Toward ^ Comprehensive Iranian Agricultural Policy. 
Tehran: IBRD, Agricultural and Rural Development Advisory 
Mission, 1975. 
Rezazadeh, Farhad. "Legitimacy in Transitional Societies: Case 
Study of Iranian Politics." Master's Thesis, Iowa State 
University, 1974. 
Bezazadeh-Shafag; S= "Economic Review; The Iranian Seven Year 
Development Plan." Middle East Journal 4(Winter 1950);100-102. 
Robinson, Aubrey C. "Iran Emerging as Top Cash Customer for U.S. 
Farm Products in Middle East." Foreign Agriculture 16(December 
1978):6-10. 
Rosenstein-Rodan, P. N. "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe." Economic Journal 53(March 1943);202-211. 
Rostow, W. W. The Stages of Economic Growth—A Non-Communist 
Manifesto. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1960. 
Rostow, W. W. "Take-off Into Self-Sustained Growth." Economic 
Journal 66(March 1956):25-48. 
234 
Ruttan, Vernon W. "Growth Stage Theories, Dual Economy Models and 
Agricultural Development Policy." In Readings in International 
Agricultural Economic Development, pp. 6-32. Edited by Melvin G. 
Blase and Joseph B. Goodwin. New York: MSS Educational Publishing 
Co., 1970. 
Safinezhad, Javad. Boneh. Tehran; Tuss Publication, 1974. 
Safinezhad, Javad. Bonehs' Documents. Tehran: Tehran University, 
Institute of Social Research and Study, 1977. 
Safinezhad, Javad. Socio-Economic Study of the Nivan Nargolpayegon 
Farm Corporation. Tehran: Tehran University, Institute of 
Social Research and Study, 1971. 
Safinezhad, Javad; Keshavarz, H. ; and Hajebi, Vida. Socio-Economic 
Study of Reza Pahlavi Farm Corporation. Tehran : Tehran 
University, Institute of Social Research and Study, 1971. 
Santus, Theotonio dos. "The Crisis of Development Theory and the 
Problem of Dependence in Latin America." In Underdevelopment and 
Development—The Third World Today, pp. 62-80. Edited by Henry 
Berstien. London: Penguin Books, 1973. 
Sazeman Cherik-haye Fadayee Khalgh. Evaluation of Farm Cooperatives, n.p.: 
Cherik-haye Fadaye Ktialgh, Farm Research Series, 1973. 
Sazeman Cherik-haye Fedayee Khalgh. Study of Economic Structure of 
Rural Kerman. n.p.: Cherik-haye Fedayee Khalgh, Farm Research 
Series, 1974. 
Sazeman Cherik-haye Fedayee Khalgh, Study of Farm Corporations» 
n.p.: Cherik-haye Fedayee Khalgh, 1973. 
Sazeman Mojahedin Khalgh. Report on Aryamehr Agricultural Cooperative, 
n.p. : Sazeman Mojahedin Khalgh, 1974. 
Sazeman Mojahedin Khalgh. White Revolution and the Rural Conditions 
in Iran, n.p.: Sazeman Mojahedin Khalgh, 1972. 
Schultz, Theodore W. Transforming Traditional Agriculture. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. History of Economic Analysis. New York : 
Oxford University Press, 1954. 
Sergisian, George. "The Price of One Kilogram of Wheat Should Not 
be Below 15 Rials." Tehran Economist 1203(July 16, 1977);29, 50. 
235 
Society of University Faculty and Thinkers on the Revolution of the 
Shah and People. Report of the Political and Ideological 
Committee. Tehran; The Society, 1973. 
Soil Institute of Iran. Fertilizer Response of Mexican and Local 
Wheat in Iran. Tehran: Soil Institute, 1969. 
Southworth, Herman N. and Johnston, Bruce F., eds. Agricultural 
Development and Economic Growth. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1957. 
Statistical Center of Iran, Survey of Human Power, 1972. Tehran: 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 1972. 
Stickley, Thomas and Hosseini, Ebrahim. Small Farmer Credit in Iran. 
Beirut; American University, 1972. 
Thorbecke, Erik. "The Employment Problem: A Critical Evaluation of 
Four ILO Comprehensive Country Reports." International Labor 
Review 107(May 1973): 393-423. 
Treakle, Charles. "Iran's Approach; Import Commodities Plus Skills." 
Foreign Agriculture 13(May 1975);3-6. 
UNESCO. Statistical Yearbook, 1970-1976. Paris; UNESCO, 1971-77. 
United Nations. Statistical Yearbook, 1960-76. New York; U.N., 
1961-77. 
United Nations. Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1976. 
New York: U.N., 1977. 
U. S. Government. U. £, Papers Prepared for United Nations Conference 
on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit 
of the Less Developed Areas. Washington, D. C.; U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1962. 
U. S. Department of Agriculture. "Agricultural Situation in Africa 
and West Asia." Foreign Agricultural Report No. 108. 
Washington, D.C.: USDA, 1975. 
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Iran 
Agricultural Production and Trade. Washington, D. C.; USDA, 
1974. 
Vakil, Firouz. "Iran's Basic Macroeconomic Problems; A Twenty-Year 
Horizon." Journal of Economic Development and Cultural Change 
25(July 1977);713-729. 
235 
Yaghmaei, AbdulIkarim H. Jagdagh: A Traditional Village on the 
Fringe of Desert. Tehran; TTIss Publication, 1974. 
Yar--Shater, Ehsan, ed. Iran Faces Seventies. New York: Praeger, 
1971. 
Zahedani, Abdolhossain. "Iran; Evaulation of Agriculutral Development 
Strategy." Ph.D. dissertation. University of California at 
Davis, 1974. 
Zonis, Marvin. The Political Elite of Iran. Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1971. 
Persian Newspapers and Periodicals 
Ayandegan, 1978—. 
Azadi, 1979—. 
Bakhtar Amruz, 1970-1974. 
Communist, 1970—. 
Daneshjoo, 1970-1975. 
Donya, 1965—. 
Etella'at, 1960-1978. 
Iran Report, 1970-1975. 
Kayhan, 1960-1978. 
Kayhan International, 1972—. 
Kar, 1979--. 
Maktab Mobarez, 1967—. 
Maiahed, 1974-1976. 
Nabard Khalgh, 1974-78. 
Paygham Amruz, 1979—. 
Payam Khalgh, 1979—. 
Rastakhiz, 1975-1978. 
Razane Daneshioo, 1975-1978. 
Resistance. 1975-1978. 
Setareh Sorkh, 1970-1978. 
Shajtizdah Azar, 1965-1979. 
Tehran Economist. 1974-1978. 
Tofan, 1972-1978. 
Vajin, 1979—. 
238 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Many individuals and organizations have contributed to the 
realization of this dissertation. 
First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr, Earl 0. Heady, 
distinguished Professor of Economics and my academic advisor, for 
his valuable guidance and advice during the writing of this thesis 
It has been a privilege to complete this work under his directions 
and supervision and draw on his abundant treasure of knowledge 
and erudition. 
I am also indepted to two prominent underground Iranian 
organizations, Sazeman Cherik-haie Fedayee Khalgh and Sazeman 
Mojahedin-e Khalgh for their voluminous research and inquiry 
concerning the economic conditions in Iran some of which I have 
extensively relied upon, especially for the discussion and 
evaluation of farm organizations. 
Special thanks are also due to Mr. Rahnama in the Plan Qrgani 
tionj Mr. M. Mostofi in Statistical Center of Iran; Ms. S. Raffee, 
for providing me with up-to-date data and information from the 
Ministry of Agriculture; Iranian Students Association at ISU for 
allowing me to freely use their library and providing me witli the 
back issues of Tehran Economist and Rastakhiz; Dr. H. Baghi for 
his valuable assistance and advice on the questions regarding 
rural education; and several other Iranians who wish to remain 
239 
anonymous but have assisted me in either securing information or 
enriching my knowledge and understanding of the irural problems. 
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Virginia, for her 
patience and understanding throughout the writing of this thesis; 
and my newly born son, Arani, who enriched our lives in the midst 
of this study and saw little of his father, but has nevertheless 
expressed the desire to share the responsibility for all the 
shortcomings and errors present in this work. 
